In 2024, Pakistan experienced a significant surge in militant violence, with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) intensifying its campaign against the state. The year witnessed approximately 444 attacks, resulting in at least 685 deaths among security forces, marking the highest casualty rate in nearly a decade. Overall, fatalities among civilians and security personnel reached 1,612, a substantial increase from the previous year. The TTP’s operations predominantly targeted Pakistani security forces, exemplified by a deadly assault on a military checkpoint in South Waziristan, where the group claimed to have killed 35 soldiers.
This escalation in TTP violence has strained Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, as Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary and support to TTP fighters. Despite Pakistan’s efforts to curb cross-border militancy through measures such as deportations, border closures, and airstrikes, including operations in eastern Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban’s reluctance to act against the TTP has exacerbated tensions. A recent report by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) delves into this complex dynamic, analyzing how the Afghan Taliban’s ascent to power has emboldened the TTP, thereby intensifying security challenges within Pakistan and complicating bilateral relations between the two nations.
South Asian Voices spoke with the authors of the report, Dr. Raashid Wali Janjua and Noorulain Naseem, to discuss the implications of their findings for the future of TTP activity in the region and Pakistan-Afghanistan ties moving forward.
What are the causes of the TTP’s resurgence in Pakistan? What have been some of the Pakistan government’s policy gaps in tackling this threat?
RWJ: The TTP’s resurgence is a consequence of a combination of factors, including a governance and security vacuum in ex-Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (now termed merged districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KPK province), a lack of livelihood opportunities in the merged districts, the absence of judicial writ after the abolition of the colonial-era Jirga and Riwaj (customs)-based justice system, the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul, and the breathing space accorded to the TTP by the previous Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government through abortive peace parleys in 2022. All insurgencies benefit from safe sanctuaries on foreign soil, and the TTP is no exception. There are bases near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border inside Afghanistan in the provinces of Kunar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, and Nangarhar. The unstable security environment in Afghanistan redounds to the advantage of the TTP as the Afghan interim government (AIG) is chary and fearful of reining in the TTP, due to fear of their joining with Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) and Al Qaeda against the Kabul regime. There are credible reports of Al Qaeda and potentially IS-KP providing manpower as well as weapons and transport to the TTP.
At an ideological level, it is worth understanding that Afghanistan is now in the grips of a theocratic government headed by Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, whose word is law and who is sympathetic to the ideological leanings of entities like the TTP, which is playing on the theme that “we supported you [the Taliban] when you [the Taliban] were fighting the Americans and now you should support us when we fight for establishment of an Islamic government in Pakistan.” Unfortunately, under the theocratic regime of the AIG, entities like the TTP get inspiration from the example of the Taliban, having defeated a global power to regain power in Afghanistan. The TTP wishes to recreate the same in Pakistan, and the AIG is tacitly supporting them in that putatively noble endeavor.
Another very important factor is the absence of a new order in erstwhile tribal areas (FATA) that were governed under colonial-era laws like the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which gave significant power to the administrative apparatus of the state through collective punishment laws and the sweeping powers enjoyed by the administrative heads, called Political Agents (PAs). Now, after the merger, the new judicial system has not yet established itself in the area, and the former PAs have not been replaced by an equally effective administrative system. The internally displaced people who were displaced after the military operations have concerns regarding the settlement terms and the facilities in their area besides their worries about the return of the TTP. The governance vacuum and illegal activities across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, like smuggling, drug running, and human trafficking, also indirectly contribute to the TTP-led violence.
NN: The Taliban takeover of Kabul provided several advantages to the TTP and enabled its cross-border offensive, but the true operational, financial, and recruitment capacity of the terrorist group is still largely indigenous. The TTP started resurfacing around 2018 across the Pak-Afghan border areas. This, however, does not discount the fact that the Taliban have retained a strong working relationship with the TTP in terms of ideological, tactical, recruitment, and sometimes financial support. The TTP’s ability to return after 2021 was largely enabled by the peace process initiated under the PTI government which led to TTP fighters from Afghanistan being allowed entry into Pakistan. Lack of national-level policy focus to counter the TTP, fallout between the military and parliamentarians at the provincial and federal level on the relevance of military operation to counter the TTP, a serious depreciation of social contract between the citizens and the state in ex-FATA and Balochistan, as well as the porousness of the Pak-Afghan border despite fencing, can all explain the TTP’s current rise. Under Noor Wali’s command, and due to the tolerance of the Taliban on the cross-border offensive, the TTP is now operational in ex-FATA and Balochistan’s border terrain as an insurgency that challenges the writ of the Pakistani state, violates the integrity of Pakistani borders, does not believe in the Pakistani constitution, and maintains links and extends support to other insurgent and separatist groups in Balochistan.
