Once considered a factor of stability during the height of the Cold War, the global arms control architecture is now all but crumbling. In South Asia, arms control has always remained elusive, and the prospects for the future seem slimmer than ever. To Pakistani scholar Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, however, bilateral arms control between India and Pakistan is still South Asia’s best bet. He makes this argument at the end of his latest book entitled Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia: Politics, Postures, & Practices. Reviewing existing theories and debates such as nuclear mythmaking and proliferation optimism versus pessimism, the book does a good job of tracing trends and transformations in nuclear politics. To make the book more readable, Jaspal dedicates chapters to explaining the concepts of deterrence and compellence and the postures of nuclear weapons states, with a focus on India and Pakistan. However, even though the central thesis of the book that successful arms control arrangements between the two countries are much-needed rings true, their likelihood is low due to a hostile geopolitical environment, India’s nuclear modernization, and the limited utility of traditional arms control.
A Dangerous Nuclear Status Quo
India’s growing nuclear capabilities and risk-acceptant behavior, coupled with Pakistan’s bid to retaliate at each level, will increase the likelihood of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation in South Asia. To understand this, it is instructive to look back at the threat of missile strikes during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis.
To Jaspal, India’s nuclear posture is part of its compellence strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. It centers on India using nuclear-laden threats to persuade Islamabad to take actions that are favorable to New Delhi, as Jaspal reminds readers India did during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis. He writes that India “used the threat of nuclear force to elicit desirable behavior from Pakistan since the disclosure of its conventional force limitations in a post-Pulwama military standoff.” Jaspal’s analysis is accurate, as evidenced by subsequent revelations about Pakistan believing India had readied missiles to target Pakistan during the standoff. That India was reportedly contemplating missile strikes after being unable to force Pakistan to release India’s pilot points to the increasing salience of nuclear weapons in its compellence strategy. While threatening missile strikes does not necessarily signal a willingness to use nuclear weapons, it certainly increases the perceptive risk of doing so. One reason is the impossibility of ascertaining whether an incoming missile contains a nuclear warhead or not. The second and more important reason is that Pakistan would have retaliated to India’s missile strikes with those of its own – and when nuclear-armed states hurl missiles at each other, nuclear use cannot be ruled out.
Against this backdrop, India’s nuclear modernization is doubly concerning for Pakistan. According to scholars Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, Indian missiles equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are capable of “increasing the prospects for successful counterforce strikes” against Pakistan. Therefore, MIRVing its missile inventory will give India more credible options to issue compellent threats to Pakistan.
India’s growing nuclear capabilities and risk-acceptant behavior, coupled with Pakistan’s bid to retaliate at each level, will increase the likelihood of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation in South Asia.
Thereafter, Jaspal examines Pakistan’s nuclear posture. He explains that Pakistan’s nuclear posture, which includes an unwritten doctrine, has sought to ensure that India does not undermine its deterrence mix. Shedding light on Pakistan’s Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD), he argues that it centers on giving the country full coverage of both India’s landmass and range of targets. That being said, while arguing that the “Plus” in Pakistan’s Quid Pro Quo Plus strategy has been kept deliberately ambiguous, Jaspal could have articulated more clearly how this ambiguity surrounding the scale of Pakistan’s response will deter India from taking escalatory military actions, as well as any potential risks it carries.
The situation in South Asia is expected to become more precarious due to the advent of emerging technologies. Jaspal writes that the integration of emerging technologies in the conventional and nuclear forces of both India and Pakistan will exacerbate an India-Pakistan arms race and upset the hierarchy of escalation. One of the examples Jaspal gives is India’s effort to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) in the military domain. Pakistan is also doing the same, albeit at a smaller scale. If left unchecked, this could turn into a destabilizing arms race, one that will weaken strategic stability.
The Untenable Proposition of Arms Control
In light of these increasing nuclear dangers, Jaspal advocates for bilateral arms control agreements between India and Pakistan. He argues that absent arms control, a subversive nuclear arms race in South Asia will make strategic stability more fragile. Certainly, the case for arms control is strong. Successful arms control arrangements strengthen deterrence and stabilize dyadic relations. Given unending hostilities between the two nuclear titans, arms control is a useful way to bring temperatures down in South Asia.
