India-Pak CBMs and Cricket: Duck, Six or Somewhere in Between?

A simple search will throw up several definitions of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Given deep suspicions of the ‘other’ and unresolved bilateral disputes, Indo-Pak CBMs are seen as a means to establish channels of communication and increase transparency between the two countries. Currently such mechanisms exist to increase military to military ties, greater people to people contact, provide advance notification of military manoeuvres and missile tests among others.

Given cricket’s popularity in both countries, it has been seen as a possible CBM. This perception has been strengthened over the years following the ‘cricket diplomacy’ of President Zia-ul-Haq in 1987 during the Brasstacks crisis and President Musharraf’s visit in 2005 to India to watch an India-Pakistan cricket match. More recently, President Asif Ali Zardari too had written to the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2012 requesting the resumption of cricket ties as it could create a positive atmosphere beneficial for improving bilateral relations.

Cricket as a possible CBM has its basis in the game’s popularity in the sub-continent. In both countries, cricketers are conferred god-like status; with a cricket scandal being touted as a national tragedy. In India even the mighty Bollywood bows to cricket’s popularity while scheduling its summer releases according to the IPL calendar. Nothing tends to get people more excited than an India-Pakistan match, especially in a World Cup. For Indian fans, this excitement comes with the added anxiety of maintaining India’s unbeaten record against Pakistan in the World Cup.

Seen as a ‘quick fix’ to improve relations, given the sport’s popularity, in reality cricket might not translate into much in terms of better Indo-Pak relations. For starters, it hardly creates the ‘positive atmosphere’ that Zardari spoke about.  The emotions attached with the fate of your team are naturally higher in case of an India-Pakistan match. It tends to bring out the jingoistic patriotism in the best of us, where wishing the worst for the other becomes acceptable. Rooting for the failure of the Indian or Pakistani cricket team, depending on your nationality, is one of the main characteristics of the Indian and Pakistani cricket fans. This was evident during the 1999 World Cup, where Pakistan’s loss in the finals to Australia was celebrated in India as if India itself had won the cup. Or when Indian fans took solace in the fact that despite its own shock early exit from the 2007 World Cup, Pakistan met the same fate.

One can make the argument that such ‘friendly banter’ has never degenerated into violence as is sometimes the case during football matches in Europe and South America. However, such hyperbole hardly creates the most conducive environment for enhanced people-to-people interaction to take place. It is therefore no surprise that one of the suggestions made in the past to improve bilateral relations has been to tone down the aggression displayed during the Wagah Border Ceremony.

Moreover, cricket, just like any other cultural ‘event’, be it films, theatre or a literary festival will always be subservient to more important issues plaguing India-Pakistan relations like Kashmir, terrorism and Siachen. Any amount of progress on these softer issues would always be hijacked by the smallest of problems in these larger issues. The dispensable nature of cricket as a CBM is further enhanced by the fact that it does not bring forth immediate political or economic benefits associated with enhanced trade or investment opportunities. Thus, cricket ties, even if capable of creating a conducive environment for improving relations, are not much of a CBM and are instead used as a form of ‘punishment’ by the aggrieved country to show its displeasure at the other. For instance, post-26/11, the Indian government responded to Pakistan’s lack of willingness to bring the culprits to justice or dismantle the existing terror infrastructure on its soil by preventing Pakistani players from playing in the IPL.

In order for a CBM to be successful, it has to be able to draw upon mutual dependencies of countries as well as build trust. The Indo-Pak agreement, initiated in 1989, not to attack each others’ nuclear installations resulting in the yearly exchange of list of nuclear facilities and advance notification of missile launches, initiated in 2005, are examples of two limited yet successful Indo-Pak CBMs. They can be termed successful firstly because both countries have continued the measures even during extreme lows in bilateral relations; and secondly because it forces both countries to communicate with each other and place certain constraints on their behaviour, however cosmetic it might seem to critics. Similarly, the supply of natural gas from India to Pakistani power plants or deepening the bilateral trade ties could be successful CBMs that are not only timely, but would also create mutual dependencies while building on trust between the two countries and their people.

