A now-deleted video posted from the official handle of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Assam unit depicted Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma holding a gun and firing bullets on two people who appeared to be Muslims. The post was captioned “point-blank shot,” and included slogans like “No forgiveness to Bangladeshis.”
This incident highlights Assam’s unique position at the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy. As India’s gateway to the east, the state has institutionalized paradiplomatic engagement with Bangladesh under the Act East framework, which seeks to facilitate cooperation ranging from trade and commerce to culture and tourism. However, election cycle rhetoric in Assam has repeatedly cast Bangladesh as a matter of concern, foregrounding migration, demographic anxiety, and border enforcement. This tension between economic cooperation and electoral securitization underscores the complicated and often counterproductive relationship between subnational politics and regional diplomacy. While migration and security concerns remain politically potent, a more constructive Assam-Bangladesh relationship grounded in economic linkages remains possible, provided stakeholders can prevent inflammatory political rhetoric from hardening into a hostile diplomatic posture.
Background: Assam-Bangladesh Paradiplomacy
Assam formally institutionalized subnational engagement by creating an Act East Policy Affairs Department in 2017. Among other things, the department was tasked with coordinating policies with the Bangladeshi government and companies. During Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Assam-Bangladesh relations enjoyed an upswing. Notably, the institution played a key role in ratifying a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on the Utilization of the Chittagong and Mongla Ports in 2019 and setting up border haats across Assam. On the diplomatic front, the Assam administration also played a positive role in endorsing the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) 2015, despite Assam losing out on overall land area.
For its part, Bangladesh also made efforts to enhance relations during this period. To aid economic engagement, Dhaka opened a Deputy High Commission in Guwahati in 2017. Additionally, in 2018, it struck an agreement to allow the Northeastern states of India access to the Chittagong port, which benefitted Assam. Then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Abdul Momen even visited Guwahati in 2022, where he expressed satisfaction with the existing relationship.
However, the India-Bangladesh relationship took a nosedive following the “monsoon revolution” of July and August 2024. Muhammad Yunus’ remarks highlighting the Northeast region’s landlocked geography and Dhaka’s leverage as the guardian of the ocean were condemned by Sarma as reflective of a longstanding agenda to promote a narrative of vulnerability associated with India’s “chicken’s neck” corridor. The chief minister has also stated outright that the interim government in Bangladesh is unfriendly and has a sinister design on India’s Northeast, including Assam. As paradiplomatic ties have fluctuated in response to political shifts in Dhaka, Assam’s electoral arena has seen a more persistent security framing of Bangladesh.
“[E]lection cycle rhetoric in Assam has repeatedly cast Bangladesh as a matter of concern, foregrounding migration, demographic anxiety, and border enforcement.”
Immigration Politics in Assam
The controversial Assam BJP post did not represent a significant aberration: the issue of illegal immigration has dominated election season ahead of polls in March and April 2026. In early February 2026, Sarma stated that he approves of actions to “trouble the Miya,” a contested term which refers to Bengali-origin Muslims, and asserted that the people of Assam need to choose between illegal immigration and identity.
Sarma’s rhetoric is also aided by his politics. Previously, the Assam government’s targeted eviction drives against Miyas in the districts of Dhubri, Lakhimpur, Nalbari, and Goalpara made waves. When questioned about the action, Sarma responded that the state’s eviction drives had targeted only Miyas and not indigenous Assamese people, asserting that Bangladeshi elements were camping in Assam to “weaken” the state. His administration has also brought legislation that allows only individuals of Assamese origin to acquire land in designated regions of Majuli, Batadrava, and Barpeta.
These dynamics are not entirely new. The Miyas were originally settled in Assam by the British to cultivate fallow land and currently hold a majority in almost 10 districts, including an electorally decisive share of the population in around 30 of the 126 constituencies in Assam. Perceptions of their unchecked immigration and subsequent popular demands for deportation, alongside similar dynamics with Hindu Bengalis, in large part sparked the anti-immigrant Assam Movement. The Assam Accord (1985) provided a political solution to the issue by declaring March 24, 1971, as the cutoff date for citizenship, but underlying tensions remained. Later, Lieutenant General S.K. Sinha’s 1998 report called illegal immigration a silent “demographic invasion,” and India’s Supreme Court characterized large-scale illegal migration into Assam as tantamount to “external aggression.”
The new variable in contemporary Assamese politics is the rise of the BJP. The original Assam agitation framed illegal immigration as a question of “foreigners” versus indigenous Assamese. The BJP sought to alter this framing through the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which fast-tracks citizenship for undocumented migrants belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian communities from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, who entered India before January 1, 2015. By deliberately excluding Muslim immigrants, critics argue that the Act introduces faith-based discrimination into India’s citizenship framework, undermining the constitutional principle of secularism.
This fraught politics of immigration has also strained India’s relations with Bangladesh. Home Minister Amit Shah’s provocative remark during the 2018 election campaign dubbing Bangladeshi migrants “termites” generated doubts and anxieties in Dhaka. The Shah controversy indicates that election rhetoric in Assam could yet complicate relations with the new BNP government, which has articulated a “Bangladesh First” approach to foreign policy. Beyond electoral mobilization, however, immigration politics in Assam is intertwined with longstanding security anxieties that predate the current government.
