As geopolitical rivalries evolve, renewable energy projects are emerging as a tool of strategic leverage, particularly along the contested border between India and China — also called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). While the two countries have long used civic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and border villages to assert control, a subtle yet consequential shift is underway: the strategic deployment of renewable energy (RE) infrastructure to reinforce territorial claims.
The border-focused RE investments by New Delhi and Beijing show how decarbonization initiatives are not just about sustainability but can also be a geopolitical tool for securing territorial control over remote frontier regions. The high-altitude solar grids, decentralized wind farms, and large-scale hydropower projects in the Himalayas do more than supply electricity to civilians — they can potentially reshape the power balance in disputed border regions. Given the potential for increased militarization due to these installations, the two countries and the global community should devise mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation to prevent any possible escalation.
Background: Infrastructure Development and Territorial Claims
Competing infrastructure development has increasingly shaped Sino-Indian border tensions in recent years, with both nations investing heavily in border infrastructure to secure strategic advantages. In October 2024, India inaugurated dozens of infrastructure projects in states bordering China to enhance military logistics and civilian connectivity. The Sela Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh, completed in March 2024, facilitates year-round troop and equipment movement along the LAC while also improving civilian access to remote villages. China, too, is reported to be enhancing its capacity for rapid troop mobilization through camps, surveillance infrastructure, helipads, and high-altitude feeder roads extending from the G219 highway.
Although both nations present their border infrastructure as essential for connectivity and development, their approaches differ sharply in timing, scope, proximity to the LAC, and strategic intent. India’s infrastructure projects — such as the 2023 Vibrant Villages Program (VVP) and the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road — focus on improving internal mobility and economic resilience, strengthening troop movement, and preventing depopulation near the border, but while staying well within India’s recognized territory. New Delhi has also so far refrained from constructing infrastructure projects that physically alter the LAC’s alignment or embed permanent settlements into contested zones.
China’s approach, by contrast, is far more preemptive and expansionist, using dual-use infrastructure not only to improve military logistics but to physically consolidate control over contested areas. China’s projects—roads, settlements, renewable energy installations, and logistical hubs—are frequently placed ambiguously close to the LAC or directly within disputed zones, thereby blurring the line between Chinese-administered areas and contested territory. As a result, unlike India’s infrastructure projects, Chinese installations physically obstruct Indian patrol operations in areas that India previously controlled. In the Depsang Plains, for example, Chinese troops, resources, and/or infrastructure have physically blocked Indian patrols from accessing several patrol points India historically controlled. Similarly, in the Galwan Valley, Chinese road networks and fortified outposts now extend into areas that Indian troops routinely accessed before the deadly clashes of June 2020.
While [India and China] have long used civic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and border villages to assert control, a subtle yet consequential shift is underway: the strategic deployment of renewable energy (RE) infrastructure to reinforce territorial claims.
Renewable Energy Along the LAC
Renewable energy (RE) deployments are now increasingly shaping this infrastructural landscape, blending developmental and military functions, particularly in remote border zones. RE infrastructure facilitates military presence in contested areas in several ways — it enables continuous surveillance and strengthens logistical readiness in high-altitude borderlands. Both India and China deploy RE to improve energy security for military outposts and border settlements. However, China’s projects have tended to be more prominent in scale and better integrated into centralized power grids than India’s deployments, which are relatively more reactive and localized.
China’s RE expansion in border areas aligns with its broader infrastructure strategy, which enhances settlement viability, economic integration, and logistical sustainability in remote frontier regions. While these projects contribute to the resilience of border outposts and military-support infrastructure, their direct role in territorial encroachment remains debated. Satellite imagery and infrastructure reports suggest clusters of solar farms in Ngari Prefecture (Rutog County), positioned near key segments of the LAC, including locations close to Pangong Tso. These projects are integrated into local and regional power grids, supplying energy to civilian settlements and broader infrastructure networks in the region. While satellite analysis does not confirm a direct power link to PLA installations, their strategic placement near dual-use logistics hubs suggests a broader role in sustaining military operations along the border.
Beijing has also deployed isolated microgrids in previously less accessible areas, providing uninterrupted energy for cooking, heating, bathing, and operational requirements at high-altitude military outposts along the LAC. The PLA, for instance, recently connected over 700 border defense outposts to the national grid, alongside the deployment of more than 80 largely isolated microgrids in off-grid, high-altitude areas. One notable example is the off-grid micropower grid completed in December 2020 for the Shenxianwan border defense company under the PLA Xinjiang Military Command in Karakoram, at a height of 5,380 meters.
India’s RE strategy near the LAC remains relatively reactionary, decentralized, and limited in scale. Its RE facilities provide basic energy access for troops and support heating, cooking, and essential communication as opposed to powering high-grade surveillance or weapons systems along the LAC. While India has deployed standalone solar microgrids in remote military outposts, these installations do not appear to be part of a coordinated strategy for military dominance. Instead, their primary advantage lies in their adaptability to rugged, high-altitude terrains where traditional energy supply chains face logistical challenges.
