An Analysis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Pakistan and China have long-established diplomatic and military ties and are now entering an epoch of developing an economic relationship with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Their partnership has established an example for the world of how states with geographical proximity but differing political, social, economic, and ideological values can establish a cooperative bilateral relationship. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has characterized the relationship as “higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the deepest sea in the world, and sweeter than honey.” However, the success of the China-Pakistan trade corridor is vital to maintaining the relationship.

The financing and the operation of the Gwadar Port is a clear indication of how necessary it is to integrate Pakistan and China economically. Increasing economic integration will help fulfill the national interests of both countries. Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang stated, “we hope to create a giant economic corridor that would not only enhance China’s strategic significance but would also help in restoring peace and stability to Asia.” China has been intelligent in formulating the trade corridor. China and Pakistan benefit from their geographic locations. The development of the corridor highlights how trade routes, especially for transportation through the sea, have become increasingly important for world affairs.

The growing volume of trade will necessitate an increased volume of maritime trade. With growing economic needs, China and India (along with other regional countries) are looking for every possible opportunity to increase investment.  Here is a look at how CPEC will benefit countries in the region.

Central Asia: After the Gwadar Port is completed, the 1,400km Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline (TAPI) will deliver and pump natural gas from Turkmenistan to parts of Pakistan. The pipeline will connect to Gwadar Port, which will make it easier to export proven reserves in Central Asia – in particular Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

China: CPEC will help build up its western region. The area, already having abundant cheap labor, big markets, and resources, can then be industrialized and expanded.

Afghanistan: The country’s oil, gas, and mineral resources, if explored and exploited, can trigger an economic bustle which will then require sea routes, for which access via Gwadar will become an imperative.

Pakistan: In need of an economic revival, Pakistan (including the province of Balochistan) is going to be moving towards a stronger economy. Road building projects eventually will connect the area of Balochistan with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Furthermore, Gwadar port occupies a strategic location near shipping routes to and from the Persian Gulf. Trade from different industrialized regions of Pakistan would flow from this port increasing revenues.

Every emerging or growing country faces challenges when it is in the transition phase of economic development. China and Pakistan have the opportunity to create connections, which if worked as planned and without any disruptions, will strengthen the Asian economy as a whole. Dr. Saleem wrote, “the new Peking Man has a singular goal – to double, triple and quadruple China’s $4 trillion GDP by 2050. And, any country that can help China go where it wants to go is a friend – or you are on your own.”

However, progress on CPEC is not without hindrances, which include:

The India Factor: Today, Pakistani–Chinese diplomatic engagement follows a pattern that has been called a “subtle partnership.”  It does “the minimum necessary to preserve Pakistani security from a distance, but it has sought to avoid all overt entanglements” in Islamabad’s challenges to Indian primacy in South Asia. Closer economic relations between China and Pakistan risk irking India.

Terrorism and Protection of Chinese Personnel: Terrorism has created an environment unwelcoming to commercial activities, along with concerns about the potential harm Chinese development project workers may face. China may become risk-averse. Upon the request of the Chinese Prime Minister, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has announced the establishment of a “high-profile force” for their protection.

India-Iran Chabahar Port: India has two major objectives in this regard. One is encirclement through the establishment of friendly relations with Afghanistan and Iran. The second is to counterbalance China through strengthened ties with the United States. But the port will also serve as competition to CPEC and the Gwadar route.

CPEC’s future in terms of its gains, losses, and benefits at the national and regional levels will define its success in the coming years. Political economist Robert Gilpin has an argument that states will pursue an approach of “benign mercantilism,” which I believe will hold true for Pakistan and China. With this project, Pakistan has been given the opportunity to deepen economic cooperation with an allied partner, which has an important status in international relations.


Image: Aamir Qureshi-AFP, Getty

Posted in , China, Cooperation, Economy, India-Pakistan Relations, Pakistan, Trade

Arooj Naveed

Arooj Naveed is a M.Phil scholar in International Relations from the University of Punjab. Her areas of interest include foreign policy, diplomacy, conflict management and conflict resolution. Some of her articles are: "Pakistan's External Security Challenges" in the book Revisiting Pakistan's National Security Dilemma, "Conflict in Waziristan" (Co-authored), "Loopholes in Public policy making: A case study of Pakistan" (Co-Authored), "Water Security: The practice of Hydro-hegemony between India and Pakistan" and within Pakistan in the book Security Concerns in South Asia (Co-Authored).

