In the wake of the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan’s assessment of its deterrence requirements has shifted. The formation of a new Pakistan Army Rocket Force Command (PARFC) led by a three-star general reflects this change and aims to provide Pakistan with the ability to respond to the type of conventional strikes carried out by India during the May crisis. While this new force intends to strengthen both conventional and nuclear deterrence, the separation of conventional and nuclear forces could raise the risk of conventional conflict by reducing entanglement. Peace time mitigation measures are required to avert dangerous escalation in future crises.
Doctrinal Shift
Pakistan’s decision to establish a dedicated rocket force represents a significant doctrinal evolution in its military strategy. Previously, Pakistan focused on deterring a limited conventional war under a nuclear umbrella by introducing battlefield nuclear weapons. Critics argued this approach lowered the nuclear-use threshold and increased the risk of inadvertent use, theft, and accidents. In October 2015, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry linked the development of tactical nuclear weapons to deterring India from operationalizing strategies such as the Cold Start doctrine. Many Pakistani policymakers believe that these weapons have served as an effective deterrent to Indian limited conventional war aims. Even Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, former director general of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), asserted that tactical nuclear weapons have “blocked the avenues for serious military operation by the other side.”
“While this new force intends to strengthen both conventional and nuclear deterrence, the separation of conventional and nuclear forces could raise the risk of conventional conflict by reducing entanglement.”
However, the 2019 Balakot strikes and the 2025 conflict demonstrate that India has explored new options to employ force by relying solely on air power to strike targets inside Pakistan—without the deployment of ground forces envisioned under the Cold Start doctrine. Though a ceasefire was reached with alleged U.S. involvement on May 10, fighting with Pakistan is “only paused” and India will “retaliate on its own terms” in the future, according to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Indian analysts insist that this new normal is here to stay, and the creation of PARFC reflects this reality and Islamabad’s effort to expand its conventional capabilities accordingly.
Formation and Purpose of New Rocket Force
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced the formation of PARFC on August 13, 2025, during an event to mark the country’s Independence Day the next day, stating that the new force aims to “strike at the enemy from different directions” and will strengthen conventional deterrence. While no further details have been released yet, officials expect that PARFC will deliver conventional warheads against India, signaling Pakistan’s readiness for limited conventional war. An official from a military-affiliated think tank noted that the force will be led by a three-star general and will remain under the Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), a structure similar to that of the existing Army Air Defence Command.
Placing the new rocket force under the direct command of the COAS incorporates it as a branch of the conventional army. The PARFC seems to be expanding the existing artillery units of the Pakistani army and turning them into a cohesive force with the induction of enhanced rocket and missile capabilities. The move appears to draw on strategic learning from the May conflict and the June 2025 Iran-Israel war, where the importance of conventional long-range firepower was clearly demonstrated.
Crucially, the PARFC is designed to strike exclusively with conventional warheads. This separation likely aims to reduce ambiguity between conventional and nuclear deterrence, thereby lowering the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation between the two sides. Although evidence is inconclusive, keeping the new rocket force separate from nuclear forces suggests that Pakistan may dedicate some dual-capable assets solely to conventional roles. Pakistan is likely to equip this new rocket force with conventionally armed systems such as Fatah-1, Fatah-2 and Fatah-4 missiles. The first two have ranges of 140 to 400 kilometers while Fatah-4 is a cruise missile with a range of 700 kilometers. Pakistan also has the option to equip this force with other short range conventional missiles like Hatf-1 and Abdali, both with ranges under 500 kilometers.
Some observers have argued that this new force aims to respond at the operational level rather than fulfilling tactical or strategic deterrence objectives. However, the force also clearly seeks to deter future Indian attacks on assets in Pakistan by showing that Pakistan can reply in kind. PARFC does not appear designed to target adversary’s defense bunkers, artillery positions and armored convoys, which can be engaged by existing field artillery guns, self-propelled howitzers, and multiple launch rocket systems. Instead, the new rocket force seems to be focused on military targets deep inside India. Pakistan aims to create the perception that in any future conflict, even without nuclear escalation, military targets across India could be struck directly or indirectly. In the future, Pakistan may develop new long-range conventional missiles or may modify its existing long-range nuclear missile for conventional roles. According to Lt. Gen Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry, the director general of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), “this time, we will start from the east of India […] they (India) also need to understand that they can be struck everywhere.” This statement indicates that Pakistan’s military posture and targeting is evolving, making a change in strategy inevitable.
