The deadly terror attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, which was initially claimed by The Resistance Front, an entity India accuses of being linked with Pakistan-based banned group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has New Delhi and Islamabad staring at the specter of a new crisis. Pakistan’s calls for restraint went unheeded when in the wee hours of May 7, 2025, India launched coordinated missile, air and drone strikes on multiple sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, including Sialkot, Bahawalpur, Muridke, Kotli, Bagh and Muzaffarabad, to avenge the 26 tourists targeted by the terrorists. While speaking in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan had shot down 5 Indian jets, but this has not been confirmed by India or international reporting. Sharif also said, after convening a meeting of the National Security Committee, that under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Pakistan reserves the right to respond “at a time, place, and manner of its choosing.” In the aftermath of the Indian strikes, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke to both the Indian and Pakistani NSAs and urged them to de-escalate, but the coming days threaten escalation as both sides’ entrenched ideological constituencies rile up rhetoric and seek revenge.
Crisis Triggers: Past and Present
Since 2001, India-Pakistan crises have often come at the heels of militant attacks that take place in either mainland India or Indian-administered Kashmir, with India attributing their origin to Pakistan, followed by strong calls from the Indian public for punitive action. However, there is a new form of low-intensity conflict taking place elsewhere in the subcontinent. Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province, is another hotspot of militancy, which Islamabad accuses New Delhi of abetting and supporting for what observers believe is part of India’s strategy to penalize Islamabad for its alleged role in supporting militancy inside Kashmir.
After coming to power in 2014, Narendra Modi wanted to break away from India’s traditional restraint in favor of projecting an assertive stance in securing the country’s foreign policy and national security interests. At the heart of this posture as it applies to Pakistan is Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. In a public talk a few years ago at Sastra University, Doval pitched the idea of “defensive offense,” which entails launching disproportionate large-scale attacks in Balochistan or elsewhere in Pakistan in response to militant attacks that India believes are sponsored by Pakistan. Many in Pakistan link this approach with a spate of targeted assassinations of individuals in the country that Islamabad alleges were punished by India for ties to militancy in Kashmir or mainland India. This narrative has gained more traction after Indian security planners were accused of sanctioning assassinations of dissidents in the United States, Canada, and Australia. With violence in Balochistan only intensifying over time and Kashmir also flaring up occasionally, tit-for-tat allegations of support for militancy and major incidents on each other’s territory have begun to act as triggers for bigger crises.
What is needed instead between India and Pakistan is sustained diplomatic engagement, open and effective communication channels, and the revival of confidence-building measures to prevent miscalculation and foster de-escalation.
These recurring episodes often force external crisis managers to intervene and help de-escalate tensions from converting into hot wars. But with many of those actors now saturated with managing crises elsewhere in the world, from the Russia-Ukraine war to conflict in the Middle East, diffusing a crisis in South Asia does not seem to be top priority. While the United States, China, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have got involved and urged India and Pakistan to show restraint, mere diplomatic statements, while necessary, are insufficient to manage a rapidly escalating crisis. Though Russia and Iran have offered to mediate the crisis, they may not be considered credible interlocutors. What is needed instead between India and Pakistan is sustained diplomatic engagement, open and effective communication channels, and the revival of confidence-building measures to prevent miscalculation and foster de-escalation. Given the absence of an India-Pakistan bilateral dialogue, it is crucial to examine how the absence of credible crisis managers coupled with entrenched ideological constituencies in both countries could push low-intensity conflicts to spiral into a full-blown war in the subcontinent.
War Constituencies in India and Pakistan
In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party derives a lot of its political and electoral power from calling for a Hindu rashtra and otherizing Muslims, which translates into adopting a belligerent stance on Pakistan and taking strong action against it. In Pakistan, for decades, the military has projected itself not only as the defender of the country’s territory but also its ideological foundations, including upholding the country’s claim on the Kashmir dispute.
Reverting to talks would mean adopting a conciliatory approach or changing the status quo on bilateral disputes, which is not aligned with ideological constituencies in either country. While both India and Pakistan demand the entirety of disputed Jammu and Kashmir, several proposals floated in the past digressed from such rigid positions, including former Pakistani Prime Minister Pervez Musharraf’s four point formula. But a pragmatic approach requires reconciling hardline positions and accommodating bargains, which entrenched factions won’t allow. Thus, both sides find coercing the other side through low-intensity conflict more appealing rather than coming to the negotiating table. Such an approach runs the risk of not only delaying normalcy in the region but also pushing it to a slow existential crisis with risk of nuclear conflagration. But as the two countries continue to erode bilateral mechanisms for de-escalation and decline to talk, can outside crisis managers go beyond firefighting recurring crises?
Third Party Crisis Intervention
Both the United States and China are now making the right noises to defuse tensions. Last week, Secretary Rubio called on India and Pakistan to exercise restraint, and Washington is encouraging other states to make similar appeals to both countries. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for a fair and timely investigation into the attacks and urged New Delhi and Islamabad to engage in dialogue. Given Washington and Beijing’s strategic, geopolitical, and economic ties with New Delhi and Islamabad respectively, they continue to have influence in the subcontinent and would want to avoid full-scale war or a potential nuclear conflagration in the region.
However, there are also constraining factors to consider. The United States, once the most active crisis manager in South Asia, is either overstretched or has different priorities. Despite viewing India as a contender for balancing China and Pakistan as a counterterrorism partner, South Asia largely figures low in the overall priority list of the second Trump presidency. There is also an opinion in India that while New Delhi may anticipate increased U.S. support, Washington may want to avoid becoming directly involved in the conflict or taking sides. On the other hand, China–another dominant player in regional crisis management—while still interested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has been disappointed with Islamabad in recent times due to persistent terrorist threats targeting Chinese nationals and projects in Pakistan. However, in the event of further escalation between Pakistan and India, Beijing could be forced to offer increased support to Islamabad diplomatically and by replenishing its military equipment due to its investment in infrastructure and commercial projects in the country.
Thus, both sides find coercing the other side through low-intensity conflict more appealing rather than coming to the negotiating table. Such an approach runs the risk of not only delaying normalcy in the region but also pushing it to a slow existential crisis with risk of nuclear conflagration.
With tensions continuing to flare up, the crisis could escalate further. Housing nearly a quarter of the world’s population and armed to the teeth with conventional and nuclear weapons, the stakes in the subcontinent could not be higher. Conflicts between India and Pakistan need more than episodic crisis management. Sustained peace will remain elusive as long as politicians and militaries in both countries find low-intensity conflict more rewarding than dialogue. Though the 2021 ceasefire brought some stability, it was a missed opportunity to convert into a broader process in pursuit of peace due to lack of sustained diplomatic will and domestic political considerations on both sides. Recurring crises like Pahalgam and Pulwama underscore that the subcontinent is indeed drifting apart and makes the case for renewed bilateral dialogue and more pragmatic voices on both sides even stronger. Talking now will prevent the subcontinent from going adrift and tearing apart.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: SAV Q&A with Lisa Curtis: The Pahalgam Crisis & U.S. Role. For more analysis on Pahalgam and its aftermath, read our entire series here.
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Image 1: TAUSEEF MUSTAFA via Getty Images
Image 2: Baisaran Valley via Wikimedia Commons
