On 26 July 2024, in an official notification by the Ministry of Interior, the Pakistani government encouraged all government entities to use the term “Fitna al-Khawarij” to refer to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan’s Armed Forces adopted the same strategy. During a February 2025 university address, the Chief of Army Staff said, “We will never allow Fitna al-Khawarij to impose their outdated ideology on our country.”
The term, Arabic for “seceders,” would replace the Inter-Services Public Relations’ (ISPR) reference to these extremists as “terrorists,” “militants,” or “miscreants.” Since the group draws its legitimacy from a narrative of “defensive Jihad,” the new term, which originally referred to a sect that rebelled against the fourth caliph Hazrat Ali (RA) known for their extremism and violent secessionism, aims to highlight that the terror group’s activities are detrimental to the Islamic faith.
By invoking this term, the Pakistani state positions TTP not just as terrorists but as heretics who have exited the fold of the Muslim community—a symbolic downgrade in a religious society. This article establishes the TTP’s own narrative, discusses the audiences that the government and armed forces are targeting through their labeling campaign, and assesses whether the strategy is an effective counter-terrorism tool.
By invoking this term [Khawarij], the Pakistani state positions TTP not just as terrorists but as heretics who have exited the fold of the Muslim community—a symbolic downgrade in a religious society.
Countering the TTP’s Narrative
The name Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is itself a powerful label that explicitly links the group with the national consciousness. “Tehreek,” which is rooted in Persian and Arabic, directly translates to “movement.” However, in some contexts, it also refers to “revolution.” “Taliban” translates to “students.” Therefore, the terror group’s name is commonly understood as “Movement of the Students of Pakistan,” lending it a positive connotation that allows it to relate to Pakistani civilians. Challenging this connotation would require separating the terror group from any association with the country and presenting it as a harmful external proxy.
The Pakistan Army’s adoption of “Khawarij” is arguably designed to fill this gap. In a personal interview conducted with a Commander of the Pakistani Army stationed in South Waziristan, the officer stated that local support for counter-terrorism (CT) operations dwindled from 70 to 30 percent in recent years.1 The shift in terminology is an attempt to recover lost ground by portraying the enemy as theologically deviant–a sharp contrast to the image they intend to portray as saviors forced to rely on terrorism as a tool to achieve their ends.
Swaying Opinions Against the TTP
Pakistan’s Armed Forces and government appear to have devised the rhetorical rebranding strategy to influence the TTP’s perception among multiple audiences. With the general public, the simple goal is to erode the TTP’s perceived Islamic legitimacy. Religious scholars are also a group that the armed forces would benefit from engaging with to mobilize clerical opposition and potentially sway religious favor in their direction. Finally, senior officials of the Armed Forces may hope to instill or reinforce moral clarity among their own security personnel who are directly facing the consequences of the ongoing CT operations.
According to a report by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the state’s narrative framing is critical in shaping the local response to militancy. In such terror operations, it is crucial to have buy-in from the local population to counter recruitment either in support of the ideology or among the terror group’s ground forces. This strategy is particularly important in the tribal and semi-tribal areas that terror groups operate in.
The Pakistani state also strategically engages religious scholars to counter militant ideologies by leveraging scholars’ theological authority. Through coordinated efforts like the Paigham-e-Pakistan initiative and state-backed fatwas, clerics from various sects publicly denounce groups like the TTP as deviants and religious traitors. The impact is clear: mainstream narratives now widely reject the notion that jihad can be waged against the state. However, its success varies–while urban audiences respond positively, distrust of state-aligned ulema in militant-influenced tribal areas limits the influence of such strategies. Still, the effort has created a unified religious front, making it harder for extremists to recruit under the guise of religious legitimacy.
For soldiers, the religious framing of militants as Khawarij adds a layer of morality to their struggle and provides motivational fuel for their continued engagement. In an Islamically devout military culture, labeling the enemy as religiously illegitimate reinforces the righteousness of the mission, enhancing morale and psychological resolve in asymmetric warfare. This narrative helps reduce cognitive dissonance in combat scenarios involving fellow Muslims, especially during operations in restive areas like North Waziristan.
