U.S.-European defense ties have shaped international security since the twentieth century. However, growing uncertainty in the transatlantic relationship under the second Trump administration and pushes for a European nuclear deterrent recently have cast doubt on the durability of these ties. What was once a largely unified “West,” converged on issues of global security, is now fragmented, divided on issues from climate change to multilateralism to the threat posed by Russia. As differences emerge in their respective foreign and security policies, partners of both sides like India are likely to face difficulties in adapting to this new paradigm.
Over the past few decades, India’s approach towards the West has been focused on building security ties with the United States, with the assumption that European and American policy positions do not differ greatly. But with the U.S.-European relationship now showing cracks, New Delhi may increasingly face the task of separately accommodating these powers across strategic and economic domains. Despite the apparent rapport between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump, recent American actions have caused unease on the Indian side. The high-level meeting between President Trump and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir last week is the latest to cause a kerfuffle, adding to India’s worries about unpredictability in the White House. More broadly, Trump’s insistent suggestions that he can deliver a mediated solution to the Kashmir dispute, despite New Delhi’s discomfort with third-party intervention, as well as the limited U.S.-China trade deal make it clear that India cannot simply throw its lot in with the Americans.
While New Delhi has historically had to balance between the two “camps,” it now faces multiple centers of power, forcing India to expend increased diplomatic capital to build consensus between the United States and Europe on its core issues of interest—most notably China.
Balance of Power in Asia
Since gaining independence in 1947, India’s foreign policy has been anchored in a refusal to align with any major power bloc—an approach known as non-alignment. This allowed India to balance between the two superpower camps during the Cold War, leaning one way or the other depending on what was strategically useful without having to fully commit. More recently, New Delhi has pursued “multialignment,” a strategy of maintaining close relationships with “as many” powers as possible without having to choose between them. Given America’s powerful military and economic position in the world, New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts have proportionally been focused on Washington.
What was once a largely unified “West,” converged on issues of global security, is now fragmented, divided on issues from climate change to multilateralism to the threat posed by Russia.
Engaging positively with the United States can also help India counter China’s assertive rise, which New Delhi sees as its primary international threat and a challenge to the existing rules-based order that underpins India’s growth, even as it seeks incremental reform within that system. China’s militarily advantageous geographic position, unresolved territorial disputes with New Delhi, and close dealings with Pakistan further complicate the bilateral equation. As a result, India has sought to balance China without antagonizing it.
Washington plays a major role in this balancing act through bilateral defense ties as well as leadership of initiatives like the Quad, a minilateral grouping that includes Japan and Australia, which share similar anxieties about China. However, with the United States under President Trump questioning the need for international security commitments, it is unclear what form its strategy to limit China’s influence in Asia will take. While not described as a completely isolationist approach, Trump is attempting to maximize American benefit from its foreign security engagements even if it may be perceived as unfair by America’s close partners.
Given such inclination towards transactional geopolitics, fellow Quad partners—including India—may fear the implications of Washington “cutting a deal” with Beijing. Although it is unclear what such an understanding may entail, based on the language used by policymakers in the Trump administration, this may involve tacit acceptance of broad spheres of influence for major powers like the United States, China, and Russia. Such a deal would inevitably pose major strategic problems for India, given its territorial conflicts with both China and Pakistan and its own regional ambitions. The recent India-Pakistan conflict has exposed the delicate balance on the subcontinent, where conflict can escalate quickly, and can also draw in responses from other middle powers, creating discomfort in New Delhi’s bilateral ties.
In such a scenario, India, which has always feared a two-front threat involving both China and Pakistan, may not be able to count on U.S. support as it did along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh in 2022. Even as American weapon systems may be at its disposal, India may not have access to U.S. military intelligence and cyber support in a troubled situation in the same way.
Concerning the potential for conflict with China, the unavailability of the United States, whether nominally or tactically, coupled with its own limited military power could force New Delhi into a compromise. This compromise would be hard to sell to a domestic public, given that border conflicts evoke emotional responses at a national level. In anticipating this scenario, New Delhi may be compelled to look elsewhere to help in balancing China. Given the proximity between Russia and China, the natural option would be European powers.
Uneasy Friendship
India’s relationship with the European Union (EU) will be increasingly under the spotlight as Washington and Brussels likely charting out separate foreign policy paths. For India, Europe now appears to be both less aggressive and potentially even more reliable as a security partner, when compared to the United States under Trump. Once derided as a “loveless arranged marriage,” India-EU ties have steadily grown over the past decade and extend to many sectors, including defense and security.
