On May 4, South Asian Voices spoke with Ambassador TCA Raghavan about the May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and the path forward for the relationship. Ambassador Raghavan is a former Indian diplomat who served as the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan from 2013 to 2015. He is a renowned historian and author whose works include The People Next Door: The Curious History of India’s Relations with Pakistan. This Q&A is part of the SAV collection marking one year after the May 2025 crisis.
Please describe the diplomatic state of affairs prior to the May 2025 crisis. What was the status and/or trajectory of the India-Pakistan relationship at that time?
India-Pakistan relations had been on a downward trajectory from roughly the middle of 2016 onwards. At the time of the April-May crisis of 2025, they were on a very low plateau. I say it was a low plateau because diplomatic relations had been downgraded. The mission strengths of the high commissions in both countries had been crunched quite substantially. There was a ban on trade. There was virtually a freeze on any kind of sporting, cultural, or people-to-people contact. So, all together, it was a relationship which was on a very low plateau.
The reason for that, of course, was twofold. In large part, the downward trend began after successive terrorist attacks from early 2016 onwards. Thereafter, some part of the downswing was following measures announced by Pakistan because of the legislative changes which took place in India with regard to Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. So, in brief, India-Pakistan relations in April-May 2025 were on a very low plateau and, on the whole, had been on a downward trajectory since 2016.
In the aftermath of the May 2025 crisis, observers in India and Pakistan had remarkably divergent perceptions of the conflict and its diplomatic and security implications. How do you understand the military and geopolitical balance between India and Pakistan following the crisis?
That India and Pakistan had radically divergent perceptions, both of the evolution of the crisis itself and of its outcome, is not surprising in itself. Most India-Pakistan conflicts have had much that same character, that both sides walk away with widely divergent perceptions of what led to the crisis, what happened during the crisis, and what the outcome of the crisis was. This time was not very different.
In terms of respective takeaways, the view in India was that a strong message has been sent to Pakistan following the terrorist outrage in Pahalgam in April 2025. In Pakistan, the view was that India has been very effectively deterred. I don’t think the crisis has changed the military or geopolitical balance between the two countries in any significant way.
“I think people in India have reconsidered this perception that Pakistan is rendered almost paralyzed or enormously weak by its internal situation. […] To my mind, that is one big takeaway for many Indians from the May 2025 crisis.”
To follow up on the diplomatic implications, one thing that some Pakistani analysts argue is that Pakistan’s performance in the crisis led to an elevation of its profile and perhaps had negative diplomatic consequences for India. How are those types of arguments received in India?
While the crisis occurred because of a major terrorist attack—what has changed is the context of that terrorist attack: The Pahalgam attack took place in an international environment in which the Global War on Terror (GWoT) is effectively over. So, it’s quite unlike the situation which occurred during past India-Pakistan crises in 2001 or 2008, or even in 2016 or 2019. Because the GWOT is over, countries’ responses to this situation were not so much because of that global narrative or that global umbrella, but based on their own assessments and interests.
Therefore, in that sense, the Pakistani perspective that India did not get international support for the actions it took or the Indian position that Pakistani transgressions with regard to terrorism were highlighted are both correct. But the fact is that they are taking place in a different international context in which a global narrative with regard to terrorism no longer exists.
What has India learned from the May 2025 crisis?
I don’t know whether there’s one single big takeaway which India has had as a whole. I think different people have different takeaways. I’m sure that on the government side or on the military side, people have their own assessments. Similarly, in Pakistan, there’ll be different assessments. I don’t think there’s one single takeaway.
But to my mind, one big lesson—or perhaps not so much a lesson, but a certain insight—which many Indians gained was that the perception which they had of Pakistan being in a state of deep internal crisis—because of that “poly crisis” phase from 2021 onwards, when Pakistan was going through multiple internal convulsions including civil-military clashes, the economic downturn, the internal security situation—needed correction. I think people in India have reconsidered this perception that Pakistan is rendered almost paralyzed or enormously weak by its internal situation. This idea that Pakistan is on a severe downturn and, because of that, lacks agency—I think people have rethought that view. To my mind, that is one big takeaway for many Indians from the May 2025 crisis.
Many analysts situated Operation Sindoor within an ongoing trend of firmer Indian military responses to alleged cross-border terror attacks – PM Modi’s articulation of a “new normal” in India’s approach toward Pakistan seemed to confirm this policy trajectory. A year on from the crisis, what impact, if any, has this “new normal” doctrine had on the Indian government’s approach to Pakistan? Has there been any debate within the foreign policy community on the future of India’s Pakistan policy?
As you mentioned, the response in May 2025 was part of a series of measures which had been embarked upon even earlier. There were the “surgical strikes” in 2016, and then deeper strikes in 2019. So, it is certainly not a break in that trend.
I think what outside observers sometimes miss when they assess this particular phase of India-Pakistan relations is how deep the internal frustration is in India about Pakistan’s unwillingness to take action against terrorist groups which have had a certain sanctuary or “free play” over there.
This deep frustration was internalized and cemented itself following the Mumbai terrorist attack when, after five or six years of trying to pursue a bilateral cooperative track with Pakistan to convert information into legal evidence which could be used to bring about convictions in Pakistan for the conspirators behind that attack, that whole endeavor ground to a halt for reasons that had to do not so much with the legal process, but to do with Pakistan state policy. I think the response in India was a deeply cynical takeaway that political and diplomatic engagement with Pakistan is on the whole pointless. In parallel, the thinking that believes in giving diplomacy a higher priority in addressing India-Pakistan issues or advocates some minimal constructive engagement is greatly weakened. A certain bedrock of hardheaded cynicism has set in that argues that the only way to deal with this constant terrorist threat is through a strong kinetic counterterrorism response. This view has very significant popular support. So, I would say that if that can be called a new normal, that is really the new normal.
