Dhaka became a city of rumors on May 22-23. The rumors revolved around whether Muhammad Yunus, chief advisor of Bangladesh’s interim government, would resign. The New York Times reported that Yunus had even drafted a resignation speech, but some advisers managed to persuade him not to step down.
Following 48 hours of uncertainty, Yunus said he would not resign. After an unscheduled meeting of the advisory council, his office released a statement on May 24, which said that “unreasonable demands, deliberately provocative and jurisdictionally overreaching statements, and disruptive programs have been obstructing the normal functioning environment.” The statement underscored the significance of a broader national unity to “maintain national stability, organize free and fair elections, justice, and reform, and permanently prevent the return of authoritarianism in the country.”
“However, if—under the instigation of defeated forces or as part of a foreign conspiracy—the performance of these responsibilities becomes impossible,” the statement said, “the government will present all reasons to the public and then take the necessary steps with the people.”
A Nobel peace laureate, Yunus was appointed as chief advisor of the interim government on August 8, three days after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power after weeks of mass protests. He started off on a promising note. He enjoyed broad support. The student activists, who were the face of the people’s uprising; the political parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), who effectively mounted resilient street protests against Sheikh Hasina’s police state by rallying behind the students; and the Army — all extended their support to Yunus.
“However, if—under the instigation of defeated forces or as part of a foreign conspiracy—the performance of these responsibilities becomes impossible,” the [Yunus’ office] statement said, “the government will present all reasons to the public and then take the necessary steps with the people.”
So, what happened since then? What prompted Yunus to consider resigning from his post as chief advisor? Three recent events seem to have triggered the Yunus resignation crisis.
First, the main opposition BNP mounted a week-long street protest alleging that Yunus’ government had blocked an Election Commission ruling declaring the BNP’s candidate, Ishraque Hossain, as the rightful winner of a disputed 2020 mayoral poll. BNP activists, who locked the main gate of Nagar Bhaban, the headquarters of Dhaka South City Corporation, alleged that Asif Mahmud Sajib Bhuiyan, adviser of local government in the Yunus administration, prevented Ishraque from taking the oath of office, despite legal and administrative formalities being completed. They demanded Asif’s resignation. Meanwhile, investigative journalist Zulkarnain Saer wrote on Facebook that Asif broke “a bunch of laws” to appoint Mohammad Azaz as the administrator who enjoys all the privileges of a mayor by peddling unwarranted influence. This allegation further fueled rage within the BNP camp against the interim government.
The second triggering event was that the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP), which extended its support to save their friend Asif from further public slander by organizing a protest in front of the Election Commission, demanded the reconstitution of the Election Commission and the holding of local government elections. Their main allegation is that the Election Commission did not appeal against a court ruling that favored the installation of BNP’s candidate Ishraque’s mayoral position. They said that the Election Commission has become subservient to one party—the BNP. With that, the NCP took a position that directly challenged the BNP.
This is a symptom of a larger contestation between the NCP and the BNP. The BNP has been challenging the NCP and its participation in the interim government. The NCP’s political rhetoric, meanwhile, has been targeting the BNP without clarifying to Bangladeshi voters how the NCP is different from other parties and what it is bringing to the table that is new.
The third and probably the most important trigger was a speech by Army Chief Gen Waker-Uz-Zaman at a meeting of senior officers at Dhaka Cantonment, where he said that the next national election should be held by December 2025. The army chief also conveyed his reservations to the interim government considering granting permission for a U.N.-backed humanitarian corridor for Rohingyas to Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and handing over the management of the New Mooring Container Terminal (NCT) at Chattogram port to a foreign company. These decisions should be taken by an elected government, Gen Waker said.
The Yunus administration reacted to the army chief’s remarks. It is believed that the reference to “deliberately provocative and jurisdictionally overreaching statements” in the statement of Yunus’ advisory council is a direct rebuke to Gen Waker’s speech. While the army chief underscored his disagreement with Yunus on key policy issues, including the timing of elections, the proposed humanitarian corridor to Myanmar, and Chattogram Port, the chief interim advisor is unhappy with Gen Waker.
It could be argued that the evolving leadership crisis for Yunus is premised on a trust deficit among his key political stakeholders, and Yunus not giving a date for elections underlies this trust deficit. Since the assumption of power, Yunus has been vague about when Bangladeshis will be able to vote in a free and fair national election. He has said that elections will be held no later than June 2026 and he will use the period until then to carry out reforms. Such vagueness has deepened distrust of Yunus among two important power brokers—the Bangladesh Army and the BNP.
Since the assumption of power, Yunus has been vague about when Bangladeshis will be able to vote in a free and fair national election.
Second, Yunus appears to be biased toward the student-led NCP. In his rhetoric and actions, he tends to prioritize the demands of the NCP. For example, recently, he banned the Awami League (AL) within 48 hours of the NCP’s protests demanding the former ruling party’s proscription. Before the ban, Yunus had said several times that he would ban the party only after building a wider political consensus on the matter. However, his decision to ban the AL was not preceded by political consultations or consensus.
For now, all the parties are quiet. Following the rumors of his resignation, Yunus held meetings with the NCP, BNP and the JeI. It is possible for Yunus to address the trust deficit by announcing an election date, though for some reason, that has not yet happened.
Editor’s Note: This piece originally appeared on The Diplomat and has been republished with permission from its editors.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: Sheikh Hasina’s Political Demise and Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy in the Yunus Era
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Image 1: Muhammad Yunus via Wikimedia Commons
Image 2: Bangladesh quota reform movement via Wikimedia Commons
