The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is increasingly positioned as the primary vehicle for regional cooperation in South Asia amid the decline of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). BIMSTEC – comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand —has gained momentum by focusing on pragmatic economic and connectivity projects.
At the 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok (April 2025), leaders adopted the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030—the bloc’s first long-term strategy—and inked new accords on maritime connectivity and security cooperation. However, like SAARC, BIMSTEC’s actual test will be to determine how the grouping can navigate an increasingly challenging geopolitical and security landscape in the region.
BIMSTEC’s Rise Amid SAARC’s Decline
India and its neighbors have increasingly shifted focus to BIMSTEC as a more viable cooperative platform, as SAARC has effectively been moribund since its last summit in 2014, paralyzed by India–Pakistan hostilities over cross-border terrorism. The recent Pahalgam attack in April, during which militants linked to Pakistan-based groups killed 26 civilians in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, has further deepened regional mistrust and dealt a blow to any hopes of reviving SAARC.
In a pointed signal, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi began his second term in 2019, he invited BIMSTEC leaders to his inauguration, unlike his first term, when he had invited SAARC leaders. This pivot also aligned with India’s broader Act East policy, which seeks deeper integration with Southeast Asia. BIMSTEC is a natural platform to operationalize this strategic shift since it brings together five South Asian and two Southeast Asian states. Given these imperatives, India has played a central role in BIMSTEC’s revival in recent years, pushing for greater institutionalization and anchoring the group’s agenda on connectivity, trade, and security.
In a pointed signal, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi began his second term in 2019, he invited BIMSTEC leaders to his inauguration, unlike his first term, when he had invited SAARC leaders. This pivot also aligned with India’s broader Act East policy, which seeks deeper integration with Southeast Asia. BIMSTEC is a natural platform to operationalize this strategic shift since it brings together five South Asian and two Southeast Asian states.
Formed in 1997, BIMSTEC initially struggled to gain traction, with limited coordination and sporadic summits over its first two decades. Its earlier focus on technical cooperation remained fragmented and lacked a cohesive institutional structure until recently. This changed during the 2022 Colombo Summit, which saw the adoption of the BIMSTEC Charter—a landmark defining the bloc’s objectives and formal structure. While the Bangkok summit’s agenda was notably broad, BIMSTEC’s claim as the premier South Asian forum stems more from SAARC’s paralysis and India’s strategic pivot than from fully realized regional integration.
Trade Integration and Maritime Connectivity Gains
Economic integration is at the core of BIMSTEC’s mandate, and the Bangkok Summit made notable strides. However, intra-BIMSTEC trade remains low—about 6 percent of members’ total trade—held back by a lack of political will, poor customs harmonization, weak transport infrastructure, and underdeveloped value chains. Despite years of negotiations since 2004 and over 20 rounds of talks, the BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) remains elusive, stalled by differing tariff sensitivities, limited value chain integration, and concerns about asymmetric benefits for smaller economies.
In this context, during the Bangkok Summit, Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra urged the acceleration of the FTA to unlock the region’s trade potential, emphasizing that BIMSTEC’s combined population should trade far more with each other. Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, during a much-anticipated meeting with Indian PM Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the summit, echoed this call, emphasizing Dhaka’s expectation that India help break the FTA deadlock. This priority has been made more pressing by global protectionist trends.
The Summit also delivered a significant breakthrough with the Agreement on Maritime Transport Cooperation. This pact creates a framework to streamline shipping across the Bay of Bengal, reducing logistical hurdles and costs for moving goods between member states. Enhanced maritime connectivity is intended to complement land corridor projects like the India–Myanmar–Thailand trilateral highway, though this remains uncertain; construction on key stretches has been halted due to the ongoing civil conflict in Myanmar.
All members stand to gain from these initiatives. India, for example, can use BIMSTEC to link its northeastern states to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand, spurring development. Smaller economies like Nepal and Bhutan would gain easier access to ports and markets, while littoral states like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka anticipate growth from streamlined shipping links. Thailand, an ASEAN economy that is reaching westward, sees BIMSTEC as a channel into South Asian consumer markets and a platform for cross-regional infrastructure projects.
Nonetheless, BIMSTEC’s track record counsels realism; Prime Minister Shinawatra’s push for the FTA could re-energize negotiations, but entrenched divergences among member states continue to delay any breakthrough. The FTA talks have languished for years, illustrating the challenge of translating political intent into binding deals. Many connectivity projects have seen delays due to funding and bureaucratic hurdles, so members will need to sustain momentum—allocating resources, resolving technical issues, and adhering to timelines—to ensure these commitments yield tangible results.
Yet, much of this remains at the framework level, and significant questions persist about execution timelines and financing. The summit reiterated the urgency of concluding the long-pending BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement, though past efforts suggest that political will, not vision, remains the primary bottleneck.
Geoeconomic Initiatives and Institutional Reforms
At the Bangkok Summit, BIMSTEC leaders unveiled concrete initiatives alongside lofty goals. They signed a landmark agreement on maritime transport to ease the movement of goods across member-state ports and welcomed a new security partnership through a memorandum with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to combat transnational crimes. The leaders collectively endorsed the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030, an aspirational roadmap to make the Bay of Bengal region ‘prosperous, resilient, and open’ by 2030. The summit communiqué also reiterated the urgency in finalizing the long-pending BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement and improving physical connectivity, where progress has lagged despite repeated commitments. Following the strong earthquake in late March that struck Myanmar and Thailand, BIMSTEC leaders issued a joint statement of solidarity and pledged support for the affected areas.
On the institutional front, the Bangkok Summit made strides to strengthen BIMSTEC from within. Members adopted Rules of Procedure for BIMSTEC meetings—a step that will lend greater consistency and efficiency to the organization’s operations. They also endorsed an Eminent Persons Group report with recommendations to reform and revitalize BIMSTEC’s structures. A key priority is bolstering the BIMSTEC Secretariat in Dhaka, which has been understaffed and underfunded, limiting the implementation of joint decisions. Steps to boost the Secretariat’s resources—and even establish a dedicated fund for BIMSTEC projects—are under consideration.
The Specter of Geopolitical Instability
Unlike SAARC, which remains immobilized by India–Pakistan tensions, BIMSTEC’s architecture avoids these fault lines by excluding Pakistan. However, BIMSTEC is not immune to internal frictions or external pressure points, ranging from Myanmar’s instability and Bangladesh’s interim governance to regional concerns about China’s growing presence. Even as member states deepen economic linkages, persistent bilateral tensions, like the recent diplomatic unease between India and Bangladesh, test BIMSTEC’s cohesion.
Even as member states deepen economic linkages, persistent bilateral tensions, like the recent diplomatic unease between India and Bangladesh, test BIMSTEC’s cohesion.
In the context of these challenges, BIMSTEC’s consensus-based approach, while inclusive, can slow down decision-making, particularly on sensitive security matters. So far, the grouping has chosen to prioritize functional economic cooperation over contentious political or security mediation—a strategy that has allowed it to progress where SAARC faltered. However, BIMSTEC cannot afford to ignore regional security dynamics altogether. There is scope for limited, issue-based cooperation—such as intelligence sharing on trafficking networks, coordinated disaster response, or capacity building in border management—without venturing into political arbitration.
Rather than replicate SAARC’s expansive but unwieldy mandate, BIMSTEC can focus on soft security areas that directly affect trade and connectivity. Strengthening institutional mechanisms, investing in conflict-resilient infrastructure, and engaging civil society networks can allow the bloc to balance its economic agenda with ground-level realities. The test of BIMSTEC’s success will not be in avoiding difficult issues, but in navigating them pragmatically to preserve momentum toward a more resilient and interconnected Bay of Bengal region.
Looking ahead, Bangladesh’s chairmanship of BIMSTEC—beginning amid a politically turbulent transition in Dhaka—will test whether the bloc can maintain momentum. With Myanmar’s internal conflict unresolved and other members juggling domestic challenges, BIMSTEC’s path forward hinges on translating summit-level intent into project-level delivery. The coming years will reveal whether the bloc can institutionalize its vision or remain trapped in summit diplomacy.
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Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Image 1: Ministry of External Affairs via Flickr
Image 2: Ministry of External Affairs via Flickr
