To better understand the implications of third-party interventions during crises on the subcontinent, the South Asian Voices (SAV) editorial team collaborated with the Stimson Center’s Strategic Learning team to compile a collection of relevant resources and analysis from regional and U.S. experts.
As South Asia continues to face periodic crises, third-party intervention—particularly by the United States—has played a critical role in de-escalation. From Kargil in 1999 to the recent “Four Days In May” crisis in 2025, Washington has consistently been one of, if not the, most influential external actor involved in crisis management in the region. However, recent trends including the evolving U.S.-India strategic partnership and U.S. pullback from sustained global engagement have introduced uncertainty as to whether this pattern would hold going forward.
Indian and Pakistani strategies in crises have often accounted for or been oriented towards third parties, in what Moeed Yusuf describes as the “brokered bargaining model.” According to this process, regional nuclear rivals iteratively compete for third-party support of their objectives by balancing calculated manipulation of the risk of war with exercises of restraint.
Tanvi Kulkarni, Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, speaking to SLI during the recent crisis, recounts U.S. and Chinese roles in past crises on the subcontinent but argues that India and Pakistan’s signals toward external actors are likely to become less relevant as the ability and interest of these third parties to intervene dwindles.
Despite potential signs of U.S. unreliability as a mediator, particularly from Pakistan’s perspective, the United States ultimately continued this role in the 2025 crisis, says Sitara Noor, Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
For more on the U.S. role in crisis management during this most recent episode, check out SAV’s Q&A featuring Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center, who analyzes how Washington was involved in bringing the India-Pakistan kinetic crisis to an end and Lisa Curtis, Senior Fellow and Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, who offers historical context on the United States’ approach to crisis diplomacy in South Asia.
In general, while India has historically preferred managing regional crises bilaterally, Pakistan has sought to bring international attention to the issue, particularly from the United States and China. Curtis discusses the strategies employed by American officials in past crises: “The United States has traditionally taken an active role during past India-Pakistan crises by coming in, working the phones, talking to both sides, and trying to find a solution that does not involve the possibility of a conflict that could potentially go nuclear.” Putting this role in the current context, Markey points out, “the United States played an important role in enabling the two sides to pull away from this [most recent] conflict. But Washington acted without coercion or incentives, as both sides had narrower goals for this conflict than a desire to actually go to war.”
While India has historically preferred managing regional crises bilaterally, Pakistan has sought to bring international attention to the issue, particularly from the United States and China.
China’s longstanding approach to South Asian crises has been one of cautious non-intervention. Historically, Beijing maintained that India and Pakistan should resolve their disputes bilaterally, refraining from inserting itself directly into conflicts. However, with deepening economic investments into Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative and growing concerns over potential nuclear escalation, China’s posture has evolved. See our Q&A with: Andrew Small, Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, who analyzes China’s role in the 2025 crisis, how its military equipment impacted Pakistan’s battlefield performance, and the broader balance of external powers in South Asia. Small suggests “China could have swung in forcefully after the Indian strikes but did not. Instead, it made general calls for restraint and offered some protection of Pakistan at the United Nations, but it was all relatively limited.”
In recent years, Chinese policymakers have shown increasing interest in playing a role in regional crises, motivated both by national security concerns and Beijing’s broader aspiration to be seen as a responsible global power. But this ambition faces significant constraints. For example, asymmetric relationships—with Pakistan as a strategic partner, and India as a regional rival—complicate Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral mediator.
Watch Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as he analyzes China’s potential and limitations for becoming an effective mediator in India-Pakistan crises.
For a step-by-step breakdown of the recent India-Pakistan conflict, read Christopher Clary’s recent analysis for the Stimson Center here.
In the coming days and weeks, the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program will continue its focus on understanding the lessons India and Pakistan are learning from crises on the subcontinent and their consequences. In the meantime, for more videos from experts analyzing the conflict and explaining relevant concepts, check out the full playlist from the Strategic Learning initiative. And for near daily analysis on the security, politics, and economics of South Asia, return to SAV regularly.
Also Read: Five Key Concepts to Understand the India-Pakistan Crisis
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Image 1: Robert Alexander via Getty Images
