On August 5 of this year, Bangladesh’s political landscape underwent a seismic shift as student protests that initially started as a call for quota reforms erupted into a nationwide movement against corruption, authoritarianism, and economic mismanagement. This eventually led to the unexpected resignation and departure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who led the Awami League Party and had been prime minister for over a decade.

The protests have not only reshaped Bangladesh’s domestic political scene but also prompted a reevaluation of its foreign policy priorities. With the re-emergence of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, an interim government led by Nobel Laureate economist Muhammad Yunus stands at a crossroads with an impending economic crisis and strained relations with major global powers.

Will 2025 usher in political stability and economic recovery for Bangladesh or will the country face prolonged uncertainty? How will Bangladesh’s foreign policy outlook toward regional and global powers change? As the country moves into the new year, its ability to stabilize its domestic politics and economy, while balancing regional and global relationships, will determine whether it capitalizes on the opportunity for democratic reform or succumbs to prolonged instability. The change of regime and the accompanying political transformation have created a lot of hope and kindled aspirations among the general public for a better future — one entailing peace and democracy.

Bangladesh’s Protests and Political Consequences

The protests, which began in various university campuses in Dhaka, culminated in a long-standing reckoning of decades of dissatisfaction with a system that was widely seen as privileging party loyalty over merit. Hasina’s administration, which had prided itself on development achievements like the Padma Bridge, the Metro Rail, and digitalization initiatives, was increasingly criticized for suppressing dissent and allegedly rigging elections in 2018 and 2023. During Hasina’s previous term, many people were particularly dissatisfied with the collapse of the banking sector, rampant corruption, large-scale money laundering, failure to ensure good governance, trampling of the political freedoms of the opposition party, and the deprivation of people’s voting rights. By mid-2024, the protests had expanded into broader grievances against inflation, unemployment, and a shrinking democratic space.

Hasina’s administration, which had prided itself on development achievements like the Padma Bridge, the Metro Rail, and digitalization initiatives, was increasingly criticized for suppressing dissent and allegedly rigging elections in 2018 and 2023.

Until August 5, 2024, the Awami League government had responded to the protests with a heavy hand, carrying out arrests, internet shutdowns, and the deployment of security forces. Yet, this only galvanized the youth—many of whom took inspiration from the movements that had succeeded in Bangladesh in the past. When key factions of the Awami League began defecting, and the military signaled its neutrality, Hasina found herself isolated. Her abrupt departure, reportedly to India, marked the end of a political era.

The downfall of the Awami League government created a political vacuum that allowed the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami to reemerge as influential players, raising both hopes as well as questions about their ability to deliver the good governance and unity that Bangladesh urgently needs. Under its vocal leader, Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, the BNP has positioned itself as a proponent of democracy and economic reform. But the Jamaat-e-Islami’s conservative ideology continues to raise concerns domestically and internationally, despite the party’s claims that it is liberalizing its policies. This political transition poses a critical question: Can these parties effectively navigate public expectations and reconcile their ideological differences to establish a cohesive governance framework?

Amid these shifting dynamics, Yunus faces the dual challenge of tackling deep-seated economic issues while navigating the political uncertainties of an interim government. Bangladesh’s economy, which was already weak due to rising fuel prices and global supply chain disruptions, has suffered under the weight of the previous government’s mismanagement. Yunus has thus far implemented emergency measures, which included securing financial aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), negotiating with development partners for concessional loans, and prioritizing job creation through Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).

While these steps have slowed the economic free fall, structural challenges, such as high public debt, low export diversification, and a volatile security situation, remain unresolved. In addressing these structural economic challenges and other systemic political grievances, such as restoring public trust in institutions and safeguarding freedom of the press, Yunus is constrained by his limited time and authority. Yunus is already trying to reform various sectors, ranging from banking to police, but such measures are arduous tasks and require long-term planning.

Yunus’ success hinges not only on economic recovery but also on creating an environment conducive to free and fair elections, which will determine whether this political transition paves the way for lasting democratic reform or exacerbates instability. Tasked with steering the country toward free and fair elections by the end of 2025, the administration lacks the political capital to pursue long-term, structural reforms, such as a population census and voter mobilization, that would require widespread legislative or institutional backing. This narrow authority means that while short-term measures may alleviate immediate crises, they are unlikely to address the root causes of economic and political instability. As a result, the interim government’s limited scope risks leaving unresolved challenges that could undermine political stability and economic recovery next year, especially if the incoming elected government inherits these unaddressed issues without a clear roadmap for reform.

Bangladesh’s New Relationships with India and Pakistan

Bangladesh’s political changes have sent ripples across South Asia and beyond. For decades, the Awami League’s rule had resulted in Bangladesh’s steady alignment with India — a historically close ally of the party — and a balancing act with China. However, the post-Hasina era has disrupted these dynamics.

India has observed the re-emergence of the BNP and the Jamaat with concern. Under Hasina, the Awami League took a number of measures to address cross-border terrorism, facilitate regional connectivity projects, and strengthen economic partnerships, including energy cooperation. These efforts cemented a trust-based relationship that India viewed as critical for its own security and strategic interests in the region. In contrast, the BNP and the Jamaat have previously been perceived as less amenable to such cooperation, raising fears in New Delhi that the new administration might deprioritize these areas and thereby affect ongoing security and economic cooperation. While Yunus’ government has reassured New Delhi of its commitment to existing agreements—including on water-sharing and connectivity—mutual mistrust has not yet been addressed.