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14 thoughts on “An Analysis of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

  1. Arooj – glad you’ve started writing for SAV, welcome. It’s an interesting analysis, particularly regarding some of the challenges that could complicate the project. You mention that the threat of terrorism and the need to protect Chinese project workers could hinder CPEC’s success. Do you see CPEC as a medium- to long-term driver of counter-terrorism cooperation between China and Pakistan?

  2. Thanks Julia. Yes , as a matter of fact this corridor can act as a driver for counter-terrorism cooperation between China and Pakistan. If both the states are to protect their infrastructural assets (railways , roads , ports e.t.c) they have to be aware of the growing phenomena of urban terrorism around the world. Recent bombings around the world in cities including Saudi Arabia, Turkey , Iraq , Somalia or Tunisia are indicative of the fact that cities need to be protected by formulation of a comprehensive policy. In case of Pakistan and China , they will have to devise a SET Strategy focused on social-economic and technological developments while taking caution on not to mix up insurgents movements with that of terrorist groups.

  3. Very Well Compiled !
    CPEC will definetly provide us wih the oppurtunity to reshape our beloved land economically and strategically in the international community. Particularly one thing that should be made assure is the continutation of Democratic institutions with in Pakistan , as the current world order has strong democratic norms whom which we should be a part of. Lastly, we will have to maintain the cordial relations with China at every cost inspite of changing the Forigen relations strategies like in the past.

  4. Arooj,
    The New York Times carried a long, investigative report last Sunday on China’s extensive investments in Ecuador. It’s essential reading for Pakistanis, who can learn from Quito’s experience.
    Here it is:

    EL CHACO, Ecuador — Where the Andean foothills dip into the Amazon jungle, nearly 1,000 Chinese engineers and workers have been pouring concrete for a dam and a 15-mile underground tunnel. The $2.2 billion project will feed river water to eight giant Chinese turbines designed to produce enough electricity to light more than a third of Ecuador.
    Near the port of Manta on the Pacific Ocean, Chinese banks are in talks to lend $7 billion for the construction of an oil refinery, which could make Ecuador a global player in gasoline, diesel and other petroleum products.
    Across the country in villages and towns, Chinese money is going to build roads, highways, bridges, hospitals, even a network of surveillance cameras stretching to the Galápagos Islands. State-owned Chinese banks have already put nearly $11 billion into the country, and the Ecuadorean government is asking for more.

    Ecuador, with just 16 million people, has little presence on the global stage. But China’s rapidly expanding footprint here speaks volumes about the changing world order, as Beijing surges forward and Washington gradually loses ground.

    While China has been important to the world economy for decades, the country is now wielding its financial heft with the confidence and purpose of a global superpower. With the center of financial gravity shifting, China is aggressively asserting its economic clout to win diplomatic allies, invest its vast wealth, promote its currency and secure much-needed natural resources.
    It represents a new phase in China’s evolution. As the country’s wealth has swelled and its needs have evolved, President Xi Jinping and the rest of the leadership have pushed to extend China’s reach on a global scale.
    China’s currency, the renminbi, is expected to be anointed soon as a global reserve currency, putting it in an elite category with the dollar, the euro, the pound and the yen. China’s state-owned development bank has surpassed the World Bank in international lending. And its effort to create an internationally funded institution to finance transportation and other infrastructure has drawn the support of 57 countries, including several of the United States’ closest allies, despite opposition from the Obama administration.
    Even the current stock market slump is unlikely to shake the country’s resolve. China has nearly $4 trillion in foreign currency reserves, which it is determined to invest overseas to earn a profit and exert its influence.
    China’s growing economic power coincides with an increasingly assertive foreign policy. It is building aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and stealth jets. In a contested sea, China is turning reefs and atolls near the southern Philippines into artificial islands, with at least one airstrip able to handle the largest military planes. The United States has challenged the move, conducting surveillance flights in the area and discussing plans to send warships.
    China represents “a civilization and history that awakens admiration to those who know it,” President Rafael Correa of Ecuador proclaimed on Twitter, as his jet landed in Beijing for a meeting with officials in January.