However, the dangerous nuclear and geopolitical environment in South Asia is not conducive to successful arms control negotiations. Weeks after the Pulwama-Balakot crisis terminated, India’s premier Narendra Modi flaunted his country’s nuclear weapons, reminding Pakistan that they are not meant for celebrating Diwali, an Indian festival in which firecrackers are used. This was coupled with threats to retake Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir from Pakistan. More worryingly, statements by senior Indian officials casting doubt on the future of India’s highly touted No First Use policy add to Pakistan’s strategic anxiety. For its part, India might feel that Pakistan’s bid to induct a menu of retaliatory options, including low-yield nuclear weapons, is destabilizing. Further, the absence of dialogue between the two countries is evidence enough of the challenges each side will face in even coming to the table for arms control negotiations.
Second, India’s ongoing nuclear modernization efforts, despite not being solely meant for Pakistan, are increasing the trust deficit between the two countries, leaving little room for negotiating arms control arrangements. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India’s nuclear stockpile surpassed Pakistan’s in 2024. SIPRI also notes that India’s “recent moves towards placing missiles in canisters and conducting sea-based deterrence patrols suggest that India could be shifting in the direction of mating some of its warheads with their launchers in peacetime.” India’s back-to-back successful tests of the Agni-V and Agni-P ballistic missiles corroborate SIPRI’s findings, representing monumental nuclear modernization efforts. Given that these missiles add to India’s nuclear targeting capabilities, Pakistan cannot be expected to remain oblivious. As a result, an action-reaction syndrome will continue to shape this nuclear rivalry.
Another challenge lies in the mechanics of arms control. Traditional arms control measures may not be well-suited to South Asia. This is primarily because of two reasons. First, unlike the Soviet Union and the United States, India and Pakistan do not have thousands of warheads and delivery vehicles, making number-cutting an uncomfortable and potentially risky affair. Second, even if both countries reduce their stockpiles, strategic stability will not increase because of geographic proximity, unresolved disputes, the advent of emerging technologies, and an ever-widening distrust.
Finally, China cannot be completely bypassed while exploring the possibility of arms control in the region. The author’s assessment of India’s nuclear posture does not fully account for China’s nuclear modernization. By virtue of being one of India’s main adversaries, China merits due attention in any analysis about the former’s nuclear-related developments. As China modernizes it nuclear forces, albeit to achieve greater strategic leverage vis-à-vis the United States, India will be pressured into modernizing its own nuclear forces. This strategic chain, which starts at the global level, cannot be ignored while discussing India’s and, consequently, Pakistan’s nuclear postures. All this will not augur well for arms control as India could refuse proposals related to it citing concerns about China’s expanding nuclear forces. And because India will buttress its nuclear armory, Pakistan will be forced to follow suit.
Toward Nuclear Risk Reduction
Although the author supports arms control between India and Pakistan, he does not suggest any substantive agreements or frameworks. This is a major lacuna in Jaspal’s book that other scholars can fill. However, to be fair to Jaspal, he uses a broader definition of arms control, which includes efforts to build confidence and increase transparency. Still, Jaspal could have explained the ideal kinds of arms control mechanisms that both sides may explore. It would have complemented his chapter on emerging technologies, not least because regulating them will be central to all arms control mechanisms going forward.
As China modernizes it nuclear forces, albeit to achieve greater strategic leverage vis-à-vis the United States, India will be pressured into modernizing its own nuclear forces. This strategic chain, which starts at the global level, cannot be ignored while discussing India’s and, consequently, Pakistan’s nuclear postures.
There is, however, a bevy of arms control and risk reduction measures that can be explored between India and Pakistan. Limiting the deployment of MIRVed-missiles or ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems can be a very effective arms control measure. While MIRVed-missiles give safer targeting options to an aggressor, BMD systems upset the balance of vulnerabilities by making their possessors relatively less vulnerable to potential retaliatory missile strikes. Therefore, in the India-Pakistan context, it makes sense to limit their stockpiling and deployment. Such proposals might be worth considering because both countries have shown a willingness to reduce nuclear risks. Amidst instability and crises, there have been instances when both have behaved responsibly. In their latest co-authored paper, Rabia Akhtar and Ruhee Neog talk about one of those, the 1988 Non-Attack Agreement (NAA) between India and Pakistan. They dub it “a positive, albeit small, step toward broader stability in South Asia.” While this consistent compliance with the NAA is critical to preventing nuclear war, it should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of nuclear risk reduction in South Asia. If anything, the durability of the NAA has been overshadowed by a host of dangerous developments. All this does not portend a bright future for arms control in South Asia.
Also Read: Agni-V: The New MIRV Race in South Asia
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Image 1: Ministry of Defence, India
Image 2: Picryl
