On April 8, 2025, the Myanmar military government—also called the Tatmadaw—reaffirmed its plans to hold multi-party elections by the second half of December this year and the first half of January next year. Parties have been asked to file their registration applications by May 9.
Despite this announcement, Myanmar is still far from democratization. Since nullifying the 2020 general election result through a military coup in February 2021, the junta’s State Administrative Council (SAC) has promised to hold elections on multiple occasions to appease international actors who continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Myanmar. This promise was also reiterated during bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the recently held 2025 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit. But simultaneously, the junta has taken several steps to silence political opposition groups in the country or disqualify them from the polls. If Myanmar holds elections under its existing laws and regulatory framework, they are unlikely to be free or fair and will only risk breeding further resentment. In that regard, while Myanmar’s neighbors and strategic partners may look upon the elections as a means to swiftly bring stability to the country, they must ensure that they don’t end up endorsing a flawed electoral process and thereby bestow the junta with undeserved legitimacy.
Stated Intent to Hold Free and Fair Elections
Myanmar is constitutionally required to hold elections six months after a state of emergency is lifted. Following the 2021 coup, the military junta has ruled under a state of emergency, which has been repeatedly extended in response to the ongoing civil war. The latest extension of emergency rule came in January 2025 and is set to expire in July. Under the 2008 Constitution, once emergency rule comes to an end, power should return to the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) and an election should follow.
Formed in 2011, the NDSC was intended to oversee national security, marking a transition from military rule to a quasi-civilian government. According to Article 201 of the 2008 Constitution, the council consists of 11 members—six military or military-nominated officials and five civilian ones—thereby effectively giving the military control over it. After the coup, Vice President Myint Swe—a former army officer and member of the main pro-military party—served as its chair by virtue of becoming acting president of Myanmar. However, in July 2024, Myanmar’s army chief and the chairman of the junta’s SAC, Min Aung Hlaing, assumed that role, giving him the authority to extend the emergency period further and amend the law according to his will.
If Myanmar holds elections under its existing laws and regulatory framework, they are unlikely to be free or fair and will only risk breeding further resentment.
Against this backdrop of consolidated military authority, the junta’s decision to hold elections, instead of further extending emergency rule, appears to be driven by strategic factors. Given the military’s setbacks and challenges on the battlefield, a further six months of emergency rule could intensify international criticism and potentially unite the resistance forces. The regime hopes that it can present the elections as a step towards democratic transition and thereby soften international pressure and criticism. To this end, Min Aung Hlaing has promised “free and fair elections” in discussions with foreign leaders. Additionally, the junta hopes to use the elections to exploit internal differences among rebel forces by encouraging smaller ethnic parties to participate.
An Unfair Playing Field
In his New Year message, Min Aung Hlaing called on citizens to support the junta’s planned elections, framing them as part of the country’s transition to a multiparty democratic system. The SAC has announced plans to replace traditional paper ballot boxes with electoral voting machines. Additionally, Min Aung Hlaing has promised to introduce a proportional representation system in national and sub-national parliaments, ostensibly to include representatives of ethnic groups and various strata of society.
Despite these promises, recent moves by the Tatmadaw have undercut the prospect of a free and fair election. The military government has reformed the Political Parties Registration Law to disqualify many parties from participating in the polls. For instance, in January 2023, the military government introduced new amendments, requiring parties contesting the national election to secure 100 million kyats (around USD $45,000) in funding within three months of registration and have at least 100,000 members—100 times higher than the level set during the 2020 elections. These restrictions will disqualify the Tatmadaw’s rival political parties and regional ethnic parties that have limited resources. Myanmar’s electoral body, the Union Election Commission (UEC) has already dissolved 40 out of the 90 parties which contested the 2020 elections—including the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won those elections—for either failing to meet these requirements or refusing to register under the new law. Numerous ethnic political parties such as the Arakan National Party and the Democracy and Human Rights Party were also banned under sections of the new law. On the other hand, many of the 63 parties that have registered under the new law and have been permitted to participate in the upcoming elections have ties to the Tatmadaw. Together, these actions reveal the extent to which democratic principles have been eroded in Myanmar since the coup.
The new legal restrictions have gone hand-in-hand with the logistical difficulties presented by holding elections in a war-torn country. As a preliminary step for holding elections, the junta conducted a nationwide census last year. But since the Tatmadaw controls less than 50 percent of Myanmar’s territory, the census covered only 145 out of 330 townships across the country. In territories controlled by resistance forces, civilians refused to cooperate with electoral authorities. In order to get around these challenges, Min Aung Hlaing has promised to start holding elections in areas controlled by the military.
Neighbors Should Deprive the Junta of Legitimacy
Despite the constrained space for opposition parties and their limited participation in the planned polls, the election may still proceed. Myanmar has had a history of holding polls even without the participation of opposition parties—most recently in 2010. This stems from the junta’s desire to counter international criticism and acquire legitimacy for its rule through electoral validation. Myanmar’s neighbors—especially India, China, and Thailand—have been urging the junta to resolve the political crisis that followed the 2021 coup. This call has only grown more urgent following Operation 1027—the rebel counteroffensive launched in October 2023 which intensified cross-border instability. The junta has now presented the planned elections as a path to a political settlement.
When the junta first proposed elections as a path forward—partly to preserve its existing diplomatic engagement—neighboring countries expressed varying degrees of support, each guided by their own strategic interests. China has offered support for an “all-inclusive election”, seeing the military as the main guarantor of stability and as the protector of its economic stakes in Myanmar. India has adhered to its policy of non-interference and emphasized the need for a “Myanmar-owned” and “Myanmar-led” democratic transition. Thailand has aligned itself with the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and accordingly stressed the importance of including all domestic stakeholders. In the case of Bangladesh, the interim government has not made any official statement supporting or opposing the junta’s election plan. Crucially, all neighbors view the situation as an internal issue in Myanmar, and while they encourage the junta to develop a solution, they remain reluctant to intervene directly.
All stakeholders—especially Myanmar’s neighbors—must be cautious in offering any form of support for the planned elections. An unfair and restricted election would only bring more chaos and breed further resentment among the people of Myanmar.
This hands-off approach may not serve the purpose of a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the crisis in Myanmar. At a time when the Tatmadaw is struggling to reclaim territory which it has lost to rebel forces, the recent embrace of the SAC chairman in the official BIMSTEC Summit risks sending the wrong message. All stakeholders—especially Myanmar’s neighbors—must be cautious in offering any form of support for the planned elections. An unfair and restricted election would only bring more chaos and breed further resentment among the people of Myanmar.
So far, the junta has failed to assure the population that it is committed to a genuine reconciliation process. For instance, the military launched deadly airstrikes only a few days after a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake hit the country. Under the circumstances, global actors who are still engaging diplomatically with the junta—in particular, neighbors such as India, China, Thailand, and Bangladesh—should acknowledge the junta’s lack of legitimacy and focus on the nature and modus operandi of the elections rather than the existence of the elections themselves.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
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Image 1: USDP in 2020 via Wikimedia Commons
Image 2: Min Aung Hlaing via Getty
