Once considered the Taliban’s “most important partner,” China faces a changed landscape in Afghanistan compared to the immediate aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover. Following a period of strong engagement with China, the Taliban is now courting a broader array of partners. Instead of laying out a grand vision for Afghanistan, China has preferred to steadily build on core drivers of bilateral engagement with Afghanistan that existed before the takeover, including counterterrorism, humanitarian aid, small attempts at regional connectivity, and emphasis on regional mechanisms. It has not been eager to make big bets on Afghanistan or officially recognize the Taliban. This choice allows China to share the burden of rebuilding the country but could also limit its influence in Afghanistan as the Taliban seeks support from competing powers like India.
Building on Existing Drivers of Engagement
So far, Beijing has not strongly laid out a grand strategic vision for Afghanistan’s future, deferring to an Afghan-led process. China was never the most important power in Afghanistan before the takeover; in 2019, then-Ambassador to Afghanistan Wang Yu conceded China lacked strength to support Afghanistan alone. Around that time, China’s engagement with Afghanistan was framed publicly in terms of counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, small efforts at regional connectivity, and using multilateral mechanisms to resolve issues.
China has since offered some ideas for Afghanistan’s future, e.g. through the 2022 Tunxi Initiative emphasizing regional economic cooperation published alongside Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. However, for China, this largely constituted previously existing plans; for example, China has nominally attempted to incorporate Afghanistan under the Belt and Road Initiative existing since at least 2016, with a plan to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan introduced in 2019 as the means. While China still apparently seeks to extend CPEC, implementation has been weak or nonexistent and will struggle to proceed without official recognition of the Taliban. In the meantime, the core aspects previously driving China-Afghanistan relations have continued and will likely continue to frame bilateral relations as demonstrated by the recent trilateral China-Pakistan-Taliban meeting, in which China again reiterated commitment to extending CPEC and emphasized the trilateral mechanism and joint counterterrorism efforts.
While China still apparently seeks to extend CPEC, implementation has been weak or nonexistent and will struggle to proceed without official recognition of the Taliban.
China clearly has aspirations to strengthen regional connectivity by capitalizing on Afghanistan’s geographical location, but these are tempered by challenges including armed terrorist groups like ISIS, limited basic infrastructure, and humanitarian issues. There are also Taliban internal divisions that some Chinese analysts warn could lead to violence. Despite these challenges, China has few options other than to engage the Taliban as the power most likely to remain in charge of volatile Afghanistan on China’s western border.
Engagement Waxes and Wanes
Chinese officials believe the Taliban will lead Afghanistan going forward and therefore they must engage with the regime. Beijing laid the groundwork to engage the group prior to their takeover of the country to hedge its bets in anticipation of prolonged conflict; it called for the group to be reintegrated into the “political mainstream” in June 2021, increasing touchpoints that July, and hosting a Taliban delegation in Beijing roughly two weeks before the takeover. Shortly after the takeover, the Taliban called China its “most important partner” in rebuilding Afghanistan.
China was one of 16 countries to maintain its embassy in Kabul and held its first official meeting with the new Taliban government on September 26, 2021. China was also the first country to appoint a new ambassador to Taliban-led Afghanistan and the first country to accept a Taliban-appointed ambassador, with President Xi Jinping even accepting the ambassador’s credentials at a formal ceremony alongside 41 other ambassadors. Since the takeover, China has continuously provided rhetorical support for the Taliban at the UN, calling for the United States to remove sanctions and release Afghanistan’s overseas assets. Against this backdrop, Chinese embassy-reported interactions between Chinese and Taliban officials spiked from late March–late July 2024.
These developments seem to point to China’s centrality for the Taliban. Yet relative to their peak in 2024, official interactions have recently become more sparse; embassy-reported interactions fell by half in the first four months of 2025 relative to the same period in 2024. Most recently, China’s special envoy for Afghanistan attended trilateral discussions with Pakistan and the Taliban in Kabul May 10–11 with follow-on trilateral discussions of their foreign ministers in Beijing two weeks later. While in Beijing, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi met separately with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for the first time since October 2023. However, Wang is not the only foreign minister Muttaqi met recently. The Taliban seems to be getting courted by other regional players; while in Doha weeks earlier, Muttaqi met Qatar’s minister of state for foreign affairs and also stopped over in Iran where he met with Iran’s foreign minister. In fact, Muttaqi even met Iran’s president. By contrast, Muttaqi has never met with Xi.
Relative to the period shortly after the takeover, it is clear the Taliban has more options for partners to engage with, allowing it to shift its diplomatic efforts elsewhere: the group is building relations with countries like the UAE and Iran but also countries competing with China, including India and even potentially the United States, which is reviewing its classification of the Taliban as a terrorist organization. Most recently, the Taliban strengthened relations with Russia, which dropped the Taliban’s terror group designation and could become the fifth country to accept a Taliban ambassador.
As it gains more partners, the Taliban is now committing to a “balanced foreign policy,” no longer calling China its “most important partner” but rather only “one of” its most important partners. This is particularly salient considering the recent India-Pakistan conflict in which China appeared to back Pakistan early on, damaging ties with India. After Chinese and Pakistani envoys met with the Taliban in Kabul May 10–11 in the wake of the crisis, Pakistani media claimed that China and Pakistan had elbowed India out of Afghanistan. Days later, however, the Taliban foreign minister made first contact with India’s foreign minister over the phone as Indian officials teased “bold moves” in Afghanistan. This shows how as the Taliban prioritizes a play for official recognition internationally, it is attempting to court as many actors as possible, which could limit China’s influence. China offers needed economic investment, but other countries like Russia have as well. China’s early challenges with following through on investment offers may also tilt the balance.
Prospects for Diplomatic Recognition
As I have argued elsewhere, China has not stepped into the void in Afghanistan in the manner some predicted, opting instead for a cautious approach and expressing weak enthusiasm for meaningfully building out economic ties. This has limited bilateral relations, with the Taliban calling to expedite existing initiatives and noting a sizable trade imbalance.
While China has so far not been willing to be the first to officially recognize the Taliban, it is also unlikely to fully expand relations until the question of diplomatic recognition is settled. Some reports indicate simultaneous recognition by multiple regional powers could be more likely to avoid reputational costs. In the meantime, as the UN develops a new proposal for Afghanistan, it is likely China will fit any prospective recognition in the context of that process. In doing so, it could lose some early-won influence to other partners the Taliban must court to gain recognition. With continuing barriers to rebuilding Afghanistan, however, Beijing may be happy for other actors to step in to Afghanistan rather than incurring the political cost of unilaterally recognizing the Taliban government.
With continuing barriers to rebuilding Afghanistan, however, Beijing may be happy for other actors to step in to Afghanistan rather than incurring the political cost of unilaterally recognizing the Taliban government.
This choice, however, comes with a cost. For example, as the Taliban more strongly lobbies Chinese competitor India to deepen ties, this invites Indian influence into Afghanistan not only for competing development projects but also for rival regional connectivity initiatives such as the Taliban’s prioritization of India-invested Chabahar port over Chinese-invested ports in Pakistan, threatening China’s regional aspirations.
Conclusion
China’s status as the Taliban’s “most important partner” is in question. With its cautious approach to expanding relations with Taliban-led Afghanistan, Beijing is now seeing the Taliban seek out new partners more actively than before, potentially diluting its influence in Afghanistan. While Beijing may have willingly stepped back from a stronger role due to the challenges of rebuilding Afghanistan, this could invite negative strategic consequences Chinese officials will have to manage.
As the Taliban approaches four years in power, Chinese officials believe they have no choice but to engage them but have not and likely will not take the lead to unilaterally recognize the Taliban without international or at least regional support. Though China is increasing trilateral efforts with Pakistan and the Taliban following the Pahalgam incident and the India-Pakistan conflict, the Taliban is emphasizing it will pursue a more balanced foreign policy than before, inviting more actors into Afghanistan—even some that Chinese analysts fear could harm Beijing’s interests. While China will still be an important partner country for the Taliban in the future, it is increasingly becoming just one of multiple, able to share the burden of stabilizing Afghanistan with some but also facing the threat of increased competition in the country from others.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: Pragmatism Shapes Growing GCC Engagement with the Taliban
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Image 1: Image via Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Image 2: Image via Ministry of Foreign Affairs