Posted in , CBMs, Culture, India, India-Pakistan Relations, Pakistan

Arun Vishwanathan

Arun Vishwanathan

Arun Vishwanathan is Assistant Professor in the International Strategic and Security Studies Program, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. Arun holds a doctorate in International Relations from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining NIAS, he held the position of Assistant Director in the National Security Council Secretariat between 2008 and 2011. He was Associate Fellow at the Indian Pugwash Society, IDSA Campus, New Delhi between 2005-2008. Arun specializes in issues relating to nuclear deterrence and strategy, proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, national security reform and defense industry ecosystem. He is the co-editor of the book Troubling Tehran: Reflections on Geopolitics and co-author of monograph on Hatf-IX/ NASR - Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak Deterrence. Arun's research has been published in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Strategic Analysis, USI Journal, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, International Journal of South Asian Studies, Synergy: Journal of Centre for Joint Warfare Studies in addition to opinion pieces in various national and international media houses. He is an alumnus of the Summer Workshop organised by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo and is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London and the Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

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Aryaman Bhatnagar

Aryaman Bhatnagar

Aryaman Bhatnagar is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. His research focuses on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indian foreign policy. Previously he has worked with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. He completed his masters in International Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and his undergraduate degree in history from University of Delhi.

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2 thoughts on “India-Pak CBMs and Cricket: Duck, Six or Somewhere in Between?

  1. The author has a confused idea about CBMs going by his two citations of ‘Exchange of List of Nuclear Installations’ in each country that should not be attacked and the ‘Notification of Missile Launches’.

    These are not CBMs in its true sense. They are borne out of necessity and probably coerced by the US to agree to because a strike on nuclear installations or a misinterpretation of a test launch of a missile as a missile attack against another (because of short distances and little reaction times) thus resulting in a conflagration which in turn may lead to a regional disaster.

    The true CBM, which the author forgot to write about, was the Indus Water Treaty(IWT) in which an upper riparian state (India) willingly gave away over two-thirds of water to a lower riparian (Pakistan) which had not only parted ways but even attacked it in 1947 and 1948. Apart from being generous in apportioning water, India also gave Pakistan GBP 62 Million for related civil works at a time when its own foreign exchange reserve position was rather precarious. The IWT came into effect in January 1961 and India was attacked in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 followed by a bigger and deceitful attack in Kashmir a few months later on August 5.

    The greatest CBM in the present circumstances would be if Pakistan disbands its terrorist tanzeems and turns around its policy of asymmetrical warfare through employment of non-state actors to bleed India with a thousand cuts.Anything else would be futile. Pakistan cannot claim that it cannot do this overnight because one has not even seen any steps being taken in that direction by it. Even taking some verifiable and irreversible small steps in that direction would be a significant CBM. On the other hand, with the denouement approaching in Afghanistan, the Pakistan Army and the Establishment seem to experience a sense of deja vu in re-establishing the lost strategic depth in Afghanistan.

    Let us therefore be realistic in suggesting the CBMs that would lead to thawing of the ‘enduring hostility’.

  2. Confidence building measures can never address insecurities, more so when they are of an cosmetic nature. Why there is insecurity is an issue that has not been studied in enough depth. There is nothing that would attract any country to want to invade or conquer Pakistan, nobody in India or anywhere else has any such desire. After 1971 India vacated Bangladesh and countries in its vicinity have had nothing to fear its intention, even Bhutan which does not have any Military as such.
    However there may be a lot of envy at India’s desire to play a larger role on the global stage. India will simply plod on but to believe that it will remain a bystander to terror attacks sponsored from elsewhere, is pushing pacifism beyond rational limits, irrespective of nuclear blackmail tactics.

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