One year ago, on August 5, 2024, Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power and forced to flee to India. Once dubbed “Asia’s iron lady” for her blend of development-driven nationalism, authoritarian governance, and unrivaled dominance over Bangladeshi politics, Hasina was brought down by a mass uprising that fueled hope of a more stable democratic future.
Yet, a year on, Bangladesh now finds itself navigating a complex landscape marked by surging crime, deepening political divides, rising religious intolerance, and contested leadership. While the interim government led by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus has promised and pursued a comprehensive reform agenda, it has struggled to build public trust and credibility toward next year’s planned elections. The success of Bangladesh’s democratic aspirations is likely to hinge on Yunus’ ability to unite a politically fractured nation and rebuild its economy in a tenuous international environment.
An Uprising Against Misgovernance
The August Uprising began as a student-led protest demanding reforms to the government job quota system. This peaceful demonstration soon escalated into a nationwide movement and drew people from all walks of life into the streets. The Hasina-led Bangladesh Awami League (AL) government deployed law enforcement agencies—including police, Border Guard Bangladesh, Rapid Action Battalion, and eventually, the Bangladesh Army—to suppress the protests. But the crackdown only intensified public outrage, and the rising death toll induced the protestors to soon demand Hasina’s resignation.
The August uprising was motivated by what many protestors perceived to be Hasina’s longstanding authoritarian and kleptocratic rule. Over her tenure, Bangladesh experienced three deeply flawed parliamentary elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024—two of which were boycotted by major opposition parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). At least 600 enforced disappearances occurred during this period, alongside widespread extrajudicial killings and the systematic harassment of dissenters under laws such as the Digital Security Act of 2018.
Although Bangladesh saw some infrastructure development—such as a few mega projects and an improved road and transport system—these gains were overshadowed by serious allegations of corruption. Most of the large-scale projects were funded through foreign loans, significantly increasing the country’s economic vulnerability. Meanwhile, inflation hovered around 10 percent.
When Yunus assumed leadership of Bangladesh’s interim government under these circumstances, he faced several challenges. His key priorities included delivering justice for crimes committed under the previous regime, implementing major reforms of Bangladesh’s electoral, judicial, and administrative processes, and preparing the country for a free and fair election.
The success of Bangladesh’s democratic aspirations is likely to hinge on Yunus’ ability to unite a politically fractured nation and rebuild its economy in a tenuous international environment.
Breakdown of Law and Order
The biggest challenge that faces the interim government is maintaining law and order. Since the fall of the previous regime, incidents of mob justice, theft, robbery, rape, and murder have surged significantly across the country. In January of 2025 alone, 294 murder cases were filed—up sharply from 231 cases last January. This number further grew by June to 344. Robberies and abduction cases have also similarly increased.
To tackle the growing threat, the government launched Operation Devil Hunt earlier this year—a joint force crackdown involving the Bangladesh Army. Over 10,000 people were arrested in a few weeks between February and March. However, the crime rate remains stubbornly high.
On the other hand, fears have also abounded among Bangladesh’s Hindu minority. According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, that despite the best, publicly stated, intentions of the interim government, the state of religious freedom in Bangladesh has deteriorated due to continued attacks on religious minorities. Most recently, on July 27, 14 homes belonging to Hindu residents in Rangpur were vandalized and looted following allegations of blasphemy against Islam.
Overall, although freedom of expression has improved in some places compared to the previous regime, the post-uprising period has brought with it a wave of unexpected chaos.
Deepening Political Polarization
During the mass uprising, most of Bangladesh’s political parties united in protest against the Hasina government. However, since the fall of her regime, parties have fallen out with each other on a range of issues.
Although the parties have now agreed on 19 reform issues including those aimed at balancing executive power, restructuring state institutions, and restoring public trust in governance, among these there are some agreements with note of dissent. Among the key differences between the parties is the electoral process for the upper house of Parliament and the representation of women. As a result, while the elections are expected to take place in February or April 2026, there is still no clarity on its final processes.
Bangladesh’s increased political polarization has even raised fears of electoral violence. Tensions between the two main parties—the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami—are rising, fueled by disagreements over proposed electoral and constitutional reforms, as well as competition for leadership within the opposition. This has consequently raised the potential risk of street-level confrontation.
Political violence has also engulfed the National Citizen Party—the party launched earlier this year by the leaders of the mass uprising. In July, the party’s procession came under attack from AL activists in Gopalganj, Hasina’s home district. A violent crackdown by law enforcement followed, resulting in the deaths of at least four people who were buried without autopsies.
In this atmosphere of volatility and polarization, right-wing and Islamist parties are gaining influence. A handful of Islamist parties led by the Jamaat-e-Islami have announced plans to form an alliance and contest the next election together. With public frustration running high on mainstream political parties like the BNP, these groups could perform well in the polls. While their participation is part of a democratic process, their growing influence—especially given their advocacy for Sharia-based legal reforms, restrictions on cultural expression, women rights, and opposition to secular education—could challenge Bangladesh’s secular foundations. This shift risks reshaping the political landscape in ways that could marginalize secular and liberal forces.