Strikingly, while India’s solar and wind power installations along the LAC remain small-scale and decentralized, New Delhi has shown a greater appetite for large-scale, grid-connected RE projects along its border with Pakistan. India’s preference for decentralized RE along the LAC likely stems primarily from the rugged terrain, harsh climate, and the logistical difficulty of extending central grids across remote, high-altitude areas. Concerns about cyber vulnerabilities — particularly after the 2022 Chinese-sponsored cyber intrusions targeting power infrastructure in Ladakh and Northeast India — could further reinforce this preference. By operating independently from the national grid, microgrids offer some resilience against cyber threats. Nonetheless, India’s decentralized strategy does not eliminate all security risks; while microgrids operate independently, they are still susceptible to direct physical damage.
Renewable energy (RE) deployments are now increasingly shaping this infrastructural landscape, blending developmental and military functions, particularly in remote border zones.
More recently, New Delhi and Beijing have also had to navigate tensions concerning hydro projects along their shared rivers. For instance, China’s plan to construct a massive 300 billion kilowatt-hour hydropower dam on the Yarlung Zangbo River (the upper course of the Brahmaputra) in Tibet—triple the designed capacity of the Three Gorges Dam—has heightened concerns for India and Bangladesh over potential disruptions to downstream water flows and ecological stability. India too is advancing plans for the Upper Siang Multipurpose Project (Hydroelectric) in Arunachal Pradesh, which seems to be part of a “counter-dam” strategy. These developments have faced local backlash, reflecting a need to contain infrastructure with unknown deleterious impacts on the community and biodiversity. The lack of a legally binding water-sharing treaty between China, India, and Bangladesh intensifies these anxieties, as unilateral water management upstream could exacerbate seasonal water shortages, as China has done elsewhere, affecting millions dependent on the Brahmaputra Basin in downstream countries.
Pathways to Containing Future Security Risks
While RE installations along the border are not inherently destabilizing, integrating RE projects into military infrastructure at strategic locations can potentially risk heightening tensions between India and China. Additionally, as seen across regions with contested boundaries, RE projects are increasingly getting entangled with strategic ambitions. For example, in the Arctic, Russia’s deployment of floating nuclear power plants serves both civilian and military needs, reinforcing its presence in a region of growing geopolitical contestation. Similarly, in the South China Sea, China’s offshore wind and solar farms provide logistical support for its territorial claims in disputed waters. These cases illustrate how RE infrastructure is increasingly interwoven with power projection and long-term strategic positioning and may add to existing threat perceptions in disputed territories.
Given these risks, scientific collaboration offers a neutral engagement channel that can foster confidence amid turbulent political relations, especially between New Delhi and Beijing. The Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2009 between India’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Chinese Academy of Sciences has facilitated joint research, allowing for sustained technical dialogue between the two countries. However, border conflagrations like the 2017 Doklam standoff have disrupted progress. Reviving Sino-Indian climate research on glacial melt monitoring, Himalayan biodiversity shifts, and flood early-warning systems can restore functional cooperation for mutual gain even amid diplomatic tensions.
While transparency in RE developments can enhance trust, sharing sensitive energy infrastructure data poses security risks, including cyber vulnerabilities. Yet, India and China could adopt controlled data-sharing mechanisms under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) to manage mutual threat perceptions – focusing on non-sensitive information such as grid expansion planning and hydropower output rather than operational security details. The 2024 border agreement, aimed at stabilizing relations, could be expanded to include data-sharing on RE installations along the LAC, even if the data shared is largely technical.
For effective transboundary water management, India and China would have to institutionalize hydrological data-sharing agreements to ensure transparency on river flows and upstream dam operations. In this regard, the recent announcement of the resumption of hydrological data sharing between India and China is a welcome step. However, given Bangladesh’s downstream dependence on the Brahmaputra, its inclusion in water-sharing dialogues is critical. The establishment of a Brahmaputra Basin Water Forum could facilitate trilateral cooperation on flood forecasting, hydropower projects, and seasonal water flow management. A comparable model is the Mekong River Commission, established in 1995 as part of the Mekong Agreement between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which promotes joint management of the Mekong River’s resources through collaborative strategies and guidelines. Beijing and New Delhi must enhance transparency, institutionalize multilateral oversight, and strengthen research cooperation to combat the potential securitization of renewable energy technologies and installations. More broadly, the global community can enhance stability by leveraging renewable energy for resilience and connectivity instead of seeking control and exacerbating conflict and geopolitical tensions.
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Image 1: MOHD ARHAAN ARCHER via Getty Images
Image 2: Amit Shah via X
