India is not a Future Proliferator

In December 2006, the “Henry Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act” was passed with strong bipartisan support consistent with the sense of the US Congress that it is in the interest of the US and the non-proliferation regime to negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. The Act stated that India has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. It specified that civil nuclear cooperation with India would provide greater political and material support to the achievement of US global and regional nonproliferation objectives of dissuading, isolating, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups seeking nuclear weapons capability or other WMD capability and their delivery means. Five years later, in July 2013, a ISIS report has clubbed India with a list of several countries posing concerns of illicit nuclear trade consumers in future. The issue needs to be delved into closely.

The report claims that along with several other countries, India has been a benefactor of the AQ Khan network. It alleges that Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and likely India “still depend on illicitly obtaining goods” like vacuum pumps, vacuum measuring equipment, high strength aluminum, ring magnets, etc ((p.37).  Arguably several of these items mentioned have dual use utilities except for a few. Besides, there is no clinching evidence whereby it can be claimed that India in particular has illicitly procured any sensitive equipment/materials and thereafter utilized it for nuclear activity clandestinely. Likewise, the assertions that India has been an important benefactor of the AQ Khan network and is presently reliant on illicit nuclear network for procurement of sensitive nuclear materials lack considerable credibility.

The ISIS report claims that “states such as India …… may resist reforms in trade control systems and rigorous enforcement of trade control laws” (p.55). This is contestable. India is cognizant of the challenges posed by proliferation of WMD and their delivery means to its national security and the international order. The danger of terrorists gaining access to WMDs has aggravated the threat of nuclear terrorism globally. Based on these considerations, India recognizes the importance of export controls not only for its own national security but also for the international order. In consistence with these necessities, India has committed to cooperate with the international community to promote and advance the goals of non-proliferation and international security. As a responsible nuclear power possessing advanced and sensitive nuclear technology and materials, India recognizes the critical importance of conscientious handling of its nuclear materials and technology right from its production stage to usage and its safe and secured disposition. Towards that end, India has joined the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) both of which are directed towards the protection of nuclear facilities and safeguards. In November 2004, India submitted its first report on measures taken to implement the obligations set by UNSCR 1540. Following September, India played an exemplary role by promulgating an ordinance to amend the “Unlawful Activities Prevention Act” of 1967, which enhanced punishment for any “unauthorized possession of any bomb, dynamite, or hazardous explosive substance capable of mass destruction or biological or chemical substance of warfare.” Thereafter, India demonstrated consistent adherence to the UNSCR 1540 resolutions by further submitting two more reports to the Security Council.

As a responsible nuclear capable state, India refrains from any illicit nuclear activity involving aiding and abetting terrorists. Its intentions can be discerned from its Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act of 2005 (WMD Act) which criminalizes any transfer of WMD, missiles specially designed for their delivery, and WMD-usable materials, equipment and technologies; or to transfer fissile or radioactive material for use in terrorist acts (Sections 8 & 9). In 2010, the Indian Parliament passed the Foreign Trade Act which has broadened the domain of dual-use controls. Earlier in 2013, India’s efforts to further tightening its export controls was made evident by announcing that India’s national Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list has been updated to be on par with the existing NSG and MTCR lists and are expected to be “more stringent than those practiced by the NSG and MTCR.”

There is a general belief among a section of non-proliferation advocates that the India-US civil nuclear deal has the potential to increase India’s nuclear weapons inventory. But that is only side of the picture. The civil nuclear deal was by nature a detailed and complex agreement and its completion entailed several intricate measures with wide-ranging implications. Undoubtedly, because of the difficulties involved the deal is subject to numerous interpretations. Despite so, it can be stated quite authoritatively that if at all, India was believed to be a potential proliferator, the Bush administration would not have invested its political capital in facilitating the civil nuclear initiative. The Indo-US nuclear deal was a way of India’s reassurance to the international community that India is a responsible nuclear nation that can further strengthen the nonproliferation regime. As voluntary steps to its civil nuclear initiative, India has placed 12 out of 14 reactors under IAEA Safeguards; refrained from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not possess them; declared unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing committed to work towards FMCT negotiations. These measures not only strengthen the non-proliferation regime but constituted important CBMs in reassuring our neighbours particularly Pakistan that India does not seek to engage in any arms race.

Arguably, India is a non-NPT member and can be declared a potential terrorist state. But that is not strategically feasible because India poses no proliferation concerns. India’s responsible nuclear record must be upheld by the international community as an exemplar that a clean non-proliferation record is the only way to make our neighbours and the rest of the world feel safe.

Posted in , India, Nonproliferation, NPT, Nuclear, Nuclear Security, Nuclear Weapons

Reshmi Kazi

Reshmi Kazi

Dr Reshmi Kazi is Associate Fellow in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, specializing on nuclear testing, nuclear terrorism and radiological terrorism in India, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament issues.. Her doctoral thesis is on ‘Evolution of India’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Study of Political, Economic and Technological Dimensions.’ Presently she is finishing her monograph Nuclear Terrorism: The Grand New Terror of the 21st Century.

Read more




5 thoughts on “India is not a Future Proliferator

  1. Reshmi, the assertions in the article regarding “India is not a future proliferator” are appreciated. But, one cannot ignore the fact that India was a nuclear proliferator — introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia first. As you talk about India’s legislative and institutional response to proliferation challenges, in the same vein, one can argue that Pakistan has done much better in this regard as well — a fact that even many Indian scholars agree.
    My point is: would it be better to leave propagating, advocating and defending nuclear policies of India and Pakistan to the government officials of the respective countries? Would it be better for researchers and scholars to present some independent unbiased thoughts? Would it be better to suggest some common grounds to evolve a cooperative framework that can strengthen strategic stability between India and Pakistan? Sorry to say, I’ve found your blog posts showing only one side of the picture giving me a feeling that these are the words of a government spokesperson.
    Cheers!

  2. Dear Sadiq,

    I understand and truly appreciate your suggestions for . But I would request you to clarify by what you mean as a nuclear proliferator. In that case, every country that assumed nuclear capability is a proliferator including the P5 countries and Pakistan as well. There is no big deal in who did it first. But all said and done, your suggestion to “evolve a cooperative framework that can strengthen strategic stability between India and Pakistan” is truly appreciated.

  3. I believe Mr. Sadiq you are a govt. employee too and if you have difference of opinion with what your govt does then express it behind the closed doors.

  4. Reshmi, I was referring to horizontal proliferation. Yes, in that sense all nuclear weapon states can be labelled as proliferators. Thanks for understanding what I suggested.

    Sohaib, I am a government servant but not a government official. Being an academician its my professional duty to present my perspective on different issues faced by the human society. Propose some viable solutions to the problems for the collective betterment and prosperity of human being. To seek an understanding of the social construction of the reality and then interpret that reality without any biasness — may that reality be a local, regional or global phenomenon. Anyways, thanks for your suggestion.

  5. India has the capability to manufacture each and every item required by the Nuclear Industry, though I agree no single Company may have the capacity or capability to supply on a turnkey basis. I know at least one Company that can supply most including Vacuum pumps, Pressure Vessels, Reactors, Valves, Piping etc — am not talking of regular metals but exotic metals that can handle temperature, pressure, corrosion etc.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *