On May 8, South Asian Voices spoke with Ambassador Jalil Abbas Jilani about the May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and the path forward for the relationship. Ambassador Jilani is a former Pakistani diplomat who served as Foreign Secretary, Ambassador to the United States, and caretaker Foreign Minister. This Q&A is part of the SAV collection marking one year after the May 2025 crisis.
Please describe the diplomatic state of affairs prior to the May 2025 crisis. What was the status and/or trajectory of the India-Pakistan relationship at that time?
The relationship between Pakistan and India has not been very promising over the last five or six years, particularly since 2019. In August 2019, India amended its constitution and repealed Article 370, as well as Article 35A. Subsequently, it issued maps depicting Indian-administered Kashmir not as a disputed territory, but as an integral part of India.
If you recall, prior to August 2019, in February, there was a clash between India and Pakistan when India violated the international boundary, violated Pakistan’s sovereignty, and attacked Balakot on what Pakistan maintains was a false pretext. At the time, Pakistan responded decisively. However, relations deteriorated even further after the August 2019 actions. Diplomatic representation was downgraded, the high commissioners were recalled, trade was suspended, and Pakistani airspace was closed to India.
Since then, there has been no formal dialogue between Pakistan and India at any level, apart from periodic engagement through Track 2 channels. In those discussions, our side advanced several proposals aimed at breaking the deadlock and restoring a more normal relationship, because we regarded the prevailing situation as unprecedented. Since 1947, even after major wars, the longest period before the two countries returned to the negotiating table was roughly two years. This time, however, nearly six years have elapsed with virtually no meaningful communication between the two sides.
In fact, I would describe the period from 2014 until the present as “barren years” in Pakistan-India relations, because there has been no serious effort to alter the status quo or initiate the kind of substantive dialogue that emerged in 2003 and 2004. In November 2003, we declared a ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC), which India reciprocated. Then we extended an invitation to Prime Minister Vajpayee. Thereafter, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Pakistan in January 2004, and together we established a mechanism through which both countries committed themselves to a meaningful and results-oriented peace process.
I was personally involved in that process, and I believe history will record the period from late 2003 until the Mumbai attacks in 2008 as perhaps the most constructive and forward-looking phase in the history of Pakistan-India relations. Virtually every major issue was placed on the table, including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which from our perspective remains the principal source of tension between the two countries. We came remarkably close to an interim understanding on Jammu and Kashmir. We were also nearing agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek, while terrorism was being addressed comprehensively through structured engagement between the two sides. India was expected to address Pakistan’s concerns regarding terrorism, and we, in turn, were prepared to address India’s concerns. Unfortunately, however, that process was ultimately disrupted.
“I would describe the period from 2014 until the present as ‘barren years’ in Pakistan-India relations, because there has been no serious effort to alter the status quo or initiate the kind of substantive dialogue that emerged in 2003 and 2004.”
In the aftermath of the May 2025 crisis, observers in India and Pakistan had remarkably divergent perceptions of the conflict and its diplomatic and security implications. How do you understand the military and geopolitical balance between India and Pakistan following the crisis?
In Pakistan, there is a strong belief that despite our comparatively limited resources, Pakistan emerged with the upper hand, while India, notwithstanding its overwhelming military capabilities, economic strength, and international influence, found itself strategically disadvantaged. One indication of this was that the narrative India advanced regarding Pahalgam failed to gain meaningful international endorsement, aside from perhaps Israel and Afghanistan.
Regardless of the competing perceptions within the two countries, I think the broader international community understands where the balance lay. Pakistan maintains that it was able to shoot down eight Indian aircraft without losing a single aircraft of its own. Despite operating systems and equipment that were far less costly than the sophisticated platforms India had acquired over the years, we were able to inflict substantial damage. Within Pakistan, the prevailing perception is that we not only downed aircraft, but also destroyed two S-400 batteries and successfully targeted ten Indian operational bases.
Having said that, the geopolitical environment has changed considerably. India had acquired a certain strategic importance internationally for a variety of geopolitical reasons. However, from our perspective, and from the perspective of many international analysts, that standing has diminished somewhat over the last several years.
What has Pakistan learned from the May 2025 crisis? In particular, how has Pakistan’s India policy shifted following the crisis, if at all?
One important lesson was that we had assumed India would refrain from repeating the mistake it made in 2019, because at that time Pakistan not only imposed significant costs on the Indian Air Force, but also took an Indian pilot into custody, whom we subsequently returned with the dignity and respect accorded to Prisoners of War (PoWs). We were also able to jam Indian communication systems during that episode.
To speak candidly, the earlier wars between India and Pakistan now appear almost primitive by comparison. This is the era of electronic warfare. The technology and capabilities we had acquired over the years proved sufficient to inflict significant damage on the other side. The lesson, therefore, is that we must never lower our guard. If anything, I believe we will be even better prepared in the future, because this relationship with India has become increasingly volatile and unpredictable, which is deeply unfortunate.
Pakistan has consistently maintained that there is ultimately no alternative to peace between our two countries. War is simply not a viable option between two nuclear powers. Even if one sets aside the nuclear dimension entirely, the conventional military capabilities acquired by both sides are sufficient to cause devastating destruction.
Some observers have framed the May 2025 crisis as catalyzing a reversal of fortunes in Pakistani foreign policy, particularly vis-a-vis West Asia and major powers like the United States – would you agree with that characterization? Why or why not?
Certainly, May 2025 was an extremely significant episode in Pakistan’s history. In many respects, it represented a turning point.
At the same time, from my perspective and from the perspective of many colleagues internationally, India’s strategic momentum had already begun to slow over the preceding several years. A number of factors contributed to this shift. One was a growing sense of disappointment within the United States, even before President Trump entered the political arena. From what we understood, there was an increasingly strong perception in Washington that while the so-called “strategic relationship” cultivated with India over nearly three decades had greatly benefited India, the relationship lacked reciprocity. India, for example, did not support the U.S. position on Ukraine, and it proceeded with the acquisition of the S-400 system despite the risk of U.S. sanctions.
There was also disappointment regarding India’s inability to fully meet expectations as a “net security provider” in Asia. The India-China border clashes in 2020, during which India lost control of 26 patrolling points in Eastern Ladakh, were one example. The events of May 2025 further reinforced those perceptions. Additionally, the ideological orientation of the current Indian government damaged India’s image internationally to a considerable extent. All of these developments were interconnected in one way or another.
When I describe May 2025 as a turning point, I do so because there was genuine surprise internationally. Many had assumed that if India attacked Pakistan, Pakistan would be incapable of mounting a meaningful response. Yet the response Pakistan delivered fundamentally challenged that assumption. Similar perceptions existed in the GCC countries, across West Asia, throughout South Asia, and in Europe and the United States. We have noticed that Pakistan is now being viewed with a greater degree of seriousness internationally.
Another important factor is that over the last three decades, the United States focused overwhelmingly on India, often at the expense of engagement with the rest of South Asia. Many countries in the region consequently felt marginalized, creating strategic space for U.S. competitors. I believe that realization has now begun to emerge in Washington and is gradually being corrected, as the United States is once again engaging more comprehensively not only with Pakistan, but with other South Asian countries as well.
I recall one particularly interesting remark by a very senior U.S. official, who observed that the era of “strategic altruism” toward India had come to an end and had been replaced by “strategic reciprocity.”
What areas, if any, do you think have the most potential for India-Pakistan diplomatic reengagement one year following the crisis?
I have been involved in Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy for many years since returning from Washington, where I served as ambassador, and I was also directly involved in the earlier peace process. I have absolutely no doubt that war between our two countries is not an option. Even conventional war is no longer a realistic option. One cannot credibly assume that a conventional conflict could remain indefinitely below the nuclear threshold. As I mentioned earlier, this is an age of electronic and technological warfare. These are no longer wars fought man-to-man, tank-to-tank, or gun-to-gun. Modern conflict is aerial, technological, and multidimensional, with innumerable ways of inflicting damage on the other side. War, therefore, cannot be the answer.
In my view, the two countries should pursue several steps, many of which Pakistan has proposed to India over time.
First, both sides must demonstrate genuine statesmanship and a serious political commitment to a Pakistan-India peace process, because such a commitment is indispensable. Unfortunately, that political will has largely been absent. We have not witnessed it from the Indian side. Pakistan, however, remains prepared and willing to engage in a comprehensive dialogue with India.
We are also willing to establish a discreet and candid mechanism through which both sides can address concerns related to terrorism. Pakistan has concerns regarding what it asserts is Indian support for various Baloch organizations, while India has concerns regarding extremist groups that create instability for India. Such organizations are also deeply problematic for Pakistan. We would like to defeat them comprehensively. But, as the saying goes, it takes two to tango. We would therefore welcome discussions on these issues as part of a broader and structured comprehensive dialogue.
At the same time, we recognize that there are certain compulsions within India’s domestic political environment. Over the last thirteen or fourteen years, Pakistan has increasingly become an issue in Indian election campaigns. One important step would therefore be to refrain from using each other as political instruments during elections. Fortunately, India has not been a major issue in Pakistani election campaigns since the 1970s. Indeed, if one examines the manifestos of Pakistan’s major political parties, they consistently advocate peaceful coexistence and trade not only with India, but with all neighboring states.
“Ultimately, perpetual confrontation benefits neither country nor their peoples. We should be cooperating with one another rather than remaining trapped in an endless cycle of hostility.”
We would also welcome the establishment of a credible backchannel that enjoys the confidence and trust of both governments. Such a mechanism could quietly explore various possibilities and help build understandings between the two sides. Ultimately, however, the revival of a structured dialogue process remains of paramount importance.
The respective high commissioners should return to their posts, and both diplomatic missions should be restored to full strength. We should also uphold the confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed upon over the years, including the Kashmir-related CBMs negotiated between 2005 and 2007, such as the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, cross-LoC trade, and meeting points for Kashmiris pending a final resolution of the dispute.
Similarly, all military and nuclear CBMs should continue to be respected. But for any of this to happen, political will is essential, as is sensitivity to each other’s concerns and comfort levels. We must also cultivate a broader national consensus in favor of peace. Equally important is the need for both sides to exercise restraint in making hostile public statements, because such rhetoric shapes public opinion and creates an atmosphere that makes diplomacy considerably more difficult.
Trade is another area of immense importance. When I left India in 2003, bilateral trade stood at approximately USD $250 million. Once the peace process began, trade increased within just a few years to nearly USD $3 billion, and we were looking toward a trajectory of USD $10 to $12 billion within the following four to five years because of the conducive environment that had emerged. Governments did not need to do very much. We simply facilitated visas for businessmen and investors from both countries. That allowed direct interaction, fostered familiarity, and gradually built confidence between the two sides. That is precisely the kind of environment to which we should aspire to return.
In summary, the world is changing, and we too must adapt to those changes. If Iran and the United States can engage in dialogue despite decades of hostility and recent conflict, then we too must reflect seriously on whether the trajectory our two countries have followed since 2014 truly serves our long-term interests. Ultimately, perpetual confrontation benefits neither country nor their peoples. We should be cooperating with one another rather than remaining trapped in an endless cycle of hostility.
Views expressed are the interviewee’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: Testing Deterrence: South Asia’s Strategic Stability After May 2025
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Image 1: Government of Pakistan via X
Image 2: Government of Pakistan via X
