Editor’s Note: This is the second article in a two-part series on the U.S. designation of the BLA as an FTO. Read the first article here.
On August 11, as a part of its “commitment to countering terrorism,” the U.S. Department of State designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) alongside the Majeed Brigade—one of the BLA’s special operations units allegedly responsible for most of its high-profile attacks. The move criminalizes material support for the BLA from anyone under U.S. jurisdiction, freezes the group’s U.S.-based assets, and restricts access to financing channels. While the BLA rejects the “terrorist” label and instead positions itself as a separatist movement and victim at the hands of the Pakistani state, Islamabad has long argued that the group is supported by India as a way for its rival to foment separatism, a charge New Delhi has denied.
The timing of the designation adds to the political weight of the decision. The declaration—a long-standing demand of Pakistan’s military leadership—came during Pakistani army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir’s second visit to Washington in under two months, in the context of an increasingly warm Pakistan-U.S. relationship following its May 2025 standoff with India. Indeed, Islamabad celebrated the move as a “major diplomatic victory” and recognition of its “immense sacrifices” in the war on terror, with Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi thanking President Donald Trump and Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari using it to link the proscribed group to India.
Most significantly, however, the BLA designation symbolizes a new geopolitical juncture in South Asia, in which Pakistan has managed to reshape the diplomatic narrative in its favor and India must absorb the consequences. With Washington seemingly tilting closer to Islamabad and even Beijing on the admittedly narrow issue of terrorism in Balochistan, New Delhi is reckoning with its “re-hyphenation” with Islamabad in international discourse and the erosion of its political and diplomatic leverage with Washington, and potentially beyond. Using the BLA designation as a jumping-off point, this piece investigates the ramifications of this moment for India as it relates to competing national and counterterrorism narratives.
Power Play in South Asia
Since it was first designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in 2019, the BLA has claimed responsibility for additional attacks, including those carried out by the Majeed Brigade. In 2024, for example, the BLA claimed it conducted suicide bombings near Karachi’s airport and at the Gwadar Port Authority Complex. In 2025, it claimed responsibility for several more attacks of increasing sophistication, most notably the March hijacking of the Jaffar Express train traveling from Quetta to Peshawar, which took more than 300 passengers hostage and killed 31 civilians and security personnel, as well as the Khuzdar bus attack, which killed at least eight people, including six children. This spate of attacks has continued since the FTO designation, including an attack that killed at least nine Pakistani soldiers in southwestern Balochistan on the very day of the designation.
“Historically, the BLA’s alignment with India on regional flashpoints such as Pakistan-administered Kashmir, coupled with New Delhi’s quiet but discernible sympathy for the Baloch liberation movement, underscores a degree of convergence that Islamabad has sought to spotlight.”
Historically, the BLA’s alignment with India on regional flashpoints such as Pakistan-administered Kashmir, coupled with New Delhi’s quiet but discernible sympathy for the Baloch liberation movement, underscores a degree of convergence that Islamabad has sought to spotlight. The movement has long found ideological backing within the RSS, the hypernationalist affiliate of the BJP, which views Balochistan’s culture, traditions, and historical identity as fundamentally incompatible with Pakistan’s, framing the province as internally colonized and its liberation movement as deserving of active support. For their part, Baloch leaders have openly thanked India for its firm stance against Pakistan and repeatedly urged it to extend diplomatic backing to their cause. Drawing on the Bangladesh precedent, they have framed their appeal in terms of India’s historical moral responsibility—a narrative that, while never fully embraced as official policy, has nonetheless added a layer of political affinity between New Delhi and the Baloch separatist cause.
The sentiment among various quarters of the Indian strategic community toward the Baloch independence movement blends sympathy with moral positioning, especially among retired military veterans. The argument seems to be that internationalizing Balochistan helps expose what New Delhi portrays as Pakistan’s hypocrisy on Kashmir—pressing Islamabad on its own restive periphery even as it campaigns globally against India’s actions in Jammu and Kashmir. Further, this sympathy often draws directly on the Bangladesh precedent, which holds that backing the Baloch could both weaken Pakistan internally and reinforce India’s image as a regional defender of liberation movements. However, there is no concrete evidence of direct Indian material support to the Baloch movement.
Notably, the Indian government and policy community have remained silent in the wake of Washington’s designation of the BLA. This silence is telling: it avoids handing Pakistan further grounds to accuse India of backing Baloch separatists, while also sidestepping a potentially awkward divergence with the United States at a time when bilateral relations are already under strain. At the same time, the absence of any discussion within India’s strategic circles suggests a reluctance to expend political capital on the Baloch issue, even rhetorically. This implies that, while historical sentiment and strands of sympathy persist, New Delhi has chosen to let the designation pass rather than risk complicating its larger diplomatic calculus.
