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Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meeting thrice in the past three months has generated a lot of debate about India’s relationship with Ukraine and its potential role in negotiating for peace between Kyiv and Moscow. As the war unfolded in February 2022, India found itself in a fix; it had to navigate its historical ties with Russia, while maintaining the trajectory of a growing partnership with the West, which was backing Ukraine. On the one hand, Russia has on multiple occasions expressed displeasure regarding the transfer of Indian-manufactured weapons to Ukraine, while on the other hand, the West has fruitlessly attempted to exert diplomatic pressure on India to condemn Russian actions. Amid these increasing tensions, balancing between the two extremes of  Russia on the one end and Ukraine and the West on the other has become crucial for India, demonstrating its diplomatic finesse and ability to position itself as an important arbitrator in the conflict and reflecting its aspirations for a larger role on the global stage. Overall, India’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war has been a testimony to its longstanding policy of strategic autonomy in the sphere of international relations. However, autonomy is not without its complications, and India may be pressured to choose sides.

The Evolving Dynamics of India-Ukraine Relations

While the history of India-Russia relations is well-known, Ukraine’s importance to India’s strategic and economic interests is less discussed. Even before the 2022 invasion, India and Ukraine shared an extensive bilateral relationship. In fact, New Delhi was among the first to recognize and establish official diplomatic relations with Ukraine. However, India had previously exercised caution in its dealings with countries that emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, taking into account Russia’s sensitivities. This approach was evident in India’s reference to Russia’s “legitimate interest” in Crimea after its annexation in 2014. 

Overall, India’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war has been a testimony to its longstanding policy of strategic autonomy in the sphere of international relations. However, autonomy is not without its complications, and India may be pressured to choose sides.

However, as Moscow has become less sensitive to New Delhi’s concerns about the threats that China and Pakistan pose, and as its own interests in Eurasia have grown, India’s position has changed to one of active engagement with countries like Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine. In fact, India’s outreach to Ukraine should be seen as part of its enhanced cooperation with Europe and its sub-regions, which New Delhi now sees as key to securing its strategic and economic interests.

The key drivers of the India-Ukraine relationship are defense and trade. Although Russia remains the largest exporter of weapons to India, Ukraine has  been a significant supplier of spare parts over the years. For instance, Ukraine has been a key partner in upgrading India’s aging An-32 transport aircraft fleet. Ukraine even offered to provide the Indian Air Force a new An-132 aircraft in 2019. Kyiv has also helped to power and maintain India’s warships, such as Krivak-Class frigates, with its engines.  Even though Ukraine’s ability to supply spare parts and defense equipment has been jeopardized due to the war, there is potential for a defense manufacturing partnership between the two countries. In addition, Ukraine has expressed interest in defense procurement from India.

In terms of trade, agricultural products and fertilizer exchanges have been the cornerstone of these ties, with bilateral trade reaching USD $3.386 billion in 2021-22. In 2020, India was Ukraine’s fifth-largest export destination, with a focus on fertilizers, sunflower oil, and steel while Indian exports include pharmaceutical products. Trade levels have declined significantly after the war broke out in Ukraine due to logistical issues but other countries are making efforts to restore pre-invasion levels.  

Modi’s recent visit to Kyiv, which led to the signing of four key agreements between the two democracies, underscores that Ukraine-India relations are more than wartime activism. For instance, Ukraine offers immense scope for joint ventures in defense manufacturing, which is in line with India’s vision to indigenize its defense industry with the “Make in India” initiative. Additionally, as India grows its economy, it will require markets in Eastern Europe and Ukraine’s agenda of rebuilding the nation after the crisis rightfully fits this bill. Finally, India-Ukraine relations and New Delhi’s support for the peace process are critical for India’s outreach to Eastern Europe. 

Ukraine: The Test of India’s Strategic Autonomy

As a country seeking new partnerships to achieve its larger ambitions on the world stage but also trying to maintain its traditional and longstanding ties, Ukraine has been a tightrope walk for India. India’s renewed partnership with Kyiv is beneficial, providing opportunities for future defense and technology collaboration as well as the ability to have an Eastern European foreign policy independent of Russia. While the West is critical to enhancing India’s capabilities to counter China in the Indo-Pacific Region. However, Russia is a traditional ally that has supported India through military equipment, diplomatic backing, and more. Thus, the primary consideration influencing India’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to be its ability to navigate its relationships with the West and Russia.

On the one hand, India has refrained from adopting a confrontational stance towards Russia. For one, it abstained from voting on the UN Security Council’s January 2022 proposal to officially classify the Ukrainian situation — prior to the commencement of Russian military actions — as a threat to international security and peace. Later that year, India also abstained from denouncing Russia’s claim of sovereignty of the Donetsk-Lugansk region in eastern Ukraine. However, on the other hand,  India has repeatedly called for respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, pressed for dialogue and diplomacy, and worked with its partners in the West to negotiate a grain deal between Moscow and Kyiv as well as pull Russia back from a potential nuclear strike. This has been India’s strategic autonomy in almost picture-perfect action.

But Ukraine has also emerged as an opportunity for India to project itself as a responsible global power capable of bridging the gap amidst warring sides in intense international conflicts. Thus, Prime Minister Modi’s offer to play a constructive role to restore peace and position India as a potential negotiator suggests New Delhi’s changing calculus vis a vis the Russia-Ukraine-West equation.

Future Implications for India

The current importance of Russia on the one hand and the West and Ukraine on the other to India’s trade and defense capabilities suggest that Delhi cannot afford to lose partners from either side. But evolving dynamics in the Russia-China-India trilateral and future Russian actions in Ukraine may pose some difficult questions for India’s strategic autonomy going forward.

The introduction of nuclear rhetoric or, more alarmingly, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would significantly alter the strategic calculus for India. Such an action would likely compel India to reassess its historically non-aligned stance and potentially issue a more robust condemnation of Russian aggression.

While the India-Russia relationship has remained relatively stable over the years, there are signs of strain. The relationship has stood the test of time and Modi signed nine bilateral agreements with Russia during his recent visit. But the delays in delivery of critical weapons and Russia’s declining defense industry might create both supply chain and maintenance problems for India in the future, as around 90 percent of Indian Army equipment and 70 percent of Indian Air Force equipment are of Russian origin, requiring continuous upgrades and repair. The Indian defense industry, though showing progress, is not yet fully capable of reducing import dependence for cutting edge defense technology and so India may have to look to the West for alternatives. Further, the potential for a tighter Sino-Russian relationship is also a cause of concern for India. As China increasingly supplies dual-use components to support Russia’s war effort and Moscow becomes more beholden to Beijing in an otherwise isolating global order, Russia may no longer be a reliable partner for India in its hedge against China. This shift would incentivize India to deepen its relationship with Western partners, pushing it further away from Russia.  

The long-term sustainability of India’s strategic autonomy might also face issues if the conflict escalates to a point where Russia forcibly annexes the entirety of Ukraine or decides to use tactical nuclear weapons. The introduction of nuclear rhetoric or, more alarmingly, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would significantly alter the strategic calculus for India. Such an action would likely compel India to reassess its historically non-aligned stance and potentially issue a more robust condemnation of Russian aggression. It could precipitate a recalibration of the long-standing Indo-Russian strategic partnership from both sides.

While New Delhi’s successful balancing act may have been the envy of many in the past, the next few years are likely to be a litmus test for the longevity and credibility of its strategic autonomy.   

Also Read: Modi’s Visit to Ukraine: A Step in Forward Diplomacy and “De-Hyphenation”

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Image 1: MEAphotogallery via Flickr

Image 2: MEAphotogallery via Flickr

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