In September 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House, the most visible sign yet of warming U.S.-Pakistan relations. The leaders’ meeting capped months of quiet exchanges that began with Trump’s gratitude for Pakistan’s assistance in apprehending the perpetrators of the Abbey Gate bombing, and symbolized a thaw in a bilateral relationship that had been icy for nearly a decade. Recent shocks to Pakistan’s security and economic predicament, most notably its four-day war with India in May, more than likely had a role in catalyzing its efforts to diversify its economic and security partnerships. The United States’ enduring regional security concerns and newfound interest in Pakistani oil and mineral resources, combined with Pakistan’s masterful personal diplomacy toward the Trump administration, have all drawn Washington closer to Islamabad.
At first glance, renewed U.S.–Pakistan relations might appear to threaten China’s influence in Islamabad. Yet Beijing’s reaction has been relatively understated. Chinese officials and state media have emphasized continuity, insisting that the “all-weather friendship” remains unchanged and that U.S. outreach does not challenge China’s primacy. This confidence reflects Beijing’s calculation that Pakistan’s tactical romance with Washington will neither supplant nor diminish China’s position as Islamabad’s most consistent and consequential partner. In fact, given the difficulties facing the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), U.S. assistance in stabilizing Pakistan’s precarious economy might even be welcomed in Beijing.
Pakistan’s Security Shocks and the Turn to Washington
Pakistan’s outreach to the United States cannot be understood in isolation from the succession of crises that have shaken its national security landscape over the past year.
The brief but destabilizing Israel-Iran conflict earlier this year rattled the wider region and exacerbated Pakistan’s already precarious energy security. Such anxieties have been compounded by Pakistan’s struggle with internal security issues, notably militancy in Balochistan and the escalating spillover of terrorist violence from Afghanistan. Border provinces in Pakistan have endured waves of attacks from an emboldened Tehreek-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) since the Afghan Taliban returned to power in Kabul, straining Pakistani security forces and eroding public confidence in the government.
“At first glance, renewed U.S.–Pakistan relations might appear to threaten China’s influence in Islamabad. Yet Beijing’s reaction has been relatively understated.”
Most damaging was Pakistan’s four-day skirmish with India in May, which exposed shortcomings in Islamabad’s ability to respond to New Delhi’s kinetic escalations, adding urgency to efforts to expand and diversify sources of foreign support. It was perhaps instinctual for Pakistan to turn to the United States, as Washington has historically played an important role in South Asian crisis management. Beyond the immediate context of the May conflict, decades of close counterinsurgency cooperation have cemented institutional links, rendering the United States a natural partner for Pakistan. In addition to the security logic, better access to U.S. financing, technical know-how, and markets is likely seen as a potential boon for Pakistan’s ailing economy.
Field Marshal Asim Munir—hailed as the most powerful man in Pakistan—has since been a frequent visitor to Washington. His three high-profile trips since June underscored both the military-centric nature of U.S.-Pakistan ties and Washington’s renewed interest in dialogue. By July, the two sides inked a trade deal that included opening the door to U.S. investments aimed at tapping Pakistan’s underdeveloped oil fields and minerals.
Beijing’s Waning Economic Enthusiasm Towards Pakistan
China remains indispensable for Pakistan, but cracks have become visible in their relationship. While the first phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) brought ambitious infrastructure projects, the second appears more restrained, with new investments slowed by concerns over Pakistan’s political instability, mounting debt, and grievances over persistent security threats to Chinese nationals.
Chinese analysts acknowledge these constraints. Insurgent attacks in Balochistan have disrupted energy projects, and Chinese workers have been targeted in terrorist bombings. At home, China’s slowing growth and ongoing fiscal restructuring are likely to have dampened Beijing’s enthusiasm for bankrolling large-scale overseas commitments, and gives it additional impetus to evaluate its more precarious foreign development and aid initiatives.
For Islamabad, China’s hesitance is worrying. It exposes the pitfalls of overreliance on a single patron, and has ostensibly nudged Pakistani leaders to hedge by reviving ties with the United States and expanding its partnership with Saudi Arabia. For Beijing, the restructuring of CPEC is meant to be pragmatic; to reduce the exposure of its development aid to political and security risks in Pakistan. Thus, Washington’s role in Pakistan’s stabilization—particularly in counterterrorism and energy development—can in some ways be seen as complementary to rather than threatening Beijing’s position in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Opportunistic Diplomacy
By expanding cooperation with the United States, Pakistani leaders hope to stay in the Trump administration’s good graces, receive economic aid, secure military assistance, and gain diplomatic flexibility without sacrificing their core partnership with China. Islamabad’s flirtation with Washington should thus be understood as a tactical adjustment, not a sea change in its strategic thinking. Pakistan is diversifying—securing short-term economic relief, keeping military channels open, and signaling to China that it retains options.
