India and Pakistan have not held significant bilateral arms control talks since 2008, constituting the longest period without such discussions since the 1980s. There are two plausible policy explanations for this. First, India and Pakistan typically discuss arms control as part of their composite security dialogue, which the two sides have not been able to properly conduct for over a decade and a half due to several factors, particularly the lingering issue of Kashmir. Second, there is no permanent forum dedicated to bilateral arms control talks. The existing set of important bilateral behavioral arms control agreements is subject to increasing challenges of interpretation, implementation, and application in the rapidly evolving military landscape, paired with a declining common understanding of how to strengthen the robustness of mutual deterrence.
With newly elected governments in New Delhi and Islamabad, the two countries are starting from a somewhat fresh slate and could potentially reconsider ties. This may be an opportune time then to consider creating a Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) on arms control. From 1988 to 2008, India and Pakistan conducted a series of behavioral arms control talks and signed multiple agreements. Both governments have the political capital and space to resume this effort. Establishing a BCC on arms control with a well-thought-out mandate would help both countries mitigate frequent and prolonged disruptions to negotiations, offering a meaningful future for arms control in South Asia.
The Current Climate on Arms Control
The absence of a regular arms control process seriously undermines the already fragile condition of strategic stability between India and Pakistan. The existing agreements, such as the Prohibition on Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (1988), Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Maneuvers, and Troop Movements (1991), Prevention of Airspace Violations (1991), Memorandum of Understanding (1999), and Pre-notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles (2005), are all subject to problems related to interpretation, implementation, and application. These challenges are due to the increased compactness and range of military platforms, new military capabilities and deployment patterns, the reorganization of forces, and the emergence of the cyber domain.
With newly elected governments in New Delhi and Islamabad, the two countries are starting from a somewhat fresh slate and could potentially reconsider ties. This may be an opportune time then to consider creating a Bilateral Consultative Commission on arms control. Both governments have the political capital and space to resume this effort.
Without formal and informal arms control discussions, both parties increasingly engage in unregulated military undertakings. These include the introduction of modern weapons and aggressive military postures at the expense of mutual deterrence stability. The two opponents are increasingly operationalizing their war-fighting doctrines to make their threats more credible. India is raising doubts about its No-First-Use commitment, operationalizing its nuclear triad, building ballistic missile defense, deploying high-precision hypersonic missile systems, enhancing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and restructuring its armed forces for unified offensive operations. Due to its weaker conventional forces and economic health, Pakistan is implementing Full Spectrum Deterrence by introducing a variety of delivery means with different ranges, including so-called “tactical nuclear weapons.” Without adequate management and restraint, bilateral military competition is increasingly susceptible to the risks of miscalculations, accidents, or the allure of a first strike based on perceived weakness.
By renewing the ceasefire pledge along the Kashmir border in February 2021 and continuing to formally observe existing behavioral arms control agreements, India and Pakistan have shown their willingness to reinforce peace and stability. With newly elected governments on both sides, there is a potential for the resumption of dialogue. For example, the three-time former prime minister and head of the ruling political party of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, who previously signed the Lahore Declaration with then-Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in February 1999, has extended overtures to India in recent months. India seems to be carefully assessing these overtures, a potentially promising sign since these governments often undertake bold foreign policy initiatives during the first two years of their tenure.
If India and Pakistan resume dialogue, they can revisit the idea of establishing a BCC. This proposed commission would provide India and Pakistan a permanent mechanism for organizing continuous dialogue about arms control, enabling the parties to promote the objectives and implementation of the existing agreements. India and China could also consider establishing a similar commission. As relations between Pakistan and India and India and China improve over time, the three countries can explore the idea of trilateral arms control agreement and a trilateral commission. However, it is important to note that the dynamics of a trilateral commission, such as identifying common security issues, roles, and responsibilities, would be more complex than those of a bilateral one, presenting potential challenges.
In the current situation, a bilateral commission is more attractive than a trilateral one. India and Pakistan have established bilateral arms control structures, currencies, and mutual interests. Although establishing trilateral structures would be beneficial in the long term, there are currently no existing trilateral frameworks that can be immediately built on. Nevertheless, it is crucial that all three countries start working on developing commitments, infrastructure, resources, and strategic analyses. Linking a bilateral arrangement with a third party would create a coordination problem in negotiations, subjecting any final accord to politicization and scuttling.
The Case for a Bilateral Consultative Commission
The proposed commission should start with limited authority, focusing on the following functions: 1) monitoring compliance with the provisions of the existing agreements, and 2) facilitating the voluntary exchange of information to enhance confidence in compliance. Over time, India and Pakistan could expand the commission’s authority to include considering appropriate proposals for new behavioral and structural arms control measures, and regulating the operations of National Technical Means for verification purposes.
Introducing a BCC with a limited mandate would complement India and Pakistan’s existing arms control policies. On the one hand, it would allow the two nuclear rivals to regularly work to enhance the objectives and implementation of the existing agreements. On the other hand, it could provide quality input for robust arms control talks when they arise as part of the comprehensive security dialogue. Interestingly, the two countries’ leadership has already agreed to such an idea in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), an integral part of the historic Lahore Declaration of 1999. After the Declaration, there was only one round of the composite dialogue (2004-2008). Based on publicly available information, the two sides neither fully discussed nor rejected the idea of a bilateral arms control mechanism during the dialogue, suggesting that the idea could be explored more.
Historically, the United States has successfully facilitated stability diplomacy between India and Pakistan and should commit to carrying forward this legacy. By encouraging this initiative, a future Harris or second Trump administration could put its own stamp on U.S. policy towards South Asia to promote greater transparency and stability in the region. As a first step, Washington should leverage its role as a sophisticated power balancer between India and Pakistan by the White House re-demonstrating an interest in South Asian affairs. Parallel to its special and privileged strategic partnership with India, the United States can revitalize Pakistan’s status as a non-NATO ally with a robust and efficient framework by providing critical military assistance to support Islamabad’s recently launched “Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability)” operation against a rising surge of terrorism in the troubled border areas adjacent to Afghanistan. The United States can also reduce tariffs on Pakistani goods and look for opportunities to enhance cooperation with Islamabad in green energy, IT, health, climate change, and good governance.
Introducing a BCC with a limited mandate would complement India and Pakistan’s existing arms control policies. On the one hand, it would allow the two nuclear rivals to regularly work to enhance the objectives and implementation of the existing agreements. On the other hand, it could provide quality input for robust arms control talks when they arise as part of the comprehensive security dialogue.
Additionally, a non-private emissary of the U.S. president could visit New Delhi and Islamabad to explore the idea of a BCC. Washington can also express its willingness to provide formal or informal technical and financial support in establishing and operating the commission. Track II diplomacy should also be employed to supplement the process. Finally, India and Pakistan can arrange an international conference to celebrate one of their oldest nuclear agreements related to the prohibition of attacks against each other’s nuclear installations and use the occasion to announce the establishment of a BCC.
From 1988 to 2008, India and Pakistan signed more behavioral arms control agreements than any other adversarial dyad, providing practical arrangements to avert unintended crises. While the current agreements are subject to misinterpretation, which impact their implementation in an evolving military environment, new governments in both countries have a rare opportunity before them. New Delhi and Islamabad have the political capital to establish a BCC with a specific and mutually agreed upon mandate, taking a concrete step towards maintaining strategic stability in the region.
***
Image 1: Joshua Song, Flickr
Image 2: Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations via Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