Deterrence Implications
For now, Pakistan’s new rocket force appears poised to enhance both conventional and nuclear deterrence. First, separating the rocket force from nuclear forces may signal Pakistan’s intent to avoid nuclear escalation by clearly distinguishing its conventional and nuclear forces, reducing the risk of triggering a new strategic dilemma for India. Unlike in the past, when Pakistan’s introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons to counter India’s Cold Start doctrine ostensibly led India to develop counterforce capabilities, this separation could provide greater stability.
Second, in the event of conventional Indian strikes on Pakistan’s nuclear assets, Islamabad would now have the option to retaliate with conventional missiles at a similar intensity, adding an intermediate layer before the nuclear rung is climbed and striking comparable targets. During the May 2025 conflict, India claimed to have struck important airbases of Pakistan such as Mushaf Air Base in Sargodha, Noor Khan airbase in Rawalpindi, and Bholari and Sukkur in Sindh. Pakistan had limited ability to retaliate against these strikes. With India’s significant strategic depth, Pakistan has previously relied on long-range nuclear-capable missiles for deep strikes against India, which are under the control of the SPD with their use requiring approval from the National Command Authority (Pakistan’s apex nuclear decisionmaking body). As such, using these missiles could lead to inadvertent nuclear escalation and diplomatic calls for restraint from global powers. In this context, the addition of long-range conventional missiles now provides more credible options to Pakistan’s army for conventional retaliation against India.
“In the event of conventional Indian strikes on Pakistan’s nuclear assets, Islamabad would now have the option to retaliate with conventional missiles at a similar intensity, adding an intermediate layer before the nuclear rung is climbed.”
Entanglement Dilemma
The PARFC likely seeks to reduce uncertainty arising from conventional-nuclear entanglement. However, maintaining a clear separation of forces could in fact weaken conventional deterrence. Critics argue that distinguishing conventional and nuclear forces may make limited war more likely by reducing nuclear escalation risks, thereby encouraging India to carry out conventional operations akin to or even beyond Sindoor-style strikes.
Proponents of entanglement would thus recommend integrating the rocket force with nuclear forces. But this approach could make such systems legitimate targets for India’s conventional strikes, increasing the risk of deterrence failure—a scenario more plausible in South Asia where limited conflicts are much more frequent than in the U.S.-China context.
Importantly, Pakistan can still accrue some benefits from entanglement even as it signals separation via the creation of a distinct rocket force under the command of the conventional army. Dual-use systems and co-deployment with nuclear forces could contribute to ambiguity, reducing India’s willingness to exploit this new rung on the escalation ladder. But walking this entanglement tight rope inevitably involves tradeoffs between deterrence and escalation risks—averting escalation in future scenarios will depend heavily on Indian perceptions of the new rocket force.
With the potential for rising escalation risks, peace time measures for enhancing crisis stability are essential. While restoring political and diplomatic dialogue would improve bilateral ties, specific confidence-building measures are also necessary. Though India and Pakistan have already agreed not to attack each other’s designated nuclear facilities and installations, the two sides could also opt in to a policy of mutual restraint of not attacking certain strategically sensitive military bases to reduce the risk of misperception and inadvertent nuclear escalation. Second, both sides can enhance understanding about the role of such conventional forces by revealing specific missiles with their payload capabilities and range to reduce risky perceptions. In the future, India may also be incentivized to separate its dual-use delivery and defense systems to reduce risk of conventional-nuclear entanglement. The separation of conventional and nuclear forces by both sides could help prevent such entanglement in any future conflict.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
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Image 1: Picryl
Image 2: Wikimedia Commons
