Why the Taliban Won’t Cut Ties with Iran

Two weeks ago, the Taliban cautioned the United States to refrain from making further demands, reservations and excuses. A few days earlier, the insurgent group expressed frustration with what they described as “additional U.S. demands” — a key U.S. demand from the Taliban has been the group’s disallowal of the use of Afghan territory for attacks against the United States by groups like al-Qaeda. The Taliban showed a willingness to offer this guarantee in exchange for a timeline and eventually a complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Unable to announce a timeline due to disagreement within its own government and with Kabul, the United States stressed the need for the insurgents to strike a ceasefire deal and start intra-Afghan talks. While the Taliban have been hinging on their key demand of an announcement of a timeline for a complete troop withdrawal before considering any of Washington’s demands, the latter asked the insurgent group to cut ties with Iran after the recent deterioration in Washington-Tehran relations.

A few days after the assassination of Iran’s top general Qasem Soleimani, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of undermining the Afghan peace process by using militant groups in the country, and cautioned the Taliban to disengage themselves from the Islamic republic. He emphasized that “the Taliban’s entanglement in Iran’s dirty work will only harm the Afghan peace process.” Pompeo, however, provided no details to support his charge.

With Iran showing strong tendencies of an Islamic theocratic state, the Taliban would find it unfavorable to degrade its relations with Tehran, especially when the group has been struggling to establish a government based on Islamic values in Afghanistan.

A week later, while the United States’ Afghanistan peace envoy and the Taliban leadership were engaging in a fresh round of talks in Doha, the leader of the Hizb-e-Islami party, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, said that Washington has asked the insurgent group to abandon its links with Iran. Although Iran and the Taliban remained in a sectarian rivalry during the 1990s, the post-9/11 scenario in the region and their shared animosity toward the United States along with many other internal and external developments indicate that it would be disadvantageous for the insurgent group to cut their ties with the Islamic republic.

The misunderstandings leading to mistrust that prompted sectarian hatred between Iran and the Taliban have been evaporating, paving the way for a stable long-term alignment glued by and centered on political Islam. During their reign in the 1990s, the Taliban received patronage from Iran’s rival, Saudi Arabia. However, it was difficult for the Kingdom to take the side of its client (the Taliban) at the expense of its patron (the United States) in the post-9/11 world. Saudi Arabia’s harsh measures against Qatar, where the Taliban have their political office, and Doha’s improved ties with Tehran, helped clear the clouds of mistrust and misunderstanding between Iran and the Taliban. With Iran showing strong tendencies of an Islamic theocratic state, the Taliban would find it unfavorable to degrade its relations with Tehran, especially when the group has been struggling to establish a government based on Islamic values in Afghanistan.

The remodeling of their relations is evident in the Taliban’s continued consultations with Iranian authorities. The group’s leadership has undertaken a number of visits to Tehran since the commencement of its peace negotiations with the United States. Their most recent trips in the aftermath of the temporary collapse in the U.S.-Taliban talks not only reflect Tehran’s significance for the Afghan insurgency but also the growing trust between the two parties.

Iran is also significant for the Afghan insurgent group because the country has maintained good terms with almost all Afghan stakeholders. Tehran shares historical ties with Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, an ethnic Tajik, who despite being an old foe of the Taliban, has recently adopted a welcoming and mild stance. On the other hand, President Ashraf Ghani’s Pashtun ethnicity has not yielded any favors from the Taliban. For instance, recently, when the Taliban refused to agree to a ceasefire, but showed willingness to generate a “reduction in violence,” the administration in Kabul was divided: Abdullah welcomed the move, Ghani called it a bluff. However, Iran has fostered smooth relations with Ghani’s faction as well. Thus, in the events of intra-Afghan negotiations, Tehran is expected to play the crucial role of a power broker, and from the Taliban’s perspective, Iran’s Islamic inclination may favor them in crafting a fine line between the republic and the emirate.

The Islamic State’s humiliation at the hands of Iran in Syria and Iraq and the rise of the terrorist group’s affiliate, Islamic State-Khorasan Province, in Afghanistan and its strategic rivalry with the Afghan insurgents demand that Iran and the Taliban remain in contact.

Additionally, and more interestingly, Iran and the Taliban face common imminent threats. Both remain in a direct tussle with the Islamic State and U.S. forces, with the ultimate aim to annihilate the former and expel the latter from the region. The Islamic State’s humiliation at the hands of Iran in Syria and Iraq and the rise of the terrorist group’s affiliate, Islamic State-Khorasan Province, in Afghanistan and its strategic rivalry with the Afghan insurgent group demand that Iran and the Taliban remain in contact. In a sense, the United States and the Islamic State share common enemies and strategic rivals in Afghanistan, which has prompted some observers and regional powers to blame the United States for facilitating the Islamic State’s rise in the war-torn country; Washington, however, denies this claim and has acted to strike the group’s stronghold in Nangarhar.

At present, the Taliban control more territory in Afghanistan than the group has since the start of the insurgency. According to the latest estimates, more than 46 percent of the country is either under the insurgents’ control or contested. Offensives intensified especially after the announcement of the U.S. August 2017 Afghanistan-centric South Asia strategy, which was aimed at forcing the Taliban to come to the negotiating table. However, the Taliban’s denial of a number of peace offers and ceasefire requests, and firm insistence on the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil indicate that the United States has been failing in its plan in Afghanistan. Obviously, Iran’s diplomatic support remained instrumental for the Taliban to carry out this stratagem. In fact, Washington has accused Tehran of providing military support to Afghan insurgents. Iran denies such claims.

Editor’s note: A version of this piece originally appeared in The Diplomat and has been re-published with permission from the editors.

***

Image: Blondinrikard Fröberg via Flickr Images

Posted in , Afghanistan, Internal Security, Iran, Peace, Security, United States, US

Kashif Hussain

Kashif Hussain

Kashif Hussain is a Research Associate at the Strategic Studies Institute, Islamabad (SSII) in Pakistan. He previously worked as an intern at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad (CISS). He was one of Pakistan’s youth ambassadors to Turkey under the Turkey-Pakistan Youth Bridge Program in March 2015. He received a B.A. from Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul followed by M.Sc and M.Phil degrees in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. His research focus is the geopolitics of South Asia.

Read more


Continue Reading


Stay informed Sign up to our newsletter below





Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *