On December 18, 2024, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on four Pakistani entities over their involvement in the alleged development of long-range missiles, also known as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, capable of traveling more than 5,500 km. The banned entities include National Development Complex (NDC), a state enterprise, located in Islamabad. Also listed were three private entities: Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International, and Rockside Enterprise, all based in Karachi, that presumably support the NDC by supplying equipment for missile development. These sanctions have led to a debate over Pakistan’s growing strategic capabilities and their implications.
From the U.S. perspective, a long-range missile’s capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia (including the United States) is concerning. Jon Finer, former Deputy National Security Advisor, expressed this concern when he accused Pakistan of developing sophisticated technology including larger rocket motors. However, this threat is currently latent, and the U.S. government has itself acknowledged that Pakistan’s capability to target the United States is still at least several years off.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Office (MoFA) termed Washington’s decision to sanction Pakistan’s entities “unfortunate and biased.” It also emphasized that Pakistan’s strategic capabilities were for defending its sovereignty and maintaining stability in South Asia. Nevertheless, MoFA neither confirmed nor denied that the country was developing long-range missiles. Following Finer’s accusations, Pakistan termed the U.S. allegations “unfounded” and “devoid of rationality.”
Pakistan’s missile program is a response to Indian developments and not targeted at the United States. Moreover, these sanctions could complicate ties and drive Islamabad further toward China.
These U.S sanctions and allegations against a major non-NATO ally do not bode well for the overall relationship. In the short term, the sanctions freeze any U.S. assets owned by the accused entities and prohibit U.S. individuals from engaging in transactions with them. However, the actions of the U.S. government can result in reputational damage to both the accused entities and any businesses that work with them, resulting in the withdrawal of other businesses’ support and cooperation. The sanctions raise several fundamental questions about the reasons for their imposition, the implications they may carry, and Washington’s evolving approach to the region, especially with the new Trump administration in power.
Motivations for Missile Development and Impact of Sanctions
The recent sanctions on Pakistani entities follow three rounds that the former Biden administration imposed on entities in Belarus, China, and Pakistan. All the sanctioned entities, including three Chinese and one Pakistani company, were accused of enabling Islamabad to develop its long-range missile systems. These sanctions indicate what Pakistan views as misguided U.S. concerns over its missile development program and raise questions over how the previous administration’s great power competition with China may have colored ties with Islamabad as it attempted to curb any collaboration Pakistan has with China to advance these capabilities. However, Pakistan’s missile program is a response to Indian developments and not targeted at the United States. Moreover, these sanctions could complicate ties and drive Islamabad further toward China.
Long-range Weapons Development
The Pakistani government has stated on multiple occasions that the country’s growing missile and nuclear programs are aimed at countering the conventional, nuclear, and naval asymmetries with India. Pakistan’s ballistic missile ranges are between a minimum of Nasr’s (Hatf-IX) 60 km and a maximum of Shaheen-III’s 2750 km, which should suffice as they give Islamabad the ability to reach targets anywhere in India. However, to counter India’s development of a ballistic missile defense system, Islamabad is allegedly equipping Shaheen-III with Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), a technology it already tested in 2017. Moreover, since India is developing long-range missile capabilities such as Agni V (with a range of more than 5,200 km) and Agni VI, albeit with an eye on China, this would necessitate a response from Pakistan and both countries might get entangled into an arms race. Additionally, various components of long-range weapons have advantages beyond increasing the range of targets. For instance, as experts have pointed out, Pakistan could use this same know-how to develop large-rocket motors for space launchers.
Impact on Washington-Islamabad Ties
The U.S. sanctions and accusations are indicative of a changing stance towards Pakistan. Though it is too early to predict how the Trump administration would deal with Pakistan, signals so far suggest that there may not be much change from the Biden administration. Considering Trump’s broader perception of Pakistan being a safe-haven for militants (despite some recent limited cooperation) and the deepening U.S. strategic partnership with India as a counterweight to China, Islamabad is not likely to be a priority in Washington. In this context, U.S. sanctions can only fracture an already fragile relationship that is marked by divergences in the post-U.S.-withdrawal-from-Afghanistan phase.
Moreover, U.S. sanctions against Pakistan may enhance Islamabad’s collaboration with China in the space and missile domains. Though Sino-Pak relations are facing certain challenges such as non-state actor violence targeted at Chinese nationals in Pakistan, the bilateral relationship remains strong. The Pakistani president’s recent visit to China, the reinvigoration of CPEC, and China-Pakistan naval cooperation are all a testament to the continued partnership between the neighbors. Thus, in this instance, the U.S. sanctions-based approach is actually counterintuitive to the broader American strategy to balance the rise of China and provide alternatives to countries in the region.
U.S. Support for India’s Weapons Development
Not only is the United States’ approach counterproductive, but its application of sanctions is also selective. While Washington sanctioned Pakistani firms for the alleged development of long-range missiles, it lifted restrictions on Indian nuclear entities to pave the way for civil nuclear technology transfer.
To counter China, Washington has extended its strategic partnership with India in the missile and space domains, which has implications for Pakistan. For instance, the United States has facilitated intelligence sharing with India, underpinned by agreements such as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement and the Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement, as well as the transfer of high-end defense technologies to India, including the short-range Javelin anti-tank guided missiles. Both sides are collaborating on the co-production of defense equipment under the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative and on strategic technology under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (now renamed as Transforming Relations Utilizing Strategic Technologies).
In the recent Modi-Trump meeting, both states announced the U.S.-India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st Century and a new ten-year Framework for the U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership. The Trump administration announced the intent to increase military sales to India, including the potential to eventually provide New Delhi the F-35, a fifth-generation advanced stealth fighter jet. The two sides also committed to increasing India’s purchases of U.S. oil and gas, to narrow the trade deficit, and to negotiate a trade deal.
Pakistan perceives these initiatives as preferential U.S. treatment towards New Delhi with the potential to undermine regional stability, accentuate existing asymmetries between India and Pakistan’s capabilities, and spur additional arms racing. Pakistan, in turn, looks to deepen its partnerships with non-U.S. sources including China, with which it has cooperated on missile development since 1989.
Bottom-line
U.S. foreign policy towards South Asia is changing. In this new landscape, India is perceived as counterweight to China, and America’s interests are diverging from Pakistan’s, possibly due to U.S. views on growing Pakistan-China cooperation. Given this landscape, it is pertinent to evaluate Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs from its threat assessment that emanates primarily from its eastern border.
Pakistan needs to pacify the U.S. concerns over its alleged development of long-range missiles. If it is doing so, Pakistan should clarify the reason for developing large rocket motors to allay U.S. misgivings.
The United States has never been in Pakistan’s threat calculus; instead, Pakistan remained a Western ally during the Cold War and acted as a frontline major non-NATO ally for the 20-year war in Afghanistan, albeit with recurring friction between the two sides. Pakistan needs to pacify the U.S. concerns over its alleged development of long-range missiles. If it is doing so, Pakistan should clarify the reason for developing large rocket motors to allay U.S. misgivings. To show its desire to engage, Pakistan should re-evaluate Washington’s proposal for Pakistan to share telemetry information on its ballistic missile testing and set limits on outside ranges, which it had previously declined. On the other hand, Washington must also engage constructively with Pakistan through diplomacy and dialogue, because sanctioning will only compromise ties further and risks incentivizing the very developments it seeks to curtail.
Also Read: Speed Without Substance? India’s Hypersonic Missile and Implications for Strategic Stability
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Image 1: Pakistani Army Press Service ISPR via Getty Images
Image 2: Shehbaz Sharif via X
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