Enduring Security Concerns
Historical grievances drive much of the concerns in Assam over security threats emanating from Bangladesh. The late Khaleda Zia—a former prime minister of Bangladesh and mother of new Prime Minister Tarique Rahman—had a warm relationship with insurgent groups in Assam: she was instrumental in sheltering the leaders of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), going so far as to call them “freedom fighters.” Rahman inherits much of the legacy of his mother, as he operated as the de-facto leader of his party during that period.
The Assam administration has also raised worries about “hobnobbing” between Bangladesh’s interim government and Pakistan. Recent reports of renewed military talks between Dhaka and Islamabad, including speculation about potential JF-17 Thunder fighter jet sales, have drawn attention in New Delhi. Although no formal security or intelligence agreements have been publicly announced, the visit of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief in January 2025 was viewed by India as a subject of concern. Such developments are often interpreted through the prism of historical experience, in which Indian officials have previously accused Pakistan of fomenting violence and terrorism in Assam. In October 2024, for instance, authorities apprehended an alleged Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operative from Assam’s Goalpara district, underscoring the possibility of a rising Islamist threat in the region. In this context, even incremental signs of Bangladesh-Pakistan engagement or an upsurge in radical groups in Bangladesh may heighten strategic sensitivities in New Delhi.
These developments occur amid rising perceptions of political exclusion among the Miya community, one of the state’s most vulnerable groups. In border regions, persistent alienation can potentially metastasize into exploitable security and governance issues. In such a security environment, New Delhi is likely to be more cautious about regional dynamics in its neighborhood.
As a result of these concerns, the India-Bangladesh border is also undergoing a process of intensified securitization. Assam itself shares approximately 166 miles of border with Bangladesh. In January 2026, Sarma publicly announced that 15 illegal Bangladeshi migrants had been escorted back across the border by Indian forces. Additionally, Indian guards have also reportedly rounded up hundreds of Bangladeshi nationals on the Indian side, crossed the border, and deported them without due process. Sarma has remarked that New Delhi does not need a repatriation treaty with Dhaka to push back illegal immigrants. Controversy has also persisted over border fencing. Since the Bangladesh interim government took over, India has tried to erect fences to curb illegal immigration, but the Border Guard Bangladesh personnel have objected at several places, leading to standoffs.
However, even though such issues are likely to remain a source of friction, Assam-Bangladesh ties are not structurally doomed: institutional and economic incentives continue to create space for cooperation.
“To prevent negative spillovers into the Assam-Bangladesh relationship, national and subnational stakeholders must work diligently to limit rhetorical hostility and foreground a constructive agenda focused on connectivity and mutual economic benefit.”
Constructive Agenda for Assam-Bangladesh Ties
First and foremost, a reset at the national level could create space for Assam’s paradiplomatic initiatives. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s congratulatory greetings to Tarique Rahman, paired with BNP General Secretary Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir’s statement that New Delhi-Dhaka ties would not be deterred by the presence of Sheikh Hasina in India, spark hope for a thaw between the two neighbors.
Moreover, while Sarma himself has adopted a hardline stance on illegal immigration, his government has simultaneously advanced economic and connectivity initiatives with Bangladesh, reflecting a dual-track approach. For example, the Assam government’s Act East Policy Affairs Department had previously unveiled a five-year plan outlining key infrastructure and connectivity projects, including direct air connectivity between Dhaka and Sylhet, road connectivity as part of Mainland India–Bangladesh–North East India (MI-B-NEI) Corridors, and international submarine fiber-optic cable network access for the Northeast through Cox’s Bazaar. Furthermore, in its last budget, the Assam government announced plans for a B3 corridor (Bhutan-Bodoland-Bay of Bengal), which originally included Bangladesh. The goal was to develop Joghigopa as a multimodal logistics park and hub within the B3 corridor to export goods through the Brahmaputra inland waterway.
Medical tourism represents another opportunity for paradiplomatic cooperation. Around 60 to 70 percent of all medical tourists in India come from Bangladesh, with most heading to Kolkata and Chennai. Assam, projected to have over 60 medical colleges by 2035 and already eyeing healthcare linkages with Bhutan, could position itself as a viable alternative and help create resilient people-to-people relations.
Lastly, water could constitute an emerging area of cooperation, particularly given the existence of shared threats in the domain. China recently commissioned the world’s largest dam, the 60 GW Medog Hydropower Station on the Yarlung Tsangpo, which can potentially affect water availability downstream and have significant agricultural, flooding, and climate risks for lower riparian regions like Assam and Bangladesh. Although some experts have suggested a trilateral water sharing agreement, India and Bangladesh could independently formulate joint water monitoring plans in the absence of China as well.
Bangladesh will likely remain a political flashpoint throughout Assam’s election season, especially as demographic and security anxieties enflame public discourse. To prevent negative spillovers into the Assam-Bangladesh relationship, national and subnational stakeholders must work diligently to limit rhetorical hostility and foreground a constructive agenda focused on connectivity and mutual economic benefit. Such an approach would shirk political convenience, capitalizing instead on the enormous promise of Assam-Bangladesh paradiplomacy to improve security and prosperity on both sides of the border.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: Bangladesh First? The Choices Defining Tarique Rahman’s Foreign Policy
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Image 1: Himanta Biswa Sarma via X
Image 2: Tarique Rahman via Facebook
