From October 14 to 15, more than 200 Afghan migrants attempting to enter Iran irregularly were reportedly attacked by Iranian border guards. HalVash, an advocacy group for the Baloch people that is based in Iran, claimed that dozens were killed and many injured but the Associated Press has been unable to verify the attack, highlighting the difficulty in obtaining information in Sistan-Balochistan. However, an initial investigation by the Taliban confirmed that two migrants were killed and dozens wounded. The number of deaths might increase after further examination as some migrants were still missing when the Taliban completed their initial investigation at the end of October.
This incident is not the first time that Iranian border guards have attacked Afghan migrants. In 2020, they were accused of torturing a group of Afghan migrants and pushing them into the Harirud River, where several migrants drowned. In the same year, three Afghan refugees died when Iranian police shot at their car. In addition, other violations — such as forcing Afghan migrants into labor, beating them, throwing stones at their homes, and shouting at them that they should leave Iran — are also on the rise.
These anti-Afghan sentiments in Iran have intensified in recent times as Afghan migrants have come to be perceived as economic and security threats — and climate change has made matters worse. High temperatures have created a prolonged drought, resulting in a decrease in the water supply from Afghanistan’s Helmand River into Iran, which is now an added factor that is contributing to the mistreatment of Afghan migrants.
The 1973 Helmand River Treaty aims to preempt disputes over the flow of river water from Afghanistan to Iran by enshrining Iran’s right to 820 million cubic meters of annual water in a “normal water year.” When the river flow is lower due to climatic factors, Iran’s water allocation is adjusted based on water availability in the riverbed. Article IV of the Helmand River Treaty explicitly allows Afghanistan to adjust and control the flow of river water in response to climatic changes. The treaty also aims to ensure that Afghanistan does not deprive Iran of its rightful share of water or contaminate Iran’s water supply. However, Iran claims that Afghanistan has much greater control over water flow, especially since the Kamal Khan Dam became functional in 2021.
While transboundary water issues are sensitive, especially as climate change intensifies, water can be used as a way for both Afghanistan and Iran to build mutual trust and potentially reduce the mistreatment of Afghan migrants in Iran. Building trust via water is possible but not that simple. It requires consistent dialogue, joint sustainable water resources management, transparent data sharing, and giving preference to transboundary interests over national interests.
While transboundary water issues are sensitive, especially as climate change intensifies, water can be used as a way for both Afghanistan and Iran to build mutual trust and potentially reduce the mistreatment of Afghan migrants in Iran.
Iran’s Dependency on Afghanistan’s Water
In recent years, droughts have become common in Iran, which have adversely affected Iran’s economy and food security, caused protests, and increased climate-induced migration. According to the Islamic Republic News Agency, in 2022 and 2023, about 800,000 people migrated from the country’s southern and central provinces to its northern provinces due to the impacts of climate change.
One of the areas most affected by droughts and water shortage is Sistan-Baluchistan, Iran’s second-largest province, which relies heavily on water from Afghanistan’s Helmand and Harirud rivers. Around 10,000 households migrated from Sistan-Baluchistan — particularly Zabol and nearby areas — to other parts of Iran in 2022. The following year, hundreds of people in this region protested against the Iranian government as the water crisis deepened. The protestors threatened the government, saying that the situation could become a “national security challenge.” In response, the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited the region in 2023 and warned Afghanistan’s leadership to take Iran’s water rights seriously.
In May 2023, after an armed clash between Iran and Afghanistan over water sharing, Iranian Deputy Director of Environmental Affairs Mojtaba Zuljodi warned that an “environmental and human catastrophe” was imminent in Sistan-Baluchistan. He also pointed out that the water diversion by Afghanistan negatively impacted the ecosystem and increased dust storms, affecting the health of Iranian residents.
Iran has repeatedly accused the former Afghan government and the current Taliban administration of not complying with the 1973 Helmand River Treaty. But conversely, in Afghanistan, political pressure has compelled the ruling regime to be cooperative with Iran or abide by the treaty. For instance, in 2022, some Afghans claimed that the Taliban administration was intentionally releasing extra water from the Helmand River in order to maintain favorable relations with Iran. However, the Taliban Ministry of Water and Energy then denied these accusations.
Precedent for Water as a Negotiating Factor
Transboundary waters hold great political significance in relations between upstream and downstream countries. During the inauguration of the Kamal Khan Dam — a hydroelectric and irrigation dam on the Helmand River in southwest Afghanistan — in March 2021, former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani emphasized that Afghanistan would no longer provide “free,” meaning “extra,” water to anyone, and that Iran should provide fuel to Afghanistan in return of water. Ghani’s statement highlights the tensions between Afghanistan and Iran on water accessibility. It is important to note that Afghan governments have always respected the 1973 Helmand River Treaty and committed not to squeeze water flow to Iran as specified in the treaty.
Water has been used as a negotiation tool by upstream countries in the past. In 2021, Turkey was accused of breaking its 1987 agreement with Iraq and Syria, where, as the upstream state, it would ensure a minimum of 500 cubic meters per second of the Euphrates River to Syria. In fact, Turkey has been accused of “weaponizing” water, yet some analysts believe that by limiting water into Syria, the Turkish government has been able to bring Syria to the negotiating table to limit its support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group. Similarly, in 2016, after an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir where 19 Indian soldiers were killed, India began reviewing its water treaty with Pakistan, and it was reported that New Delhi was “using the water issue to put pressure on Pakistan in the dispute over Kashmir.” India has indicated that it would like to negotiate the Indus Water Treaty, the bilateral treaty that was signed in 1960.
Afghanistan also has examples of the strategic value of water from its own history. For instance, Afghanistan had been excluded from Central Asian water institutions for several decades, causing significant challenges. In response, leveraging its status as an upstream state in the Amu Darya River basin, the Taliban started constructing the large Qosh Tepa irrigation canal as a strategic pressure tool to compel Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan to strengthen diplomatic and trade ties with Afghanistan. Similarly, Afghanistan can use the 1973 Helmand Treaty and the Kamal Khan Dam as a water regulatory tool to secure the safety of Afghan migrants and establish a more favorable relationship with Iran.
Mitigating Push Factors for Afghan Migrants
Using water as a tool to change state behavior comes with many complications. Iran and Afghanistan can and should address the root causes of irregular migration through dialogue and cooperation. Both countries must coordinate at the national level to formalize migration agreements and provide legal pathways. Importantly, public institutions, such as the Taliban Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, need more funding to enhance their capacity for the sustainable reintegration of returnees, thus preventing irregular remigration. Simultaneously, the Taliban also need to tackle the root causes of migration by providing employment and entrepreneurship opportunities and vocational training, especially for youth in provinces with higher rates of poverty and migration. Finally, since climate change is a key driver of migration from Afghanistan to neighboring countries, especially Iran, the Taliban administration needs to mitigate its impacts by providing safety nets for Afghans in need and developing standard early warning systems nationwide to prevent the loss of life and livelihoods.
Internationally, the United Nations should start a diplomatic campaign in the international community to stop Iran’s actions against Afghan migrants. The killing and mistreatment of Afghan refugees is against the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol. If Iran continues its actions, the UN Human Rights Council and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should raise the issue globally and advocate for targeted sanctions to pressure Iran into compliance. These efforts may be successful as Iran is already under economic strain and suffering from the impacts of climate change, including water scarcity.
Afghanistan Engaging in Water Diplomacy
Afghanistan could leverage its shared water resources with Iran to foster improved political relations and water diplomacy, encouraging better treatment of Afghan migrants. A careful and effective strategy would involve regulating water flow, not as an act of denial but to encourage bilateral cooperation to prevent water-related tensions, particularly in Sistan-Baluchistan, which is heavily reliant on water flow from Afghanistan. In such a water-scarce region, the strategic control of water flow could directly encourage Iranian officials to address Afghanistan’s concerns. Thus, through this approach, Afghanistan could incentivize dialogue with Iran without harming civilians’ rights or violating water treaty provisions and international water law principles.
Afghanistan could leverage its shared water resources with Iran to foster improved political relations and water diplomacy, encouraging better treatment of Afghan migrants. A careful and effective strategy would involve regulating water flow, not as an act of denial but to encourage bilateral cooperation to prevent water-related tensions […]
While Afghanistan’s water control measures should adhere to the 1973 Helmand River Treaty to fulfill its minimum obligations, they can also be strategically used to advocate for the better treatment of migrants. Afghanistan might compel Iran to pursue a collaborative win-win outcome by managing river flow. However, water diplomacy alone will not be enough for Afghanistan to stop the killing and mistreatment of its migrants. Comprehensive action involving bilateral exchange and the support of international organizations is needed to address the root causes of migration, build trust and cooperation between the riparian countries, and combat the impacts of climate change.
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Image 1: UN Women/Sayed Habib Bidell via Flickr
Image 2: Uni.Royal via Wikimedia Commons