    China’s leaders portray the overseas investments as symbiotic. “The current industrial cooperation between China and Latin America arrives at the right moment,” Prime Minister Li Keqiang said in a visit to Chile in late May. “China has equipment manufacturing capacity and integrated technology with competitive prices, while Latin America has the demand for infrastructure expansion and industrial upgrading.”
    But the show of financial strength also makes China — and the world — more vulnerable. Long an engine of global growth, China is taking on new risks by exposing itself to shaky political regimes, volatile emerging markets and other economic forces beyond its control.
    Any major problems could weigh on China’s growth, particularly at a time when it is already slowing. The country’s stock market troubles this summer are only adding to the pressure, as the government moves aggressively to stabilize the situation.
    While China has substantial funds to withstand serious financial shocks, its overall health matters. When China swoons, the effects are felt worldwide, by the companies, industries and economies that depend on the country’s growth.
    In many cases, China is going where the West is reluctant to tread, either for financial or political reasons — or both. After getting hit with Western sanctions over the Ukraine crisis, Russia, which is on the verge of a recession, deepened ties with China. The list of borrowers in Africa and the Middle East reads like a who’s who of troubled regimes and economies that may have trouble repaying Chinese loans, including Yemen, Syria, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe.
    With its elevated status, China is forcing countries to play by its financial rules, which can be onerous. Many developing countries, in exchange for loans, pay steep interest rates and give up the rights to their natural resources for years. China has a lock on close to 90 percent of Ecuador’s oil exports, which mostly goes to paying off its loans.
    “The problem is we are trying to replace American imperialism with Chinese imperialism,” said Alberto Acosta, who served as President Correa’s energy minister during his first term. “The Chinese are shopping across the world, transforming their financial resources into mineral resources and investments. They come with financing, technology and technicians, but also high interest rates.”
    China also has a shaky record when it comes to worker safety, environmental standards and corporate governance. While China’s surging investments have created jobs in many countries, development experts worry that Beijing is exporting its worst practices.
    Chinese mining and manufacturing operations, like many American and European companies in previous decades, have been accused of abusing workers overseas. China’s coal-fired power plants and industrial factories are adding to pollution problems in developing nations.
    Issues have already surfaced in Ecuador.
    A few miles from the site of the hydroelectric plant, the Coca River vaults down a 480-foot waterfall and cascades through steep canyons toward the Amazon. It is the tallest waterfall in Ecuador and popular with tourists.

    When the dam is complete and the water is diverted to the plant, the San Rafael falls will slow to a trickle for part of the year. With climate change already shrinking the Andean glacier that feeds the river, experts debate whether the site will have enough water to generate even half the electricity predicted.
    Ecuadoreans on the Chinese-run project have repeatedly protested about wages, health care, food and general working conditions. “The Chinese are arrogant,” said Oscar Cedeno, a 20-year-old construction worker. “They think they are superior to us.”
    Last December, an underground river burst into a tunnel at the site. The high-pressure water flooded the powerhouse, killing 14 workers. It was one of a series of serious accidents at Chinese projects in Ecuador, several of them fatal.
    When the research arm of China’s cabinet scheduled an economic development conference this spring, the global financial and corporate elite came to Beijing. The heads of major banks and pharmaceutical, auto and oil companies mingled with top Chinese officials.
    Some had large investments in the country and wanted to protect their access to the domestic market. Others came to court business, as Beijing channeled more of its money overseas.
    At the event, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, commended China’s efforts to engage globally through investment and trade, as well as to enact economic reforms. It “is good for China and good for the world — their fates are intertwined,” she said in her keynote address.
    China’s pull is strong.
    It is the world’s largest buyer of oil, which gives China substantial sway over petropolitics. It is also increasingly the trading partner of choice for many countries, taking the mantle from Western nations. China’s foreign direct investment — the money it spends overseas annually on land, factories and other business operations — is second only to the United States’, having passed Japan last year.
    Chinese companies are at the center of a worldwide construction boom, mostly financed by Chinese banks. They are building power plants in Serbia, glass and cement factories in Ethiopia, low-income housing in Venezuela and natural gas pipelines in Uzbekistan.
    The evolution has been swift. When China started to open its economy in the late 1970s, Beijing had to court companies and investors.
    One of the first multinationals to enter was the American Motors Corporation, which built a factory in Beijing. The project was initially aimed at producing Jeeps for export to Australia, rather than building cars for Chinese consumers.
    “We didn’t devote a lot of our boardroom discussions to it,” said Gerald Meyers, then the chief executive of the carmaker. “We were really trying to scrape out a living in our domestic market.”
    Today, China produces two million cars a month, far more than any other country. It mirrors the broader transformation of the economy from an insular agrarian society to the world’s largest manufacturer.

