After a four-day conflict involving missile strikes, drone incursions, and intense aerial combat, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on May 10. Both nations have since declared victory and celebrated what they claim is a new approach of dealing with the other. While this may seem familiar to the world, the risk of a skirmish escalating into a full-scale war has not been this high since Kargil in 1999, right after both countries became nuclear-armed states.
As the two sides step back from the crisis, the ceasefire remains conditional from India’s standpoint, with its leaders asserting that Operation Sindoor continues. While this situation is unsettling, it is important to consider how we got here and why India might find it challenging to reverse course on its Pakistan policy.
Rationale Behind India’s Pursuit of a “New Normal”
Since the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, there has been a growing realization in India that moral authority and diplomatic protests alone are insufficient to counter Pakistan’s revisionism. Frustrated by the international community’s indifference or deliberate silence on terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil, along with the unwillingness of the Pakistan Army to alter its support to terror groups that target India, New Delhi has redefined its threshold for military action this time around. Thus, in response to the April 22 Pahalgam attack, New Delhi carried out precision strikes on nine targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir targeting terrorist infrastructure in an action it called “measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible.” After decades of adhering to the policy of strategic restraint, India’s frustration of painstakingly building a diplomatic case against Pakistan’s sub-conventional proxy war has given way to an assertive doctrinal shift that will resonate beyond this military confrontation.
Critics of punitive military action have often highlighted the inability of such Indian measures to fully deter Pakistan from this sub-conventional proxy war. Even during the current crisis, some argued that kinetic action might only end up strengthening the Pakistan Army’s precarious position domestically, albeit temporarily. Advocating restraint, they suggested India slowly effect political change in Pakistan. However, India’s ability to influence internal changes in Pakistan is inherently limited. If showing restraint alone could weaken the Pakistan Army’s grip or end Pakistani political parties’ seamless collaboration with the military to form “hybrid regimes,” India would have achieved it long ago. Moreover, past Indian attempts at meaningful engagement with Pakistan’s civilian leadership—partly to bolster its standing—have often backfired, as seen in incidents like the Kargil War (1999), the Mumbai attacks (2008), and the Pathankot attack (2016). Many in India view these incidents as intentional acts of sabotage by the Pakistan Army to resist any major shift in the country’s policy toward India.
After decades of adhering to the policy of strategic restraint, India’s frustration of painstakingly building a diplomatic case against Pakistan’s sub-conventional proxy war has given way to an assertive doctrinal shift that will resonate beyond this military confrontation.
For Pakistan, though, relations nosedived only in 2019, when India conducted cross border airstrikes in response to the killing of 40 Indian soldiers in Pulwama, followed by the revocation of Indian-administered Kashmir’s autonomy and statehood. However, this assertive Indian approach stems less from an ideological churn in India and more from Pakistani civilian leaders’ inability or reluctance to take risks in trying to solve contentious bilateral issues in recent years (from Pervez Musharraf to Nawaz Sharif), partly due to the constraints imposed by the country’s army. So, while the Indian leadership has always advocated for an assertive approach, in reality a focused diplomatic effort preceded its recent “muscular” and securitized strategy vis a vis Pakistan.
Past Lessons for Future Crises
Looking back, despite the deadly skirmishes of 2013 and a surge in ceasefire violations, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited his Pakistani counterpart to his swearing-in ceremony in 2014. Productive engagements culminated in a joint statement in 2015 where both governments committed to discussing “all outstanding issues.” To its credit, Pakistan agreed to expedite the 2008 Mumbai attack trials, while India expressed readiness to address Kashmir. Despite bilateral hiccups and emerging differences, Modi accepted Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s invitation for the SAARC summit in Pakistan, and a cordial meet in Paris paved the way for an NSA-level meeting in Bangkok. The secret initiative saw India’s foreign minister visiting Pakistan with a message to “move forward,” leading to the resumption of the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue. India’s commitment to peace was further underscored by an unprecedented visit by Modi to Lahore to attend a family event at Sharif’s residence in late December 2015, a move heavily criticized by the Indian opposition. However, this bold conciliatory gesture was met with a terrorist attack on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot a week later.
Defying public sentiment at the time, Indian leadership accepted Pakistan’s offer for a joint investigation of the attack, incurring significant political costs. Allowing a rival intelligence agency to visit its military installation, only to be accused of staging a false flag operation, is one reason why India now quickly rejects offers of joint or impartial investigations. Failure in achieving any such reciprocity from Pakistan post Pathankot ended up pushing India to consider force to avenge the Uri attack in September 2016, resulting in a cross-border raid by the Indian Army. These “surgical strikes” may have set a new precedent, but it is the Pakistan Army’s prolonged conflict with various political factions in the country that worsened the situation over time.