This opportunism coincides with President Trump’s own frustrations with India, driven by deadlocked bilateral trade talks, New Delhi’s refusal to credit Washington for mediating a ceasefire with Islamabad, and India’s purchases of Russian oil despite Western sanctions. These frictions create an opening for Pakistan, which presents itself as a willing partner at a time when U.S.-India relations are under strain.
Beijing likely has a tacit understanding that Pakistan has an interest in extracting benefits from both the United States and China. Pakistan’s security and economic needs are vast and multidimensional, and U.S. aid or investment in rare earths or energy security will not fundamentally undermine China’s central role in infrastructure, energy, and defense. So far, the U.S. government has pledged just USD $1.25 million in financing to developing Pakistan’s rare earths, which pales in comparison to the initial tranche of USD $8.5 billion promised by China as part of CPEC 2.0. Thus, U.S. support complements, but does not supplant, Chinese development aid and may serve to relieve some portion of China’s assistance burden in Pakistan.
On the other hand, Islamabad has steadily issued affirmations that its dealings with Washington won’t tread on Beijing’s interests in Pakistan, notably in response to reports in October of last year that Pakistan was shipping rare earths to the United States. Going forward, continued reassurances and clear carve outs for Chinese interests—especially in sensitive sectors like critical minerals—are conceivably necessary for Pakistan to allay any concerns that Beijing might have about Islamabad’s budding partnership with Washington.
Beijing’s Response: The Usual Playbook
U.S.-Pakistan relations have historically been spotty and opportunistic, as demonstrated by their waxing and waning with U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. The United States turns to Pakistan when it needs logistical support or counterterrorism cooperation but disengages when interests wane—something that Chinese state media has taken pains to highlight. As such, there is little reason for Beijing to expect a durable U.S. commitment this time around.
China, by contrast, has been willing to take the long view. Beijing has endured as Islamabad’s most consequential security partner, and China’s CPEC investments in Pakistan—from the construction of Gwadar Port to energy corridors—have spanned decades despite significant implementation struggles. The depth of this engagement signals long-run mutual commitment, even if Islamabad moves to diversify its partners.
Importantly, China has refrained from publicly criticizing Pakistan for its outreach to the United States, and has instead doubled down on high-level engagement with Islamabad to signal its commitment to their relationship. Since Munir’s June trip to Washington last year, Chinese and Pakistani officials have met no fewer than five times at the ministerial or higher level.
“Beijing’s strategic ties with Islamabad are too deep and durable to be displaced by a temporary thaw with Washington.”
Furthermore, defense cooperation remains the backbone of the relationship—most recently demonstrated by the critical role that China played in institutional cooperation and equipment and intelligence sharing with Pakistan during the May 2025 conflict with India. Co-production schemes, arms exports, and/or technical assistance for armaments ranging from Islamabad’s nuclear program and ballistic missiles, principle surface combatants, submarines, main battle tanks, and fighter aircraft serve as symbols of Pakistan’s faith in Chinese military industrial prowess. These deep-rooted defense ties cannot be readily supplanted by the United States.
Meanwhile, Beijing is doing its own tactical diplomacy in South Asia. On August 29 last year, China welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for talks—part of a broader effort to deescalate tensions with New Delhi and present a united front in the face of U.S. tariff policy. Beijing’s economic and diplomatic heft gives it the means to simultaneously cultivate Pakistan whilst seeking détente with India, highlighting its adaptive South Asia strategy.
Confident China
The U.S.–Pakistan rapprochement is real but limited. For Islamabad, it is a pragmatic response to insecurity—an attempt to secure partners amidst an economic downturn, rising militancy, and pressure from India. For Washington, the renewed engagement reflects transactional interests, from counterterrorism coordination to selective economic cooperation to capture opportunities for energy and critical minerals.
For China, however, this moment represents continuity, not disruption. Beijing’s strategic ties with Islamabad are too deep and durable to be displaced by a temporary thaw with Washington. If the U.S. share of Pakistan’s stabilization burden grows, China also benefits from a more secure Pakistan as a more reliable and capable strategic partner.
As a result, Beijing appears neither alarmed nor antagonized by Islamabad’s diplomatic flexibility. China understands its relationship with Pakistan to be built on long-term strategic alignment, institutional ties, and defense cooperation. The U.S.–Pakistan honeymoon may shift short-term geopolitical dynamics, but it does not alter the structural reality: China’s role in Pakistan remains entrenched and enduring.
Views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
Also Read: Pakistan’s Rare Earth Ambitions Meet China’s Export Controls
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Image 1: PRC State Council
Image 2: White House