    While the change has showered wealth on China, it has also brought new demands, like a voracious thirst for energy to power its economy. The confluence of trends has compelled China to look beyond its borders to invest those riches and to satisfy its needs.
    Oil has been on the leading edge of this investment push. Energy projects and stakes have accounted for two-fifths of China’s $630 billion of overseas investments in the last decade, according to Derek Scissors, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute.
    China is playing both defense and offense. With an increased dependence on foreign oil, China’s leadership has followed the United States and other large economies by seeking to own more overseas oil fields — or at least the crude they produce — to ensure a stable supply. In recent years, state-controlled Chinese oil companies have acquired big stakes in oil operations iin Cameroon, Canada, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan, Uganda, the United States and Venezuela.
    “When utilizing foreign resources and markets, we need to consider it from the height of national strategy,” Prime Minister Li said in 2009, when he was a vice premier. “If the resources mainly come from one country or from one place with frequent turmoil, national economic safety will be under shadow when an emergency happens.”
    For President Correa of Ecuador, China represents a break with his country’s past — and his own.
    His father was imprisoned in the United States for cocaine smuggling and later committed suicide. At the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Mr. Correa focused his doctoral thesis on the shortcomings of economic policies backed by Washington and Western banks.
    As a politician, he embraced Venezuela’s socialist revolution. During his 2006 campaign, Mr. Correa joked that the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez’s comparison of President George W. Bush with Satan was disrespectful to the devil.
    In an early move as president, Mr. Correa expelled the Americans from a military base in Manta, an important launching pad for the Pentagon’s war on drugs. “We can negotiate with the United States over a base in Manta if they let us put a military base in Miami,” President Correa said at the time.
    Next, he severed financial ties. In late 2008, Mr. Correa called much of his country’s debt, largely owned by Western investors, “immoral and illegitimate” and stopped paying, setting off a default.
    At that point, Ecuador was in a bind. The global financial crisis was taking hold and oil prices collapsed. Ecuador and Petroecuador, its state-owned oil company, started running low on money.

    Shut out from borrowing in traditional markets, Ecuador turned to China to fill the void. PetroChina, the government-backed oil company, lent Petroecuador $1 billion in August 2009 for two years at 7.25 percent interest. Within a year, more Chinese money began to flow for hydroelectric and other infrastructure projects.

    “What Ecuador wants are sources of capital with fewer political strings attached, and that goes back to the personal history of Rafael Correa, who holds the United States directly or indirectly responsible for his father’s death and suffering,” said R. Evan Ellis, professor of Latin American studies at the United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. “But there is also a desire to get away from the dependence on the fiscal and political conditions of the I.M.F., World Bank and the West.”
    The Ecuadorean foreign minister calls the shift to China a “diversification of its foreign relations,” rather than a substitute for the United States or Europe. “We have decided that the most convenient and healthy thing for us,” said the foreign minister, Ricardo Patiño, is “to have friendly, mutually beneficial relations of respect with all countries.”
    The Chinese money, though, comes with its own conditions. Along with steep interest payments, Ecuador is largely required to use Chinese companies and technologies on the projects.
    International rules limit how the United States and other industrialized countries can tie their loans to such agreements. But China, which is still considered a developing country despite being the world’s largest manufacturer, doesn’t have to follow those standards.
    It is one reason that China’s effort to build an international development fund, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, has faced criticism in the United States. Washington is worried that China will create its own rules, with lower expectations for transparency, governance and the environment.
    While China has sought to quell those fears over the infrastructure fund, its portfolio of projects around the world imposes tough terms and sometimes lax standards. Since 2005, the country has landed $471 billion in construction contracts, many tied to broader lending agreements.
    In Ecuador, a consortium of Chinese companies is overseeing a flood control and irrigation project in the southern Ecuador province of Cañar. A Chinese engineering company built a $100 million, four-lane bridge to span the Babahoyo River near the coast.
    Such deals typically favor the Chinese.
    PetroChina and Sinopec, another state-controlled Chinese company, together pump about 25 percent of the 560,000 barrels a day produced in Ecuador. Along with taking the bulk of oil exports, the Chinese companies also collect $25 to $50 in fees from Ecuador for each barrel they pump.
    China’s terms are putting countries in precarious positions.
    In Ecuador, oil represents roughly 40 percent of the government’s revenue, according to the United States Energy Department. And those earnings are suddenly plunging along with the price of oil. With crude at around $50 a barrel, Ecuador doesn’t have much left to repay its loans.
    “Of course we have concerns over their ability to repay the debts — China isn’t silly,” said Lin Boqiang, the director of the Energy Economics Research Center at Xiamen University in China’s Fujian province and a government policy planner. “But the gist is resources will ultimately become valuable assets.”