The report clearly mentions the current organizational and hierarchical structures (tashkeels) that the TTP has across the Pak-Afghan border areas. Exhibiting the classic tactics of guerilla warfare, the TTP is using the same tactical maneuvers against Pakistan’s security forces as the Taliban did against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan. Some of these tactics are: 1) the TTP’s reliance on the porousness of the terrain for dispersed, hit-and-run operations, which makes it tougher for the Pakistani security forces to outroot the TTP, especially in the absence of the Taliban’s support; and 2) The TTP’s ability to capitalize on tribal goodwill and linkages on both sides of the border. The TTP has exploited local tribals’ refusal to surrender political power to centralized judicial, administrative, or political systems, instead preferring a tribal system-based legal and political control. This makes intelligence gathering and getting local support for a military operation against the TTP difficult. Local police are also unable to effectively secure an area from the TTP. The organization has capitalized on goodwill with the Taliban based on tribal linkages and a history of waging war against a common enemy (the United States). This, however, is now costing the Taliban their bilateral relations with Pakistan. The TTP is even harnessing a tribal system-based support across Balochistan with insurgent groups there, pushing security forces to spread their operations, which eventually favors the TTP.
Unfortunately, under the theocratic regime of the AIG, entities like the TTP get inspiration from the example of the Taliban, having defeated a global power to regain power in Afghanistan. The TTP wishes to recreate the same in Pakistan, and the AIG is tacitly supporting them in that putatively noble endeavor.
There are two major policy gaps on Pakistan’s part in deterring the TTP’s guerilla warfare: first, not making full use of tribal political support, and second, not utilizing the disdain that majority of the youth in Pakistan’s periphery have towards the TTP’s religious extremism and terrorism. Additionally, Pakistan needs to focus more on accountability and jurisdiction-related challenges faced by the security sector (police, Frontier Corps, and army units on the ground). For now, these entities are perceived by the local public and the Taliban as one unit that strive to maintain law and order, secure borders, and comb the area for TTP assets and activities, without complementary support from the local administration and formal judicial mechanisms.
The report identifies the Pakistani government’s insufficient attention to the mainstreaming of former FATA as a key factor in the return of the TTP in Pakistan. What are three short-to-medium-term measures the federal government could take to tackle this alienation of the populace and deny space to the TTP in FATA, and what would it take to ensure their implementation?
NN: The report’s analysis is built on a baseline survey of around 200 respondents from ex-FATA followed by focus group discussions with the youth of the region. The responses reflect a deep dissatisfaction with the Pakistani government’s measures on development, mainstreaming, security, justice, and administrative reform in the region. 52.4 percent of respondents claimed that a lack of local involvement coupled with the government’s inability to introduce reforms is the prevailing cause of dissatisfaction. 86.8 percent were dissatisfied with the police’s role in maintaining peace. Our report, based on security sector data, suggests that Rs 383.2 billion has so far been invested in health, roads, mosques, water and sanitation, police infrastructure, education, socio-economic, and multi-sectoral reform-based projects. The government has also pledged Rs. 400 billion for ex-FATA, of which Rs. 75.5 billion has been received over the past four years via an Accelerated Implementation Plan. Despite this, staggering underdevelopment prevails in the region. While there is a focus on building education and security infrastructure, there is not enough focus on ensuring enrollment of students or supporting an educated and skilled workforce to keep government departments running. On the economic front, locals have negative perceptions of the interests of the government – for example, regional mines and minerals have been declared government property, to the dismay of locals. Meanwhile, oil and gas-based projects in the region have not resolved the acute energy crisis that has brought down local quality of life. Empowering and mainstreaming local political leadership via provincial assemblies and local governments can bring incremental, systematic, and sustainable progress on political and development goals of the region. This, however, requires that law and political process are not derailed.