Since 2016, recurring India-Pakistan crises where attacks are followed by attempts at bilateral dialogue but then succeeded by the Pakistan Army ousting the country’s civilian leadership further compound New Delhi’s dilemma. Leaders like Nawaz Sharif, seen in India as genuinely inclined towards peace, have often been removed just as major bilateral peace efforts were gaining momentum. For India, the Pakistan Army’s willingness and the civilian leaders’ ability to push for a reset diminishes with each orchestrated power transition. Furthermore, Pakistani politicians have themselves ensured that talks remain contingent on concessions, making it hard for even willing Army Chiefs like General Qamar Javed Bajwa to absorb the audience cost of engaging with India meaningfully.
The ceasefire agreement of 2021 may have demonstrated the existence of constituencies favoring normalization on both sides. And had Islamabad stayed the course, the elections in Indian-administered Kashmir and the imminent restoration of statehood could have become an opportunity to re-engage. But the gradual fraying since the appointment of the new Pakistan Army Chief and now Field Marshal Asim Munir have made India wary of conditional dialogue, let alone concessions.
From Off-ramps to Off-track
While Pakistan takes pride in countering “Indian aggression,” it may also acknowledge that, despite imposing some costs on the Indian use of force—like potential Indian aerial losses in the initial stages—India’s rediscovery of the “utility of force” and push for escalation dominance will likely bring New Delhi’s conventional military superiority in play in the next crisis. It is hard to deny that India’s initial strikes in major cities, including Pakistan’s heartland—untouched since the 1971 war—were lethal and precise. Plus, the overwhelming nature of the strikes at Pakistani air bases, and the ease with which India neutralized air defenses, will be noted by military planners in Pakistan, even as the public mood remains euphoric.
Breaking free from ritualistic restraint has never been easy, but India’s determination now goes beyond merely challenging Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. It seems to reflect an effort to emulate the tactics of brinkmanship that Pakistan has perfected. Nevertheless, India is not likely to be lulled into believing that Pakistan’s security establishment will do a sudden course correction after this episode. Historically, the Pakistan Army has refused to moderate its strategy or abandon its maximalist goals, often at enormous cost to itself, not just India. While being aware of the momentary respite the Pakistan Army might get internally post this crisis, there is recognition that Pakistan’s economic and political problems are far too structural to subside in the medium to long run.
Breaking free from ritualistic restraint has never been easy, but India’s determination now goes beyond merely challenging Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. It seems to reflect an effort to emulate the tactics of brinkmanship that Pakistan has perfected.
India’s Future Options
Following through on public declarations of treating every attack as “an act of war” presents its own challenges, but there is firm determination in New Delhi to impose serious costs on Pakistan, despite the risks such actions may carry, whether diplomatic or otherwise.
What has stirred some concern in India, though, is the role of the United States. Initially, Washington recognized India’s right to defend itself, with Vice President JD Vance even implying that an Indian response was justified, as long as it was calibrated. Yet, many Indians believe that President Donald Trump’s public framing of the ceasefire undermined the military advantage that India had imposed on Pakistan through strikes on critical targets like the Nur Khan and Sargodha air bases. This is believed to have prompted U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to directly dial the Pakistan Army Chief. While Indian officials recognize that most of Trump’s pronouncements on the ceasefire are primarily about bolstering his image as a “peacemaker” and that Trump’s mediation offers are just casual remarks, similar to 2019, it has not resonated well with the public.
Regardless, rather than worrying about the bogey of “re-hyphenation,” India might now seek to forcefully leverage its partnerships and growing global heft to press for more scrutiny on international financial and other kinds of aid to Pakistan. Even the temporary hold on the Indus Waters Treaty is likely to remain in place, as India remains adamant to link the talks on water with terror and surpass past attempts to isolate Pakistan.
Still, keeping in mind the global churn and threats emanating from Beijing—and its foray in the neighborhood—pushing partners like the United States to help cut Pakistan to size might again take a backseat. Though, as the dust settles, there could be some soul-searching in the Indian establishment about whether New Delhi can afford to sidestep the Pakistan challenge on its way to becoming a major power, especially as the China-Pakistan axis grows stronger.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: The Resolve Paradox in India-Pakistan Crisis Bargaining
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Image 1: César Guillotel via Pexels
Image 2: Raajan via Flickr