A Reset in Diplomacy
Under Hasina, Bangladesh’s foreign policy aligned closely with India. The interim government has looked to recalibrate this alignment—shifting from Dhaka’s previous India-centric alignment to a more balanced, multipolar approach, aimed at developing relations with other countries. After the mass uprising, relations with New Delhi plummeted as public anger grew over India’s perceived support for Hasina’s increasingly autocratic rule. Following the formation of the interim government, New Delhi preferred to play a waiting game, inducing Yunus to pivot to other partners.
This change became most evident in March 2025, when Yunus chose Beijing over New Delhi for his first official foreign visit. During the four-day trip, Bangladesh secured USD $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, loans, and grants, including key infrastructure projects like the Mongla Port modernization and the China Industrial Economic Zone in Chittagong. The shift deepened further during the June 2025 Kunming summit, where representatives from China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh convened to discuss regional trade and connectivity. Although Dhaka declined to join a security working group led by China and Pakistan, the symbolism of its presence was hard to miss. The summit also signaled a potential challenge to regional trilaterals that include India like Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
In the meantime, historically tense relations with Pakistan have also thawed, signaling a potential realignment in South Asian geopolitics. Under Hasina, Dhaka had taken a firm anti-Pakistan stance rooted in the legacy of the 1971 war. However, with her departure, the interim government showed a willingness to normalize bilateral ties. In less than a year, high-level meetings have taken place between Yunus and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, followed by cultural exchanges. For example, Pakistani renowned singer Rahat Fateh Ali Khan performed twice in Dhaka in December 2024, the resumption of trade routes, and easing of travel restrictions. Late last year, Pakistani cargo ships docked in Chittagong for the first time since 1971. Bangladesh’s potential procurement of JF-17 fighter jets from Pakistan further underscores growing defense cooperation. While historical grievances persist, the rapprochement is unmistakable, contributing to a shifting regional balance that increasingly sidelines New Delhi.
Bangladesh remains under intense economic pressure from the United States, particularly after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed a 37 percent tariff, which was later revised to 20 percent. Consequently, Bangladesh’s largest export sector—readymade garments—risks economic loss. In the interest of compromise, the interim government has pledged to increase imports from the United States and agreed to purchase 25 Boeing aircraft.
Overall, Bangladesh’s foreign policy after Hasina and under Yunus is becoming more balanced and flexible. While building closer ties with China and warming up to Pakistan, Dhaka is also trying to manage its relationship with the United States and reaching out to India. The key challenge remains the management of tensions with India. However, while Yunus has often expressed his interest in building “the best of relationships with India,” outwardly, New Delhi appears to be watching and waiting for elections. At this time, Dhaka may have no choice but to diversify.
With public frustration running high on mainstream political parties like the BNP, these groups could perform well in the polls. While their participation is part of a democratic process, their growing influence—especially given their advocacy for Sharia-based legal reforms, restrictions on cultural expression, women rights, and opposition to secular education—could challenge Bangladesh’s secular foundations
What’s Next?
The road to the 2026 national election will determine whether the spirit of the uprising leads to representative, accountable democracy or fades into memory. The interim government has promised major reforms, but for an unelected government, turning those promises into action is proving difficult.
Questions have arisen over whether the next election would be fair and peaceful given the current fragility of law and order. So far, political parties have failed to agree on a new electoral system. If no agreement is reached, the next election may face boycotts, low voter turnout, and historically significant levels of violence.
Bangladesh’s economy is also still under pressure, with inflation numbers remaining high, particularly impacting food prices. Unemployment is estimated at around 5 percent, up from 4.5 percent in 2023, leaving millions struggling to find work. Nonetheless, compared to Hasina’s tenure, Yunus’ interim government has made some progress in stabilizing inflation and establishing six commissions to reform the judiciary, election system, administration, police, Anti-Corruption Commission, and the constitution. Additionally, for the first time in its history, Bangladesh has reduced its total annual budget. However, these changes will take time to show results, and there is a real risk that public frustration over inflation and inequality could flare up again before the economy improves or reforms are realized.
Internationally, Bangladesh is walking a fine line. It is building closer ties with China and Pakistan, but, at the same time, improving relations with the United States and trying to navigate a new relationship with India. Managing these sometimes competing relationships is critical, as any misstep could hurt Bangladesh’s exports, international investments, and security interests.
The interim government now faces a critical test of credibility. After the fall of the Hasina regime, the Bangladeshis expected rapid and transformative change, but progress has been slow. Young people, who were the backbone of the uprising, are growing impatient with the pace of reforms, fueling division and disorder. However, an alternative path to democracy remains in sight if the interim government focuses on delivering reform in key areas: restoring law and order, finalizing an inclusive electoral framework, and increasing transparency to bridge political divides and build a more stable political environment. Without progress on these fronts, the promise of a democratic reset may slip away.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also read: Why Did Bangladesh’s Interim Advisor Yunus Threaten to Resign?
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Photo 1: K M ASAD via Getty Images
Photo 2: Ajmal hoq Helal via Flickr
