In 2024, Sri Lanka conducted both presidential and parliamentary elections that realigned its political order. By any measure, the election of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (popularly known as AKD) in September and the landslide legislative victory for his coalition in November constituted a peaceful revolution—not merely because both polls were among the most tranquil conducted in the past half-century, but also because of how the country joined together across ethno-religious lines to oust long-entrenched elites and elect better-educated and professional newcomers who coalesced under Dissanayake’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led National People’s Power (NPP) coalition. While the new government hopes to promote a more pluralist polity and better governance, its popularity will be short-lived given the island nation’s daunting economic challenges.
The 2024 elections saw several transformative and historic developments in Sri Lanka’s political landscape. In the presidential election, Dissanayake, who won less than 4 percent of the vote in the 2019 contest, came out on top with 42 percent. In the parliamentary polls, his NPP coalition went from three to 159 seats. This is the first time under the current preferential voting system that a political entity has captured a supermajority. If opposition leader Sajith Premadasa’s Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s United National Party (UNP), and those from other parties supporting Wickremesinghe had joined forces to support Premadasa or Wickremesinghe, AKD would not be president today. Yet, his win created the tailwind for the NPP’s incredible electoral victory.
This wave of change is especially reflected in Parliament. Nearly 150 of the 196 parliamentarians elected—there are 29 who are appointed—are first-timers. Reading the tea leaves, over sixty established politicians decided not to contest the parliamentary polls. For the first time in nearly 80 years, no member from the Rajapaksa family contested elections from their Hambantota District. The Rajapaksas have dominated politics since 2005 even when out of power, and their Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party won 145 seats in the 2020 parliamentary elections. This was after Gotabaya Rajapaksa handily won the presidency in 2019. But by contrast, in these elections, Gotabaya’s nephew and the family’s heir apparent, Namal Rajapaksa, finished fourth in the presidential election with less than 3 percent of the vote. In the parliamentary elections, the Rajapaksa family faced further ignominy when the SLPP was reduced to just three seats. The new parliament also has nearly twice the number of women compared to the previous one, including Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, who played a leading role in mobilizing women for the NPP.
Overall, Dissanayake’s NPP coalition gained by rising above the ethnic and religious divisions that have traditionally determined Sri Lankan politics. While minorities, who make up around 25 percent of the population, have little choice but to vote for Sinhalese Buddhist candidates during presidential elections, they usually support ethnic parties during parliamentary polls. Few Tamils and Muslims voted for Dissanayake in the presidential election, but enough voted for the NPP in the parliamentary elections for it to win five of the six predominantly minority districts. This partly had to do with how Dissanayake reached out to minorities despite their not voting to make him president and also the dissension among Tamil parties. The upshot is that this is the first time a party led by Sinhalese Buddhists won districts in the predominantly Tamil Northern Province, and it is an opening that could bode well for ethnoreligious relations in the country.
The rise of Dissanayake and the JVP is a stunning turnaround in Sri Lankan politics. The JVP is not just any political party in Sri Lanka. It unleashed two bloody insurrections that killed tens of thousands of people (which includes many of its cadres) in 1971 and 1987-89. The group was banned, and many members were detained under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979, which has been mainly used against Tamil separatists and alleged Muslim extremists. Its leader was captured, tortured, shot, and burnt alive. Thirty-five years later, his political progeny has reached the apogee of political power. It is an outcome directly related to the island’s economic plight.
Backdrop to Economic Ruin
It is indisputable that Dissanayake and the NPP would not be in power if not for the island’s polycrisis. Wracked with inflation and scarcities, Sri Lanka went into sovereign default when it suspended debt payments in April 2022. This happened during an aragalaya (struggle) that sought to topple the government. Three months later, the country officially declared bankruptcy.