This brings us to the next key issue in the region, which is the lack of inter-institutional trust. On security sector reform, focusing exclusively on capacity-building of the police force is not enough. Similarly, increasing the number of courts and judges cannot by default extend the writ of state on the citizens in ex-FATA. Instead, a deeper intervention, such as creating social acceptance for court systems and orders or enhancing the capacity of the police to enact court orders, could solve the lacuna in the justice system and internal security lapses in the region. Both these gaps are heavily exploited by the TTP by offering alternative justice systems and extending a parallel security umbrella (or even withdrawing it occasionally) for locals and militants. As a start, the demarcation of operational, budgetary, and jurisdiction-based boundaries between the Frontier Corps, police, and army units on the ground is much-needed. This, however, cannot happen in the absence of inter-institutional dialogue, facilitated by the cooperation of civil society and political actors in the region. Paying attention to local preferences on the justice system and enacting policing and administrative reform are key to restoring the public’s trust in institutions. Based on our survey, 77.4 percent of respondents thought the jirga system should be merged with the judicial system, instead of abandoning the cultural values-based justice mechanisms altogether.
Underdevelopment and relative deprivation coupled with the youth bulge in ex-FATA and Balochistan act as indirect enablers of the spillover of militancy from Afghanistan and sustaining of indigenous operations by the TTP. As government survey findings on income per capita and quality of life in this region suggest, little has been achieved so far, despite hefty promises by several governments to align economic, political, and social interests of the border areas more with the rest of Pakistan. The IDP situation in ex-FATA from repeated military interventions has led to more than just displacement, it has also caused brain drain. Furthermore, several tribal leaders have been killed by the TTP in the past, leading to a political vacuum. Unless civil administration, tribal leadership, and youth are taken onboard for counterterrorism initiatives in border areas, sustainable peace will not return to the region. A huge hurdle to this, however, is the military taking the lead in countering the TTP via coercive use of force. Unless development and infrastructure-based reform in ex-FATA is coupled with the restoration of trust-based initiatives to reduce the civil-military divide, factions like the TTP will keep resurfacing and create operational room by capitalizing on institutional distrust and political divides.
Development goals for ex-FATA might be even tougher to meet with the recent expected U.S. funding cuts to Pakistan. Since 1948, the United States has sent more than USD 30 billion in direct aid to the country. Over the years, it has also provided a major chunk of the funding pool for international agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Development Programme, UN International Children’s Emergency Fund and World Health Organization that operate in Pakistan. This placed the United States in a strategic position as a financer, negotiator and enabler of developmental and humanitarian assistance-based programs in Pakistan. Through this American assistance, the development sector in Pakistan sustained its activities despite changing in local governmental priorities and shifting of the focus away from humanitarian and capacity-building projects in remote or conflict-ridden peripheral regions of Pakistan. This recent U.S. funding cut is likely to impact millions of Pakistanis who are reliant on health, education, women’s mainstreaming, environmental and capacity building initiatives funded by Washington. Afghan refugees are likely to be among the most affected. For instance, some 20,000 Afghans that were poised for resettlement to the United States are stranded in Pakistan and face potential deportation following the Trump administration’s halting of new refugee admissions.
You argue that there has previously been a lack of political will in Pakistan to enact the National Action Plan to root out terrorism and domestic militancy in the country. In this context, how do you see the prospects for Pakistan’s recent counterterrorism operation, Azm-e-Istehkam?
RWJ: Azm-e-Istehkam is a combination of kinetic operations in the shape of intelligence-based operations, and non-kinetic measures, such as countering the illegal spectrum including smuggling, narco-trafficking, kidnappings for ransom, and human trafficking. The deportation of unlawful Afghan migrants and strengthening of border controls through the one document (visa) border crossing regime are steps in that direction. In addition, the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) that was introduced after the 2014 TTP attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar is being implemented with renewed vigor. The NAP included points about the modification of the criminal justice system to counterterrorism, which have not yet been implemented. Similarly, the monitoring and regulation of religious seminaries and a reform of their curricula is an area that still needs to be addressed. In Pakistan 14,000 of a total 40,000 madrassahs (religious seminaries) have been registered, all of which need to be brought under government regulation for proper monitoring of extremist narratives. Azm-e-Istehkam is, in fact, a renewed focus on counter terrorism in the context of the rising tide of TTP militancy in the merged districts of KPK. However, the prospects of Azm-e-Istehkam depend upon the political ownership of the operation by the provincial government and a whole-of- government approach involving the police, paramilitary forces, judiciary, civil administration, and the army.