Turning the Tables
There are certainly practical implications that the designation of the BLA could pose for India, including potential effects on New Delhi’s intelligence cooperation with the United States on Balochistan-related networks, informal backchannels with Baloch groups, and alleged links to separatists. However, the greatest significance of the United States designating BLA as an FTO is in the rhetorical realm.
For years, India has cast Islamabad as a state sponsor of terrorism in global fora, citing support for groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. With this designation in its diplomatic quiver, Pakistan can more effectively position itself as a fellow victim of cross-border terrorism and rhetorically link the BLA to alleged Indian backing—a war of words within the diplomatic arena. This potential rhetorical equivalency on the international stage could be a step toward matching India’s stated narrative that every act of terror constitutes an act of war.
In some ways, this is not a particularly new dynamic. It was highlighted most spectacularly in the weeks following the May conflict, where dueling diplomatic delegations from both Pakistan and India presented their narratives about what happened and why to the world. Pakistan’s success in promulgating its perspectives on terrorism could, in the case of any future crisis, undercut India’s central diplomatic claim that it has been merely a passive target of terrorism. While Islamabad may lack leverage to push Washington toward punitive measures, the BLA designation arms it with a potent talking point to argue victimhood and that its own security concerns deserve equal weight. This chips away at India’s moral high ground—a position already tested by allegations surrounding the Nijjar assassination in Canada and the Pannun case in the United States—and nudges discourse toward the “re-hyphenation” of India and Pakistan following the May crisis.
“This chips away at India’s moral high ground—a position already tested by allegations surrounding the Nijjar assassination in Canada and the Pannun case in the United States—and nudges discourse toward the “re-hyphenation” of India and Pakistan following the May crisis.”
Beyond the initial reputational damage, re-hyphenation may extend to a gradual weakening of India’s normative influence in regional and global fora. Pakistan has already demonstrated its ability to shape outcomes even in fora where India holds strong standing. Most recently, the September SCO declaration acknowledges both the Pahalgam attack and the violence in Balochistan, framing Pakistan’s security concerns alongside India’s. This further complicates New Delhi’s claim to a distinct moral high ground on terrorism.
The U.S. validation of Pakistan’s security concerns via the designation of the BLA reflects not only greater U.S. receptivity to Pakistan’s stated positions, but also Islamabad’s opportunism at a time when states are reluctant to commit to long-term partnerships. To that end, Islamabad may intend to use its improved position to revive aspects of its Cold War–era triangular diplomacy, balancing between Washington and Beijing in ways that serve its own interests. Beijing’s aversion to the BLA is absolute, after all, and Washington may not object to weakening a group targeting Chinese nationals if doing so also advances counterterrorism objectives and preserves its own prospective access to natural resources in the region. This potential alignment could further stymie India’s attempts to set its narrative regarding security and terrorism in its immediate neighborhood.
Future Fault Lines
Pakistan will almost certainly seek to capitalize on its successes so far. It may press the issue of terrorism in Balochistan in bilateral and multilateral arenas, perhaps even pursuing a UN designation to tighten the group’s financing. The designation also buttresses Islamabad’s counter-insurgency narrative at home, casting Balochistan operations as part of a globally sanctioned fight against terrorism, while bolstering its standing in oversight bodies like the Financial Action Task Force.
For New Delhi, though, the challenge is primarily reputational. India has occasionally secured symbolic wins since the May crisis—such as pushing the SCO to note Pahalgam—but these have not shifted the broader narrative. If reputational costs mount, India could find itself constrained diplomatically, forced to rely more heavily on alternative levers, such as its growing partnerships within the SCO, technical counter-terrorism cooperation to reassure Western partners, or carefully calibrated narrative management to blunt Pakistani claims. Even if operational realities remain unchanged, Washington’s perceptual tilt complicates India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy, giving Islamabad a rhetorical lever to demand “balanced” U.S. treatment—especially if other states follow suit on the BLA designation.
At the same time, the designation introduces a potential, if remote, opportunity for both India and Pakistan to explore limited confidence-building measures on the terrorist threats they each face—such as structured evidence-sharing or multilateral counterterrorism workshops—that could temper misperceptions. While current circumstances render such initiatives improbable, they may serve as valuable avenues for de-escalation once regional dynamics stabilize. In this context, India would benefit from signaling operational transparency to Western partners, demonstrating procedural restraint through technical mechanisms with Pakistan, and allowing external actors to foster discreet channels where both sides can address sub-conventional threats before they spark another potential crisis.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: U.S. Designation of BLA as Terror Outfit: A Win for Pakistan, but Not a Panacea
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Image 1: Ghulam Murtaza via Wikimedia Commons
Image 2: India in USA via X