Another complication in the new relationship between India and Bangladesh’s interim government is the narrative surrounding the persecution of the Hindu community living in Bangladesh, primarily spread through propaganda and misinformation on social media. Reports of anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh have created rifts between the two countries. Although some fact-checkers argue that such reports are exaggerated or politically motivated, these claims have had a substantial influence on public opinion in India, where such narratives often heighten communal sensitivities and amplify political pressure on New Delhi to take a firmer stance toward Dhaka. Further to this, the call in India to boycotting trade with Bangladesh and the closure of India’s visa center in Bangladesh have strained diplomatic relations. Notably, many Hindus in Bangladesh were perceived to support Hasina’s administration, and the change in leadership has intensified these narratives and complicated efforts to stabilize bilateral ties. However, the interim government is trying to alter this perception by implementing various measures (for example, increasing the number of holidays to celebrate the Durga Puja festival), which have already been reflected in the 2025 vacation calendar.

While its relationship with India has reached an impasse, the interim government has attempted to forge ties with Pakistan, which had previously been halted for the last 15 years under the Awami League government. Although the bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and Pakistan is complex due to past grievances over alleged war crimes and the legacies of the 1971 war, support on Pakistani social media toward the recent protests has helped to create a conducive environment for reestablishing diplomatic ties between the two countries. Since the new government needs to overcome economic and political crises at home, gaining the support of all international stakeholders is pertinent. Therefore, rebuilding diplomatic engagement with Pakistan is now part of Bangladesh’s broader foreign policy strategy. The interim government’s stand is that, in this globalized world, maintaining good relations with all key stakeholders is crucial for fostering regional stability and strengthening Bangladesh’s position in the global arena.

Bangladesh’s Other Geopolitical Considerations

Aside from India and Pakistan, China is an important partner for Bangladesh, especially on issues of trade, infrastructure, defense cooperation, and regional stability. One of the important pillars of Bangladesh-China relations is bilateral trade and investment, which have been crucial for Bangladesh in retaining its economic growth and meeting its future development targets. China is a major investor in Bangladesh’s critical infrastructure projects and is positioning itself as a reliable partner amid the political transition. It has extended outreach to the interim government, emphasizing the importance of continuing projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The challenge for Bangladesh lies in balancing new Chinese investment against its existing debt burden—a point of contention raised by critics of BRI projects.

Separately, the United States had been critical of the Hasina government for human rights violations and has cautiously welcomed the interim government’s commitment to democratic reforms. However, Washington remains wary of the Jamaat’s potential influence and is keen to ensure that Bangladesh does not become overly reliant on China. Yunus has sought to rebuild trust with the United States, including through talks on labor rights and trade privileges, thereby signaling a potential recalibration of foreign policy. Although there has been apprehension over the potential shift in cooperation following former U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent election win, Bangladesh’s interim government has signaled that its relationship with the United States is deep-rooted and does not solely depend on the political party in power.

Bangladesh’s Path Forward

The interim government has pledged to hold free and fair elections by the end of 2025. However, questions remain over whether this timeline is feasible. Public frustration could reignite protests if the government delays elections, further destabilizing the fragile political environment. Moreover, prolonged uncertainty risks damaging investor confidence and delaying critical economic recovery efforts.

On the other hand, rushing elections without addressing systemic issues such as electoral integrity and voter intimidationwhich have occurred previously—could undermine the very reforms that the protests sought to achieve. While now more influential, the BNP and the Jamaat will still face significant challenges in navigating public expectations and maintaining cohesion.

While now more influential, the BNP and the Jamaat will still face significant challenges in navigating public expectations and maintaining cohesion.

The interim government must prioritize internal stability while maintaining strong relations with major external stakeholders. Bangladesh has historic relations with India, and Dhaka seeks to maintain this legacy for mutual interests and regional stability. To materialize this, in November this year, Bangladesh organized an international seminar titled “Bay of Bengal Conversation” in which several Indian and Pakistani scholars participated and discussed a wide range of bilateral issues, ranging from trade to social media roles. A key takeaway from this event was the recognition of Track II diplomacy and people-to-people connectivity as critical tools for rebuilding trust and mitigating discomfort among neighboring countries, particularly at a time of strained formal diplomatic relations. This is a good step towards meeting the need for alternative platforms to address lingering tensions and foster regional collaboration. The recent visit of India’s Foreign Secretary to reiterate the continuation of a positive relationship between the two countries adds another necessary positive note to Bangladesh’s thorny journey.

As 2025 approaches, Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture. A successful transition to a stable, democratically elected government may mark the beginning of a new chapter—one where economic resilience and inclusive governance take precedence. However, failure to address deep-seated grievances risks plunging the nation into prolonged turmoil. Internationally, Bangladesh’s ability to maintain balanced relations with the United States, India, and China will be crucial in securing its strategic and economic interests.

Given the complex geopolitical dynamics at hand, it is also important for the interim government to address its domestic challenges. Since the interim government comes into power for a shorter period, handling the domestic challenges with a firm approach is pertinent. Domestically, the challenge lies in addressing youth unemployment, ensuring freedom of the press, and rebuilding diminished public trust in institutions. Therefore, in the end, the question remains: Can Bangladesh’s leaders rise to the occasion, or will history repeat itself, with political rivalry overshadowing the country’s immense potential? In this time of transition, one thing is clear: The foreign policy choices made in the next year will shape Bangladesh’s trajectory for decades to come.

Also Read: Sheikh Hasina’s Political Demise and Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy in the Yunus Era

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Image 1: Rayhan9d via Wikimedia Commons

Image 2: CA Press Wing via The Daily Star

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