    If Ecuador or other countries can’t cover their debts, their obligations to China may rise. A senior Chinese banker, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity for diplomatic reasons, said Beijing would most likely restructure some loans in places like Ecuador.
    To do so, Chinese authorities want to extend the length of the loans instead of writing off part of the principal. That means countries will have to hand over their natural resources for additional years, limiting their governments’ abilities to borrow money and pursue other development opportunities.
    China has significant leverage to make sure borrowers pay. As the dominant manufacturer for a long list of goods, Beijing can credibly threaten to cut off shipments to countries that do not repay their loans, the senior Chinese banker said.
    With its economy stumbling, Ecuador asked China at the start of the year for an additional $7.5 billion in financing to fill the growing government budget deficit and buy Chinese goods. Since then, the situation has only deteriorated. In recent weeks, thousands of protesters have poured into the streets of Quito and Guayaquil to challenge various government policies and proposals, some of which Mr. Correa has recently withdrawn.
    “China is becoming the new company store for developing oil-, gas- and mineral-producing countries,” said David Goldwyn, who was the State Department’s special envoy for international energy affairs during President Obama’s first term. “They are entitled to secure reliable sources of oil, but what we need to worry about is the way they are encouraging oil-producing countries to mortgage their long-term future through oil-backed loans.”
    Plagued by Problems
    A pall of acrimony surrounds the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, Ecuador’s largest construction project. Few of the Chinese workers speak Spanish, and they live separately from their Ecuadorean counterparts. When the workers leave their camp in the village of San Luis at noon for lunch, they walk down the main street in separate groups. At night, they also walk in separate groups up the hill to the local brothel. (Prostitution is legal in Ecuador.) The workers sit at separate tables drinking bottles of the Ecuadorean beer, Pilsener.

  5. Thanks for sharing this article. Pakistan indeed can learn much from the experience. In my opinion this transational phase would hold true for every emerging power. These strategies of survival as mentioned by John J. Mearsheimer in chapter 5 indeed is “The Tragedy of Great Powet Politics” ( The title of his book).

  6. China needs us. Pakistan should embrace this huge opportunity with a pragmatic, and business-like cost-benefit analysis instead of confounding this transaction with metaphors of oceans, mountains, honey and now iron. It’s about hard cash which the finance minister badly needs for the country.

  7. The Belt and Road, Terminates at the Rope and Noose
    There will NOT be another Super Power emerging

  8. Thanks.
    According to me , there is one important aspect that needs to be kept in mind while comparing CPEC with Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and that is related to the nature of deal.
    Both CPEC and Indo-U.S. nuclear deal starting off with different objective , the former being economic while the latter being strategic partnership evolved, transformed and added or continues to add the ” value of alliance ” with an established vs , as analyst state , to be established global leaders of the world , the U.S. and China . However , i think CPEC partnership is a much stronger force of attraction or eventually would become one , even for India , keeping , in mind , how different regional states see this corridor as opening window of opportunity for the 21st century Asian economic century. CPEC , if completed successfully will be a regional game changer , politically , between arch rivals , India and Pakistan , economically for people and socially, for integration.

  9. the writer of the article is requested to please clarify
    1. what are the challenges to cpec.
    2. how these can be tackled.

  10. In my view , challenges to CPEC are twofold i.e. external and internal.
    1. External Challenges include ; Involvement of states and actor’s , who do not want to see progress being made on CPEC ; concerns of protection of Chinese personnel
    2. Internal Challenges include ; Provincial Concerns on various projects under CPEC , which have been resolved , till now ; In the future issues of urban terrorism
    Resolving External Challenges : Doing away with and exposing state and actor’s hindering progress on CPEC , which the state of Pakistan already is progressing with; Special security arrangements for Chinese personnel , progress on this issue also has been made
    Resolving Internal Challenges : Political Will and Consensus needs to be strengthened; the city of Baluchistan would need a policy framework , under which the working and monitoring of port can progress smoothly , the government of Pakistan would have to ensure that benefits from the projects reach and benefit the province , state and its people equally.

  11. It is good analysis.
    As we know that this up coming project between China and Pakistan with the name of CPEC will bring more economic development and prosperity in the region, even this corridor flourish tourism sector of both countries. At the beginning of this project some international as well as national obstacles are exist for both nations especially Pakistan perspective, because the status of Pakistan’s area that is Gilgit-Baltistan (GB )is not still defined by the constitution of Pakistan. On another side Chinese government has declared that without giving constitutional status to GB, China will not spoil its money on this project and will not make economic rout through such controversial territory. If Pakistan is sincere about CPEC then make GB as its fifth Province.

  12. I came across this while searching for some in depth analysis on the subject of CPEC. Could the author perhaps do an updated version, looking at recent developments and how things are looking one year on?
    Many thanks.

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