NN: More than the lack of political will, weak governance and the absence of rule of law have resulted in the non-implementation of the National Action Plan in its entirety. Azm-e-Istehkam is the state’s new counterterrorism initiative focused on both domestic threats and cross-border terrorism perpetrated by the TTP. Data from 2021-2024 reflects a systematic increase in and sustained offensive by the TTP against Pakistani security forces, with people and infrastructure becoming collateral damage. However, Azm-e-Istehkam is not the first military operation in the region. Beyond intelligence-based operations (IBOs), the use of coercive force in the past has been counterproductive for political stability in the region. Due to mass IDP movements, and loss of livelihoods and infrastructure, local perceptions of persecution and racial profiling have increased, resulting in anti-state sentiment taking root, and later being politicized. The TTP has capitalized on this for its own recruitment and financing, especially given that ex-FATA has a youth bulge coupled with joblessness, lack of education, and constant exposure to violence. This is an ideal environment for militant groups to thrive in. However, repeated use of coercive force to counter the TTP is not enough to stop the violence, and measures need to be taken to address grievances regarding livelihoods and to incentivize the group to give up arms. Sustained efforts to resolve specific issues in the region, like enabling the judiciary and civil administration to exercise jurisdiction, the use of local culture and leadership to revive trust in the state and even negotiating with militants for incentive-based disarming could lead to long term peace in the region.
Based on your research and interviews with locals, what would be the best strategy for Pakistan, both at the provincial and federal level, to mitigate violence caused by the TTP? What are the economic, military, and social measures Pakistan would need to adopt to eliminate terrorism and ensure domestic stability and development?
NN: Countering terrorism action in ex-FATA Pakistan would benefit from divided responsibility and accountability of such initiatives across different relevant institutions at the national level. The military, for example, could focus on purely coercive counterterrorism initiatives, and avoid involvement in political and social aspects of counterterrorism-related policy interventions. The parliament would need to assume more responsibility and lead the policy reform on countering terrorism via parliamentary acts, legislative reform, political dialogue, and social interventions in ex-FATA and Balochistan, at both the provincial and national levels. Diplomatic engagement with the Afghan Taliban, ideally based on economic and connectivity-related incentives for a peaceful border, transparent transit and mobility, and curbing transnational crime and terror, could be useful. Relocating fighters in exchange for financial support may set a dangerous precedent in bilateral ties. This can also be constituted as a violation of international law, where countering violent terrorism by default requires international cooperation based on collective response.
Pakistan’s policy community needs to look at militancy and terrorism in the border areas as an overlap of indigenous and bilateral issues, which can be resolved only when favorable conditions at both the local and bilateral level exist. Instead of blaming locals or foreign governments for facilitating terrorists, a better approach is looking at militancy as a recurring phenomenon. Addressing this issue needs sustained political intervention and development initiatives at the local and bilateral level, to ensure anti-state elements become irrelevant to the local and state government. Political voices from KPK have opposed counterterrorism operations in the region. A prevailing air of distrust, sense of ethnic persecution, and fear of collateral damage could set back the political process that the state is trying to pursue with locals, meanwhile continuing intelligence-based operations under military operation.
Instead of blaming locals or foreign governments for facilitating terrorists, a better approach is looking at militancy as a recurring phenomenon. Addressing this issue needs sustained political intervention and development initiatives at the local and bilateral level, to ensure anti-state elements become irrelevant to the local and state government.
How effective have Pakistan’s efforts over the past three years been to encourage the Afghan Taliban to crack down on the TTP? What could Pakistan do to more effectively incentivize Taliban action against the TTP?
RWJ: The AIG has always responded positively to Pakistan’s requests for reining in the TTP, but they have been unsuccessful in dissuading the TTP from attacking Pakistan. There were occasions when the TTP commanders were feted by AIG officials in Kabul, suggesting the deep ideological linkages between the TTP and the Taliban. In despair over the double dealings of the AIG, the Pakistani government resorted to stricter border control measures like installing the single-entry visa regime, strengthening border check posts and surveillance, and deporting unlawful Afghan migrants. Pakistan leveraged timed-border-closures and trade regulation to force the AIG to control the TTP, but these measures have not yielded the desired results.
It is difficult to predict how effective Pakistan’s pleading with the AIG will be in persuading them to rein in the TTP. This is especially because the TTP knows the weaknesses of the AIG, such as the cleavages between the hardline and moderate Taliban, and their fear of Al Qaeda and ISKP. Afghanistan’s economic weakness and internal instability does not bode well for the security of the region. There is a possibility of an intensified civil war in Afghanistan if the Taliban leadership does not show flexibility and makes efforts towards inclusive governance and ensuring human rights. Pakistan does not have high expectations of the AIG’s ability to counter the TTP but has no option than to keep the Taliban leadership engaged in dialogue.
Given the airstrikes conducted by Pakistan in Afghanistan in December 2024, reports of the TTP’s relocation away from the border and into central Afghanistan, and recent references by Pakistan’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Mohammad Sadiq of a potential Preferential Trade Agreement between Islamabad and Kabul, how would you characterize the current state of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations? What can we expect from this bilateral in 2025?
RWJ: The current Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is tense, and things cannot improve unless the AIG displays resolve to assuage Pakistan’s genuine concerns regarding cross-border terrorism and illegal activities.
For one, despite several plans to relocate the TTP away from the border region, the initiative has not made any progress. Even the Pakistani airstrikes have not led to any serious efforts towards relocation of TTP sanctuaries away from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The TTP still operates in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan.
Additionally, AIG’s unstinted support to TTP has blocked bilateral trade along the border. Trade relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were already in quasi-preferential mode due to the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement and other bilateral arrangements. There is great potential in trade acting as a catalyst for peace between the two countries, especially through well-recognized and historical trade conduits at eight crossing points, including Torkham and Chaman. There is another possibility of a railroad and telecommunication corridor connecting Uzbekistan with Afghanistan and Pakistan through the Termez-Jalalabad-Peshawar route, which is supported by all regional countries. Trade and security issues, however, have been interlinked to the detriment of trade in the recent past. Due to the inability of the AIG to rein in the TTP, the Pakistani government has had to impose strong border controls in accordance with international best practices and law. However, the border controls and a single document entry regime have riled up the Afghans due to past informality and ease of border crossing. Over decades, a culture of illegal activities like smuggling, gun running, and drug peddling created a community of vested interests in such activity continuing. The imposition of trade restrictions and tariffs by Pakistan is meant to be a punitive measure to address increased militancy and cross-border crime. Ultimately, the restoration of trade and the facilitation of connectivity through infrastructural projects like the Trans Afghan Railway linking Central Asian states like Uzbekistan with Pakistan is likely to redound to the advantage of Afghanistan.
Pakistan is doing its best to positively engage with the AIG to impress upon it the value of peace and stability and the need for reining in terrorist entities like the TTP. The differences in outlook of several factions within the ruling AIG and the fear of outfits like the TTP, Al Qaeda and ISIS are acting like constraints on the ability of the AIG to control terrorism and placate neighboring countries like Pakistan.
The prognosis for the security situation in Afghanistan is bleak, with the ISKP gaining ground. Additionally, the increased economic and humanitarian problems along with internal rifts between the Kandhari and the Haqqani-dominated Kabul factions portend more instability and the possibility of internecine conflict amongst rival factions in Afghanistan. Pakistan and the region need to be wary of a possible outflow of refugees from Afghanistan in the wake of this strife. The international community on its part should worry about Al Qaeda and ISIS gaining ground in Afghanistan and projecting terrorist threats globally.
Brig. (retd.) Dr. Raashid Wali Janjua is a PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Pakistan and is a graduate of the Canadian Forces College with a Master’s degree in Security and Defence Management from the Royal Military College. He has extensive command and staff experience as a former Pakistani military officer and is a regular contributor to leading national and international dailies and journals. His area of research interest include security, energy politics, civil military relations, and South Asia.
Noorulain Naseem is an academic and policy researcher focused on Afghan refugees and border management in Pakistan. She is a former Stimson Center Visiting Fellow, and was previously a part of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), working on U.S.-Pakistan relations post the 2021 withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan.
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Editor’s Note: The views expressed are the authors’ own.
Image 1: Aamir Qureshi/AFP via Flickr
Image 2: UN Photo/Luke Powell via Flickr
