Ten years after the 26/11 attacks stunned Mumbai and nearly led to a military confrontation between India and Pakistan, the nuclear-armed rivals continue to update and transform their conventional and nuclear military doctrines, postures, and strategies. The past few years, in particular, have seen a range of developments, including speculation that India’s no-first use doctrine may be changing, India’s use of “surgical strikes” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, a ten-year high in ceasefire violations along the Line of Control, the testing of missiles such as Pakistan’s Nasr and India’s Agni-V, and increasingly aggressive rhetoric from both Indian and Pakistani policymakers and militarily officials. In light of these developments, SAV contributors Joy Mitra, Ali Ahmed, Maimuna Ashraf, and Sannia Abdullah reevaluate whether India and Pakistan are exhibiting strategic direction or drift.
India’s official nuclear doctrine has remained unchanged since its adoption in 2003. Some may take this apparent continuity as evidence of India’s intentional strategic direction. […]
Twenty years ago, the government of Pakistan decided to respond in kind to India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. Pakistan conducted six nuclear explosions to […]
Before the overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, three major wars between India and Pakistan highlighted the latter’s struggle to bridge the conventional imbalance. […]
India’s military threat landscape today consists of territorial and resource-related disputes with Pakistan in its west and northwest and with China in the east and […]