Sri Lanka has long lived beyond its means thanks to successive governments racking up debts to uphold social programs. Corruption, loss-making state-owned enterprises, and a bloated government service that includes over 1.5 million personnel contributed to the debt. So did the civil war, which stemmed from Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism. In explaining the present economic crisis, pundits have rightly pointed to Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s addlebrained tax policies and chemical fertilizer ban, woes stemming from COVID-19, global central banks raising interest rates, and the war in Ukraine. What has not been emphasized sufficiently is how the island’s ethnocracy helped mask corruption and nepotism and gradually legitimized a kakistocracy—a government comprised of subpar and crooked leaders. This is because the country at large kept rewarding political entrepreneurs who marginalized minorities and thereby undermined the island’s overarching interests. These politicians, who have long manipulated majoritarianism and committed or facilitated corruption, catapulted the country to ruin. This trend began in the mid-1950s when Sinhalese politicians competed with each other to make Sinhala the island’s only national language and continued into the post-civil war era when the Rajapaksas whipped up Islamophobia to shore up their Buddhist base.
What has not been emphasized sufficiently is how the island’s ethnocracy helped mask corruption and nepotism and […] at large kept rewarding political entrepreneurs who marginalized minorities and thereby undermined the island’s overarching interests.
Sri Lanka needs serious reforms on multiple fronts. However, it is debatable whether the NPP can implement the requisite reforms. For instance, the NPP manifesto promised to terminate the PTA, but it appears pressure from military personnel may be causing the regime to have second thoughts. A bureaucracy that has benefited from corruption may also stymie Dissanayake’s sincere efforts to reform institutional procedures. While the government has won plaudits in the Northern Province for ending some unnecessary roadblocks, handing over some private land hitherto occupied by the military, and allowing Tamils to commemorate their civil war dead without hindrance, expanding these policies while trying to accommodate other legitimate Tamil demands would provide Buddhist nationalists fodder to whip up anti-minority sentiment. There are also economic challenges that will take precedence over reforms, given that the government’s popularity depends on how well it satisfies complaints over poverty, disaster assistance, food scarcity, and cost of living. Tackling these issues, however, could widen the fiscal deficit and cause the government to run afoul of its agreement with the IMF.
Relations with Key Foreign Partners
Another challenge for the new government will be what Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath has described as a neutral foreign policy. This means that the government will operate in a multi-aligned manner without getting caught up in regional and global power rivalries. Successive governments have adopted this line, but the Rajapaksa governments clearly preferred dealing with China, while Wickremesinghe was broadly pro-West in his outlook. Given the JVP’s historically pro-China sentiments, Beijing must feel more comfortable with AKD at the helm. But Dissanayake is unlikely to entertain vanity-ridden white elephant projects that contribute to the island’s debt. The president insists that stability must precede reforms, suggesting the JVP’s Marxist roots will not predetermine government policies. He and the NPP realize that if they are going to be effective politically, they must pursue domestic and foreign policies that improve Sri Lanka’s economy. The government will therefore attempt to pursue foreign policies that are more dispassionately self-serving than designed to please any foreign country. This will not be easy for Dissanayake because he will need to be sensitive to Indian security concerns especially vis-à-vis China.
Over the years, the JVP has shifted its own attitude towards India. The JVP was among the most anti-India parties even before it opposed New Delhi’s involvement in trying to solve Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict in the 1980s. By the time Dissanayake became JVP leader in 2014, the party had toned down its anti-India and anti-Tamil rhetoric. Its line now is that the world and region are different, and the party must adjust to prevailing circumstances. India recognized this shift when it provided Dissanayake a red carpet welcome in February, seven months before he became president. The invitation to visit New Delhi and meet with External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval was unusual given that AKD was not the leader of the opposition and the NPP enjoyed little to no influence within the legislature.
These developments have laid the groundwork for India-Sri Lanka relations under Dissanayake, but there are still several challenges to work through in the future. Jaishankar visited Sri Lanka in October after Dissanayake was elected and Dissanayake visited India in mid-December. In his meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other Indian leaders, Sri Lanka’s scrutiny of the Adani Group’s controversial energy projects likely came up especially given recent U.S. bribery charges against Gautam Adani. India is eager to finalize various proposed agreements, but the AKD government insists it must review all projects before fully endorsing them.