Consequently, there is surprisingly little debate about this approach. I say “surprisingly little” because normally, most issues with regard to Pakistan policy are pretty fiercely debated and contested in India. But this approach is widely accepted because of the deep bedrock of cynicism and frustration which set in following the successive failures of diplomatic engagement to secure Pakistani cooperation on counterterrorism.
There’s also an international environment which feels that with the end of the GWoT, firm kinetic responses are a very effective way to address the terrorist threat. Indeed, in many ways, the actions which India has taken against Pakistan are actually mirrored by the actions which Pakistan is taking against Afghanistan, both in diplomatic terms as also in kinetic and military terms. So, I think it is part of a wider trend, with similar examples in other regional situations also.
Thinking about coercion theory as applied in both the India-Pakistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan cases, we’re seeing that firmer kinetic responses to alleged cross-border terrorism may not necessarily be having the deterrent effect that the coercer intends. With that in mind, how has India evaluated the impact if its recent approach to Pakistan?
Whenever there’s a major cross border terrorist attack in any country, anywhere in the world or at any time, there are always two dimensions to the response. One is, how do you address public outrage in your own country? Secondly, how do you send a message to the other country from where the terrorist group operated?
Now, it’s a fair question: does a kinetic response act as a deterrent in terms of preventing further terrorist attacks? One doesn’t know. But certainly, the historical evidence is that perhaps not. There are many examples of that, both in the India-Pakistan case or in the Pakistan-Afghanistan case, or indeed in other cases. There’s also a more general emergent international trend that military actions do not lead to the kind of political results you want. We see that in the ongoing war in Ukraine. We also see that in the ongoing war in Iran. Very evidently, there are limits to what military action actually achieves unless you have capacities to bring about total regime change or a comprehensive military defeat.
But I think the reality is that, at some stage, governments have to take kinetic measures to send a clear message, regardless of the fact that that they will not alter reality in any significant long-term, structural sense. This means that the kinetic option will always remain there for countries to use when they face a major threat.
Some analysts contend that the tumultuous period in U.S.-India relations began with the dispute over the U.S. role in the India-Pakistan ceasefire in May 2025. In your view, how did the crisis and its aftermath shape India’s relationship with the United States, if at all?
In optical terms, I think the crisis did impact India-U.S. relations, but substantively, perhaps not very much. The India-U.S. relationship today has a very broad base in terms of economy, technology, investments, trade, and more. So, I think that the overall structure of the relationship has not been impacted. But there is a certain optical impact in terms of public opinion in India—a feeling that the United States is no longer looking at India-Pakistan relations in the way that it did during the GWoT era.
The other point to remember is that there were many in India who felt that the U.S. policy with regard to Pakistan had shifted in a structural sense in favor of India, from about 2018 onwards, and especially after 2021. However, other analysts in India have always argued that given Pakistan’s attributes—its size, population, nuclear weapons capability, and sensitive geopolitical location—the United States will always have a major stake in maintaining a substantive relationship with Pakistan. So, this optical kind of disappointment, which there was in India over the U.S. role being perceived as not entirely even-handed or not being supportive of India, I think many people have now pointed out that that view itself was short-sighted.
“India-Pakistan relations in the past have often moved forward […] on the basis of political initiatives. So, we should never rule out the possibility of fresh political initiatives to change what is now a very bleak landscape.”
One point that has been made by some analysts that has generated a little bit of controversy is this idea that a United States that is closer to Pakistan might be less supportive of Indian kinetic actions against Pakistan in the future. What do you make of that analysis?
It’s very difficult to assess what position the United States will take because that position keeps changing. So, I don’t think any cut and dry assessments can be made. But my overall sense is that the U.S. posture in South Asia was always about maintaining a substantive relationship with all the parties concerned, especially in the India-Pakistan context.
That particular phase from 2018 to 2024, when U.S. diplomatic posture was certainly tilted against Pakistan, with virtually no high-level contact between Pakistan and the United States, lots of frictions pertaining to Afghanistan and more—I think that phase is now over. So, the US will revert to its original posture of formulating positions not on the basis of any preconceived notions or tilts, but based on which way it wants to go depending on its own assessment of the situation. In a sense, just like all countries—including India—want to have strategic autonomy, the United States also wants to retain its strategic autonomy on South Asian issues. In brief, the US position now is changed from what it was in the decade prior to 2025, or more specifically in the 2018-2025 period.
What are the prospects for India-Pakistan diplomacy, one year after the May 2025 crisis?
Unfortunately, I see no objective signs which would suggest that there is some forward movement possible. There’s no indication of that in terms of the postures of either government, and especially in terms of the position of the Government of India, because its position with regard to cross border terrorism is very firm and very clear.
But this is not to say that there is zero possibility of any change. India-Pakistan relations in the past have often moved forward on the basis not so much of cut and dry analysis or diplomatic assessments, but on the basis of political initiatives. So, we should never rule out the possibility of fresh political initiatives to change what is now a very bleak landscape.
The second point, which may not have any basis or objective reasoning to support it but is certainly interesting, is the fact that the overall narrative on Pakistan-Afghanistan cross border issues is very similar to the narrative on India-Pakistan issues. So, that suggests that there is a certain common point, however minimal, in the thought perception of both countries. Can that common point be developed into some kind of a bilateral diplomatic process? As I said, there is no sign of that. But, nevertheless, I find this common narrative on cross border terrorism in both countries somewhat unique and of interest.
Views expressed are the interviewee’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: India’s Past Lessons, Current New Normal, and Future Pakistan Policy
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Image 1: Narendra Modi via X
Image 2: Narendra Modi via X