As Trump upends the global order, India and Europe fall into the category of global actors, including others like Japan, Australia and the members of ASEAN, which will be anxious about balancing China and the United States. But that does not mean that India and the EU automatically have a shared, overlapping view of international security. Indeed, their bilateral ties have been put under stress ever since the invasion of Ukraine, due to New Delhi’s long-standing relationship with Russia. Most European nations have tied their security to the defense of Ukraine, even in the face of American recalcitrance, maintaining that large powers cannot unilaterally change the territorial limits of other sovereign nations regardless of the power differential.
On paper, this principle serves India’s security concerns as well: The 2020 conflict in Ladakh was seen by New Delhi as a Chinese effort to occupy Indian territory and Beijing also claims the entire landmass of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Viewed from this angle, Europe and India have common perceptions of resistance against revisionist powers, which would ideally be a strong ideological base for greater security cooperation. The EU has also begun to label China as a disruptor of the international order, taking issue with Beijing’s efforts to coerce smaller nations.
But India’s reliance on Moscow for a range of things like military hardware and energy remains an obstacle when considering closer ties with Brussels. And while European partners may choose to be sensitive to India’s unavoidable dependence on Russian military hardware, other concerns may arise. India would be of much greater value to Europe without its increasingly nationalist tendencies, as Brussels will contemplate what it can get from New Delhi as a partner. For one, Europe may not expect India to offer much assistance, whether in terms of capacity building or norm setting, if it is perpetually embroiled in neighborhood conflicts without a foreseeable solution. Other than the consequence of overstretched bandwidth, nationalist postures can lead to instability in India-EU relations as well, given that it may fuel mutual suspicion of the other’s interests and alignments.
Dynamic Situation
Rather than having to pick between the United States and Europe, in the short- to medium-term, India’s task is more likely to be one of building consensus between the transatlantic players, who would have previously coordinated their approaches. India will have to expend diplomatic capital in shaping perceptions of China in Western capitals while also managing their reactions to Chinese actions to contain any negative fallout in its region.
Moreover, the situation will likely be dynamic. In the event of a distant United States, the EU may seek to manage its own vulnerabilities by forging closer relations with China, especially through trade. Some European leaders have already begun demanding a China policy that does not simply mimic Trump’s confrontational stance. However, economic engagement cannot be seen as a standalone activity and may accompany, whether by choice or compulsion, an alignment in strategic vision. India’s options in terms of partners in balancing Beijing would then depend on the degree of advancement in EU-China strategic ties, especially if transatlantic relations further deteriorate.
Conversely, even if the United States remains committed to deterring China, the ensuing trade war could cause a global recession, possibly undermining American power. For India and its other Quad partners, who rely on the United States as a security guarantor in the Indo-Pacific, Washington’s decision to spark an economic crisis presents significant challenges—even if they are temporarily on hold. In another scenario, even if highly unlikely, it would be even more detrimental if the United States were to directly clash with China, as middle powers in Asia would face the brunt of a full-blown war between the two powers.
India’s Policy Options
For many years, New Delhi has taken a calibrated approach in managing the China threat. It has built relationships with external powers and participated in multilateral fora with the aim of countering Beijing’s assertive stance in South Asia, while also investing to upgrade its own defense capabilities. However, fast-changing global security dynamics, with a substantial rise in China’s military and economic power, have outpaced India’s target of eventually becoming self-dependent in defense. Therefore, India relies, to a considerable degree, on a curated network of strategic relationships—anchored around the U.S.-India partnership—in order to balance China in the region. At the same time, to prevent an all-out confrontation with China, New Delhi consistently attempts to improve bilateral relations with Beijing. However, due to escalations over longstanding territorial disputes in recent years, there appears to be a ceiling on how much of a thaw there can be in their relationship. This also severely limits the possibility of an effective tactical entente, with both India and China as active partners.
Rather than having to pick between the United States and Europe, in the short- to medium-term, India’s task is more likely to be one of building consensus between the transatlantic players […] India will have to expend diplomatic capital in shaping perceptions of China in Western capitals while also managing their reactions to Chinese actions to contain any negative fallout in its region.
A split in the West, in which there are certainly cracks at the moment, would force New Delhi’s diplomacy to go into overdrive. It would have to persuade Western partners to maintain the status quo with China, attempting to create conditions that would limit the possibility of a swing to an extreme. Too much dependence on China, whether economic or strategic, of potentially close partners like Europe would not be in India’s interest. At the same time, an excessively confrontational position, such as of the United States’s under Trump, is also akin to playing with fire in the Indo-Pacific region.
Until it is in a better position militarily and economically, India has limited choice but to necessitate strategic engagement with external powers to address its China challenge. In order to do so, New Delhi would do well to invest in its diplomatic relationship with the EU, as well as the various capitals that drive foreign policy within the bloc, while also engaging with the question of how to keep the once-united West in the same boat, particularly when it comes to China.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters
Also Read: The EU-India Partnership: Realigned and Re-imagined?
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Image 1: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen via Wikimedia Commons
Image 2: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the G7 via Facebook