Other issues that were likely discussed include Indian fishermen illegally fishing in Sri Lankan waters and the environmental damage done by their bottom trawling. Separately, broader regional geopolitics will pose other challenges. Sri Lanka has applied to join BRICS and will look for India’s support in this regard, even as it tries to avoid being pressured by New Delhi to allow India to explore cobalt-rich areas within Sri Lanka’s continental shelf. Dissanayake is also scheduled to visit China early next year, and some of what the Chinese will want—for instance, allowing its naval research vessels to access Sri Lankan waters and dock at the Hambantota Port—India will oppose. These issues make clear that the government’s supposed neutral foreign policy will require deft diplomacy.
The government will therefore attempt to pursue foreign policies that are more dispassionately self-serving than designed to please any foreign country. This will not be easy for Dissanayake because he will need to be sensitive to Indian security concerns especially vis-à-vis China.
Dissanayake may also rearrange Sri Lanka’s relationships with major powers outside the immediate neighborhood. Sri Lanka had productive relations with Japan until the Rajapaksas started sidelining Japanese projects in favor of Chinese (mainly non-concessionary) projects. This was not due to ideological reasons. The Japanese were averse to corrupt dealings; the Chinese lenders lacked such qualms. The new government seeks to make Japan a more important player in the country and both sides have agreed to revive eleven development projects that were put on hold. But irrespective of partners, the road ahead for Sri Lanka will be rocky.
The Difficult Road Ahead
The overarching challenge ahead of Sri Lanka in 2025 will be economic in nature. The island is amid its 17th IMF bailout, which comprises a USD $3 billion loan being disbursed over 48 months while ensuring the government stabilizes the economy. Overall, the reforms that the IMF called for are daunting. They include revamping and privatizing state-owned enterprises, strengthening the banking system, keeping inflation down, instituting a more efficient tax system, increasing foreign currency reserves, and minimizing corruption. Some have claimed that a new IMF package will be necessary, given unrealistic expectations associated with the current one. One such expectation is to reduce public debt from around 109 percent of GDP today to 95 percent of GDP by 2032. At present, Sri Lanka needs to repay about USD $6 billion in debt every year until 2029. The island owes China around USD $4 billion, while it must repay commercial creditors nearly USD $15 billion.
The Wickremesinghe government had reached a draft agreement with foreign creditors to restructure bonds worth USD $12.5 billion two days before the presidential election and also passed several laws to ensure that the bailout agreement with the IMF was honored. These measures constrained the new government, but not seeking to reverse course has appeased businesses and helped the new government finalize its sovereign bond restructuring agreement in mid-December. The NPP must now focus on reducing the price of food and spending more on health and education at a time when poverty has doubled to around 25 percent and over 1 million people saw their electricity cut off in 2023.
The NPP’s main themes in the parliamentary elections were anti-poverty, anti-corruption, and anti-waste, and these were also the themes that Dissanayake weaponized in the presidential campaign. The government will continue doing so, and this will buy it some time with the economically disgruntled. Dissanayake has promised to reopen around 400 investigations dealing with murder, corruption, and other serious crimes like the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings that killed over 270 people, and implicate pro-Rajapaksa state intelligence personnel. The NPP also seeks to recover ill-gotten monies that politicians have parked abroad, an issue the United States has promised to help with. This as the government faced an early setback when its Speaker of Parliament had to step down after merely twenty-two days for allegedly falsifying his academic credentials. The new regime is bound to deal with similar embarrassments in the months ahead. Yet, ultimately, AKD’s and the NPP’s popularity and legitimacy will depend on how the government assists with people’s livelihoods. Many already complain that the Dissanayake regime has not lowered gas and petrol prices as promised. Farmers whose crops were devastated by floods agitate over insufficient state support, while numerous villagers complain over monkeys and elephants destroying their harvest. This, as everyone gripes over the high price of rice and coconuts. Indeed, Dissanayake and the NPP are learning fast that campaigning is much easier than governing, and governing successfully requires tackling mundane needs.
Also Read: A New Era in Sri Lanka?: Implications of Dissanayake’s Presidency
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Image 1: Anura Kumara Dissanayake via X
Image 2: Nazly Ahmed via Flickr