Precedents of Effective Labelling Strategies
Pakistan is not the first state to rely on rhetorical strategies that paint the enemy as the “other.” Furthermore, the term “fitna al-khawarij” is not the first or only instance in which the Pakistani state has chosen labels to invoke an emotional response from their citizenry or other stakeholders.
During the Bush administration, the United States employed terms like the “Axis of Evil” to galvanize support for foreign interventions, including the invasion of Iraq, that attained tremendous endorsement. Similarly, Israel has repeatedly employed rhetorical strategies such as accusing Hamas of using “human shields,” a phrase intended to dehumanize the civilians killed in the conflict and delegitimize Hamas as their protector. In South Asia, Indian authorities have referred to national operations with names that energize their public to support the armed forces; for instance, some have interpreted the name “Operation Sindoor” to signify the women who lost their husbands in the terror attack in Pahalgam. Previously, India labeled its urban leftist activists as “Urban Naxals,” a term loaded with ideological judgment.
For soldiers, the religious framing of militants as Khawarij adds a layer of morality to their struggle and provides motivational fuel for their continued engagement… [as] labeling the enemy as religiously illegitimate reinforces the righteousness of the mission, enhancing morale and psychological resolve in asymmetric warfare.
Similarly, the Pakistani state’s approach to invoking the desired emotional response among their intended audience has often relied on rhetorical strategies. The most recent example of this approach was on May 10, 2025 when Pakistan labeled its retaliatory strikes against India as “Operation Bunyan-um Marsoos,” taken from an ayat in the Holy Quran that refers to “a wall constructed of molten lead” to symbolize strength and impenetrability. Pakistan has relied on religious legitimacy before in framing militants as enemies of Islam and Pakistan, portraying them as foreign-funded agents or traitors working against national unity.
In addition to rhetorical strategies, media campaigns, such as those aired during military operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad, used emotionally charged language and imagery—clips of grieving families and anthemes with the backdrop of the national flag—to solidify this perception. The public has been exposed to and conditioned by this style of messaging repeatedly through television, textbooks, and religious sermons, making them highly receptive to emotionally and morally charged narratives against terrorism.
Is Reframing an Effective Counter-Terrorism Tool?
Early evidence suggests that this linguistic innovation is having an impact. Anecdotal observations and social media posts indicate a growing familiarity with the term among the public. However, skepticism remains as critics have argued that rebranding alone cannot substitute for coherent policy or ground-level engagement. While the labeling serves as a psychological and ideological tool, its tangible impact on reducing the TTP’s operational capabilities remains to be fully assessed and is likely to be limited.
The objective of the rebranding, which is to attract widespread consensus over the identity of a national enemy, has confronted countless hurdles, including the citizenry’s contempt towards the armed forces. However, the recent exchange of missiles between India and Pakistan has reignited a sense of patriotism and support for the armed forces among the Pakistani citizenry which may reinforce national cohesion. The success from cross-border exchanges could translate to support for fighting the enemy within, but the translation of that impact remains to be seen.
Even as the success of this ideological tool remains uncertain, it is important to acknowledge that such measures could award the authorities new tools to add heroic dimensions to cover up extrajudicial killings. Notably, the “Khawarij” framing has not been extended to secular insurgent groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), indicating a selective application of religious narratives. Although, like the TTP, they are involved in armed exchanges with Pakistan’s Defense Forces, the BLA are widely recognized as a separatist movement with political instead of religious foundations.
In conclusion, the use of “Khawarij” represents a strategic shift in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism discourse. While it may offer short-term benefits in narrative control and public engagement, its long-term efficacy will depend on whether it is supported by calculated operational procedures like targeted Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs), which can minimize collateral damage, de-radicalization and reintegration programs, and a sustainable civil-military balance. Ultimately, this linguistic turn suggests Pakistan is not just fighting terrorists on the ground—it is engaged in a battle for ideological and moral authority within its own borders.
Also Read: SAV Q&A with Dr. Raashid Wali Janjua and Noorulain Naseem: The TTP’s
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
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Image 1: Government of Pakistan MIB
Image 2: Paigham-e-Pakistan Initiative
- Private Conversation with author, Jhelum Cantt., December 16, 2024 ↩︎
